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PREFACE 
Swaziland is in many ways a unique country on the African 
scene. The last African state to receive political independence 
from colonial Britain (in September,1968), it has since been 
politically and socially dominated by the considerable personage 
of the world's longest reigning Monarch, His Majesty King Sobhuza 11. 
The King, with absolute sway in the traditional sphere, is also 
proving a considerable binding force for a Nation being atomised 
by the forces of westernization. The Nation, a single tribe, is a 
relatively small one of approximately 520,000 population in a 
country of just over 6400 square miles. 
Process is,of course,no respector of scale and as has been pointed 
out on a number of occasions, Swaziland duplicates many of the 
phenomena and dynamics of Independent Africa at large. For the 
student its size becomes a distinct advantage since it represents 
a compact laboratory which encapsulates much of the African past 
and present. 
Swaziland has been my periodic home for the last twelve years. I 
was fortunate to be there during the 'heady' days of independence 
in 1968 and to experience at first hand the dissolution of many 
of the pernicious racial barriers which had been allowed to 
penetrate from neighbouring South Africa during the colonial period. 
In the years since one has been made aware of the signs of increasing 
prosperity and material welfare and a 'booming economy'. 
viii 
In recent years, as knowledge of the country has increased and 
a more perceptive eye hopefully gained, it has become increasingly 
obvious that the greater prosperity is the preserve of a privileged 
few, that the economy is controlled by the forces of multi-national 
capital way beyond Swazi reach and that deep internal social 
contradictions are developing in the country. In addition, regional 
inequalities in health and wealth have if anything intensified and 
what was once called the colonial legacy - its distinctive human 
landscape - is still very much present. 
In African studies as a whole there has been a growing awareness over 
the last decade that much of Africa is de facto still colonial; at 
least still tending to serve the purposes of the former European 
colonial power. 
A desire to uncover the nature and implications of these purposes 
in Swaziland has led to a growing interest in the Swazi past. This 
interest has been fuelled by the geographer's appraisal that the 
human landscape bears the visible imprint of these purposes as 
they were worked out during the colonial period. It is within this 
interest area that the objectives of this thesis were framed. 
Research for this thesis was undertaken during leave of absence 
from Wilfrid Laurier University from August 1977 to January 1978. 
The time was evenly divided between Britain,where research was 
primarily archival, and Swaziland, where archival research was 
coloured by first hand experience and by conversation with both 
black and white within the country. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"Swaziland is an unusual country,in some ways quite unique." 
Sir Alfred Pease,1914. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this research paper must be viewed in 
the context of the new research field of African historical 
geography, particularly as it relates to the contribution of 
defunct colonialism to the geography of newly-independent states. 
This objective is,in essence, to provide a deeper historical and 
geographical understanding of the arrangement, patterning and 
organisation of space in contemporary Swaziland. In particular, 
it seeks explanations for a distinctive pattern of land owner-
ship and control, and the relationship of this pattern to the 
space-economy of development. 
The use of an orthodox developmental perspective on Third 
World spatial organisation, even were a coherent one to exist, 
appears doomed to flounder on the rocks of classic ideological 
bias and abstracted empiricism as previous studies of spatial 
2 
organisation in Swaziland have done. The search for alternative 
modes of explanation was triggered in the first place by the 
realization of persistent and intensified regional and social 
inequalities in the post-colonial period and by the fact that 
the first decade of independence (1968-78) has witnessed no 
substantial reorganisation of colonial space and hence,presumably, 
also of its underlying structure. 
2 
The penetration of Marxian-structuralist interpretations of 
colonialism, imperialism and development/underdevelopment into 
geography in the recent past (post 1970) have, however, provided 
a new range of theoretical constructs which appear to have much 
greater explanatory depth in the analysis of spatial organisation 
3 
in the Third World. Commitment to such a mode of explanation, 
with its fundamental emphasis on historicity, would also breath 
new life into the stagnant state of African historical geography. 
In this initial chapter of the study the basic geographical 
patterns in Swaziland are constructed as a contemporary backdrop 
to the historical emphases of this dissertation (1.3). This 
follows an outline of the basic aims and intentions in attempting 
to construct the underlying structures of spatial organisation 
in the historical context (1.2). Data used and methodology 
deployed are discussed (1.4) and a summary of the structure of 
the thesis presented (1.5). 
1.2 SUMMARY OF INTENT 
In pursuit of the primary objective of this dissertation 
postulated in 1.1 above the following focii need to be enunciated. 
In the historical context of the thesis, it is intended to try and 
establish the association and connections between regional 
and international economic and social forces and the organisation 
of space at the local level, within Swaziland. This has already 
been attempted for a number of other countries in Africa (see 
Chapter Two). It will entail the construction and analysis of 
the process of European capitalist penetration of Swaziland for 
3 
the colonial period; looking at the agents of capital and their 
links within the metropolis and with the colonial state, and at 
the aims of capital in relation to methods of surplus appropriat-
ion, prospective and realised. 
At the local level the study will explore the particular 
way in which space was organised in Swaziland in response to 
the implicit and articulated social and economic aspirations of 
a metropolitan settler class in relation to control over land, 
labour and raw materials. Examination of the details of land 
alienation and partition, as proposed and implemented, will 
reveal the ways in which an apparently unordered spatial array 
is, in reality, the product of an ordered social and economic 
structure of capitalist integration. 
To mitigate a total Eurocentric bias it is further intended 
to pinpoint the areas of value conflict between imposed and 
indigeneous systems and to show how the will of the former 
inexorably dominated at points of conflict. It is proposed that 
the empirical focii of the thesis be sited in neo-Marxian 
structuralist conceptualisations of social and economic reality 
as an integrating explanatory framework. 
1.3 CONTEMPORARY SPATIAL ORGANISATION 
Swaziland has existed as a definite political entity 
since the 1870's. Its location in relation to other southern 
African states and its small size are illustrated in Map One. 
It was ruled as a British colony from 1902 - 1968; receiving 
formal political independence from Britain on 9th September,1968. 
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General elections in the same year under a Westminster-style 
constitution returned the Imbokodvo National Movement, with 
its leader the traditional monarch Sobhuza 11, to power. After 
the 1972 elections, the King suspended the constitution and 
disbanded parliament as a prelude to investing supreme 
legislative powers in himself. This autocracy has continued 
4 
to the present . Economically, the country is committed 
to its colonial inheritance of dependence on South Africa for 
imports and its neo-colonial status as a supplier of raw 
5 
materials for the western capitalist world 
As regards internal spatial patterning, Webster,Murdoch & 
Lawrance (1968), I'ons (1967) and Murdoch (1970) all give some 
indication of the environmental diversity prevailing in Swazi-
land. But it has become common practice in the heterogeneous 
mass of secondary accounts to divide the country up into four 
north-south running natural belts, clearly distinguished by 
several environmental indicators (Table One and Map Two). 
Superimposed over this pattern of spatial environmental 
diversity, and not totally unrelated to it, is a complex and 
dynamic patchwork of land holding and ownership. Two general 
categories of land holding can be identified, based on 
diametrically opposed principles of holding and ownership; 
1. Individual Tenure Land (I.T.L.),which is held under freehold 
or leasehold by international capitalist corporations (10% of 
the total area) and individual white owners,resident and 
absentee (32%) . In 1974, there were 589 farms and estates. 
Of these a mere 35 covered 60% of I.T.L., or almost one-quarter 
6 
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TABLE ONE 
THE NATURAL BELTS OF SWAZILAND 
HIGHVELD 
MIDDLEVELD 
LOWVELD 
LUBOMBO 
AREA 
(sq.km.) 
5 2 0 0 
4 7 0 0 
6 2 0 0 
1400 
ELEVATION(m) 
MEAN RANGE 
1 2 0 0 
600 
270 
550 
7 9 0 - 1 8 2 0 
3 3 0 - 1 0 5 0 
8 0 - 7 5 0 
4 0 - 9 0 0 
MEAN ANNUAL 
TEMP.( F . ) 
60 
67 
72 
68 
MEAN ANNUAL 
RAIN.(mm) 
1 0 0 0 - 2 3 0 0 
7 5 0 - 1 1 5 0 
5 0 0 - 9 0 0 
6 0 0 - 1 0 0 0 
DROUGHT 
HAZARD % 
20 
2 0 - 4 5 
4 0 - 8 0 
4 0 - 6 0 
% of years with less than 635mm rainfall, 
Source: Murdoch(1970),Hughes(19 
FIGURE I 
TOPOGRAPHIC SECTION ACROSS SWAZILAND 
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of the total area of Swaziland. 
2. Swazi Nation Land (S.N.L.), which is held "in trust" for 
the Swazi nation by the monarch. Individual ownership of land 
is consequently not practised. Land allocation and tenurial 
practice is still largely traditional within the bounds of a 
complex social framework elaborated by Hughes (1964,1972) and 
O 
Kuper (1966). It comprises land allocated to the Swazi in 
1907 by the British colonial state and subsequent extensions 
during the colonial period. Also included are extensions since 
1968 (11% of total area). 
The breakdown of control between these types of land 
holding is portrayed in Table Two and Map Three. 
A number of other spatial configurations tie in closely 
with this basic subdivision of space. These include population 
distribution, landscape form and functional organisation. 
As regards distribution and density of population,Murdoch 
(1970) writes that "the overriding factor determining gaps in 
the network of homesteads has been the 1907 partition" (p.62). 
Table Three illustrates the clear difference between S.N.L. 
and I.T.L. in population holding. A demographic analysis is 
still more enlightening. This reveals that the male : female 
ratio on S.N.L. is 75 : 100, on I.T.L. it is 126 : 100, and 
in urban areas 192 : 100. These are startling differences 
which indicate the existence of a marked differential migration 
9 
pattern in the colonial period (Map Four). 
Second,with reference to landscape appearance,inspection 
of the 1972 Swaziland Ministry of Agriculture air photo coverage 
9 
TABLE TWO 
DISTRIBUTION OF LAND HOLDING,1976 
ACRES 
2.461.250 
461,250 
2,000,000 
1.879.750 
23,250 
559,200 
458,500 
56TOTAL AREA 
57 
11 
46 
43 
1 
32 
10 
SWAZI NATION LAND 
of which; 
Tibiyo Fund,Govnt. 
Stations etc. 
Land held or grazed 
by Swazi farmers 
INDIVIDUAL TENURE LAND 
of which; 
Urban land 
Title Farms 
Corporation Title 
Source : Swaziland Ministry of Agriculture,Land Planning 
Section. 
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SWAZILAND DIVISION OF LAND 
CONTROL ,1975 
CHI Swazi Nation Land 
O I T H Land 
• I Multi National Corp. Land 
d ! Gov. Farms 
10 
~MTles 
20 
-_1 
Source ; Ministry of Agriculture, Mbabane 
MAP THREE 
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TABLE THREE 
SWAZI POPULATION DISTRIBUTION,1966 
HIGHVELD 
MIDDLEVELD 
LOWVELD 
LUBOMBO 
Total 
POP.( 
SNL 
65 
135 
64 
16 
279 
•000s) 
ITL 
48 
28 
32 
4 
113 
SQUARE 
SNL 
770 
1190 
1420 
270 
3650 
MILES 
ITL 
1230 
590 
980 
270 
3070 
DENSITY 
SNL 
84 
113 
45 
60 
76 
(per 
ITL 
39 
48 
33 
15 
37 
sg.mi 
ALL 
57 
92 
40 
37 
58 
Source : Jones (1968). 
12 
DENSITY PER SQ MIL 
m over 150 
E H 75 150 
EZD 40 7A 
I I under 40 
"A A L 
miles 20 
SOURCE: FAIR ETAL (1969) 
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shows up the visible differences between Swazi rural landscape 
with its dispersed settlement pattern and the larger-scale 
commercial farms and plantations . 
Most striking,however, is the functional variation. Table 
Four illustrates the major differences between tenurial type 
in terms of agricultural practice. As regards total agricultural 
G.D.P., almost 60% comes from I.T.L. while about 39% originates 
from S.N.L..Of the total area of land under I.T.L. control (43% 
of Swaziland) only 6.8% is crop cultivated (3.1% is sugar 
plantations). Of the area under cultivation, nearly 60% is 
owned by only 20 farms or estates . Thus agricultural production 
is the dominant preserve of 20-35 estates (a number of which 
are completely owned by foreign capital), while considerable 
areas of unused or under-utilised land are locked-up outside the 
12 
control of the Swazi nation . S.N.L.,on which 76% of the 
total population reside, are characterised on the other hand 
by over-population, over-grazing and concommitant environmental 
degradation. In 19 76, 65% of rural Swazi families were 
unable to satisfy minimum required levels of nutrition and 
13 imports of maize reached an all-time high of $ 1.6 million 
It is possible to be somewhat more definitive about the 
structure of the contemporary space-economy under capitalist 
development. This was first analysed by Fair,Murdoch and 
Jones (1969) who identified four "core development regions", 
but which are better referred to as zones of intensive 
14 capitalist articulation . These zones are delimited on Map 
Five. The severe regional imbalances which they represent are 
14 
TABLE FOUR 
LAND USE AND MAJOR CROPS (1975) 
SWAZI NATION LAND 
Land Use (%) 
Cultivation 
Fallow 
Homesteads 
Grazing 
12.2 
2.7 
0.6 
84.5 
Major Crops(%) 
Maize 
Groundnuts 
Sorghum 
Beans 
Others 
76.9 
8.2 
4.9 
1.7 
8.3 
INDIVIDUAL TENURE LAND 
Cultivation 
Fallow 
Grazing 
Forests 
Other Land 
6.8 
1.3 
70.4 
16.0 
5.5 
Sugar Cane 
Cotton 
Maize 
Rice 
Citrus 
Others 
42.5 
17.0 
14.4 
6.3 
5.6 
4.2 
Source: Central Statistical Offie 
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highlighted by the following statistics; 
(i) These zones comprise 15% of the total area of the country 
and contained,in 1966, 24% of the Swazi and 75% of the white 
populations 
(ii) Land in these zones is 95% non-Swazi controlled. 
(iii) These zones were together responsible for 91% of G.D.P. 
in 1975 and accounted for 92% of the total value of exports in 
the same year 
(iv) The flow of foreign private capital investment and foreign 
aid since 1968 has continued to be almost exclusively towards 
these zones. These are therefore the zones of most intense 
surplus extraction. The International Labour Organisation 
estimates that external payments of foreign-owned corporations 
1 7 
were at least $ 22 million in 1974 (as high as 20% of G.D.P.) . 
Foreign domination of the economy and the consequent external 
conditions of dependency are examined by Fransman(1973) and Crush(1977). 
(v) Almost 93% of the total wage-earning labour force of 61,000 
is located in these zones (84% of which is unskilled or semi-
skilled). 
(v) Per capita incomes show sharp regional inequalities. The 
15% of the population in urban areas/corporation towns received 
43% of the total personal income; the 20% on I.T.L. received 
16% of the total; whereas the remaining 62% accounted for only 
1 8 18% . There are also wide income discrepancies between the 
white/black urban-based middle class and the wage labourers 
within the four zones. 
(vi) The sex-age structure of the population is significantly 
different between these zones and the rural periphery. 
16 
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(vii) government expenditure on services,infrastructure,housing 
19 and so on is heavily biased towards the capitalist cores 
The poorly-developed transport infrastructure of the country 
(except in the Mbabane-Manzini region) is a reflection of the 
external orientation of the capitalist zones. The lack of 
internal integration is shown up by Maasdorp(197l) in a traffic 
flow study. The railway serves purely as an agency for export 
of the products of foreign exploitation. 
This background information on the contemporary spatial 
structure of Swaziland highlights the existence of considerable 
regional inequalities within the country and also suggests that 
the arrangement of contemporary space is controlled by the 
social and economic processes of integration into the international 
capitalist system. The argument to be sustained in this thesis 
is that this link between capital and spatial structure is not 
merely a contemporary phenomenon or indeed only a function of 
the advent of the multi-national corporation since 1940. It is 
rather a link which goes back to the earliest penetration of 
foreign capital into the country. 
1.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The materials and data analysed in this study comprise 
empirical and empirically-based information from a variety of 
sources. The direction of the research proposal (presented in 
March 1977 in Wilfrid Laurier Graduate Seminar Series) indicated 
that qualitative source materials of primary and secondary 
nature were the chief concern. Quantitative data tends to be 
18 
fragmentary in the historical record. Where available,however, 
it was recorded and is used to amplify and support the major 
arguments of the thesis. 
Research was conducted in two locations during the period 
August to December, 1977. These were Britain, the colonial 
hearthland, and Swaziland, where the effects of colonialism 
were most strongly felt. Certain relevant documentation has 
found its way into proximate South African archives, and these 
sources were consulted where necessary. Data sought was in 
accord with the stated aims of the research, outlined and 
discussed in this chapter and Chapter Two. 
In Britain, The National Registry of Archives (London),with 
its comprehensive bibliographic catalogue, in combination with 
N.Mathews and M.D.Wainwright (1971) A Guide To Manuscripts And 
Documents In The British Isles Relating To Africa, are the 
natural jumping-off points for the primary source material 
search. Attention was directed from there to The Public Records 
Office and to two Oxford University libraries (The Bodleian 
Library and The Rhodes House Library). The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Library and the Royal Commonwealth Society 
Library contain little pertinent information on Swaziland that 
cannot be found elsewhere. 
An unhappy coincidence was the closure of the Public 
Records Office (moving its location from Chancery Lane to 
Kew), during the period of the research season in England 
( 1 August - 10 October, 1977). It is believed that this 
omission may not be as damaging as at first thought since most 
of the documentation catalogued in Mathews and Wainwright 
19 
proved available for consultation elsewhere. 
Important collections of private papers were consulted 
at Oxford (Appendix la). These included those of Lord Milner 
(Governor of the Transvaal,1897-1905) and the Earl of Selborne 
(Governor of South Africa ,1905-1910) in the Bodleian Library 
and Sir Robert Coryndon (Resident Commissioner,Swaziland,1907-
1916) in the Rhodes House Library. L.B.Frewer (1971) Manuscript 
Collections Of Africana In Rhodes House Library.Oxford is a 
good guide to the holdings of the latter library. 
The British Museum Reading Room proved to be a useful source 
for some of the more obscure secondary texts concerned with 
Swaziland. These include such works as Davis (1898),Griffith (1890), 
Coryndon(1914) and O'Neill (1921). 
In Africa, The Swaziland National Archives was the major 
source of primary and secondary materials. In January,1978 
the archives were moved from Mbabane to a new centre at Lebombo. 
For primary source materials, V.F.Ellenberger (1962) Catalogue 
Of The Swaziland Records. 1881-1949 proved a satisfactory guide 
to the invaluable collection of original colonial, settler and 
Swazi documentation for the period up to 1940. The files consulted 
were in a state of disarray but the required catalogued information 
was,with one notable exception, fortunately generally available 
(Appendix la). A patchy index available at the Archives covers 
the period from 1950 but these files were not available for 
study due to the change of location. 
The extensive Swaziland National Archives Library, built 
up by R.V.Hiller in the early 1970's, contains a great deal of 
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official and unofficial published material. For the period prior 
to 1900, the Colonial Blue Books were consulted for information 
about the nature and processes of colonial offialdom. In the 
Blue Books, Convention agreements, individual and commission 
reports, and private correspondence are a mine of qualitative 
data. S.B.Williams,M.B.E., a member of the first British 
colonial administration in Swaziland in 1903 and still resident 
in Swaziland generously consented to the loan of his personal 
set of Blue Books for further study. 
For the early colonial period, The Times Of Swaziland proved 
worthy of close scrutiny. Despite its unashamed role as an 
advocate of white interest it carries much valuable comment on 
the pre Boer War era (pre 1899). It also provides objective 
accounts of the proceedings of the Swaziland Concessions 
Commission and the work of the partition commissioner. Several 
publications of the Commission itself were drawn on for 
supplementary information and material (Appendix lb). The High 
Commissioner's Gazettes and Notices contain all legislation 
passed by the colonial state during the colonial period. These 
are currently being indexed at the National Archives (but see 
also, M.G.Balima A Guide To Official Publications In Botswana 
Lesotho and Swaziland.1868-1968 ). 
A sojourn in Durban,South Africa, enabled research on the 
private papers of A.M.Miller at the Killie Campbell Africana 
Library (University of Natal). This proved to be an important 
exercise considering Miller's role in early colonial Swaziland 
(Appendix la/lc). The private papers of G.Grey,Partition 
Commissioner for Swaziland 1907-8, proved impossible to trace, 
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but a comprehensive picture of his role can be pieced together 
from the aforementioned sources (Appendix lc). 
C.S.Wallace (1967) Swaziland : A Bibliography , J.P.Webster 
and P.Mohume (1968) A Bibliography of Swaziland, and particularly 
J.J.Grotpeter (1975) An Historical Dictionary of Swaziland are 
good guides to the published secondary material on Swaziland,most 
of which was available in the National Archives Library. The 
National Archives has a small map collection but the most 
important discovery for the purposes of this thesis were the 
maps of the 1906 Concession Boundary Survey, found by chance 
in an office of the Ministry of Works,Power & Communications,Mbabane. 
An obstacle encountered in research was the paucity of 
primary Swazi documentation for the period under study. Since 
it was necessary to obtain information (particularly for Chapter 
Six) the same documentary stock as above was utilised. Its 
interpretation must therefore be a matter of some care. 
Retrospective comment on earlier eras and personal 
interpretations of the contemporary scene were obtained in an 
informal manner from a number of Swazis, white residents and 
S.B.Williams. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The review of the literature in Chapter Two traces the 
development of neo-Marxian perspectives and theory in development 
and historical geography, through a summarised critique of 
orthodox approaches to the appropriation of a model deemed 
suitable for the study of Swaziland's spatial evolution. Chapter 
Three provides a historical background and base to the period 
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under specific study. Chapters Four,Five and Six constitute the 
core of the thesis, analysing the interplay between capital, 
the colonial state and the Swazi population in generating a 
distinctive colonial, spatial, patterning and organisation.chapter 
Seven briefly traces the changes in spatial organisation in 
the remainder of the colonial period (1914-1968) and afterwards, 
while the final chapter is a statement of conclusions to be drawn 
from the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
" The theory of development is simply a theory, and a bad one." 
J.M.Blaut,1973. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to 
and synthesis of neo-Marxian approaches in development and 
historical geography. This is prefaced by a summary of the 
critique of orthodox development geography from within the 
discipline (2.2). Approaches to a general theory of imperialism 
and colonialism, and the related question of Third World 
spatial form and organisation are then elucidated (2.3 and 2.4). 
The argument that attention should be focussed on the structures 
of imperialism is carried through in the elaboration of a 
model within which the study as a whole can be framed (2.5). 
A summary of theoretical elements at the heart of the study 
is then presented (2.6). 
2.2 ORTHODOXY 
Brookfield(19 73) marks the nadir of orthodox geographical 
approaches to development as Hodder's "Economic Development In 
The Tropics",published in 1969. It seems,however, that ingrained 
perspectives die hard as exemplified by the work of Johnson (1970), 
Weinand (19 72), Logan (1972) and Ginsburg (1973). Under a 
breaking wave of criticism of inherent Eurocentricity and 
capitalist ideological bias from Hurst (1973), Blaut (1973), 
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Santos (1974), McGee (1974), Brookfield (1975), Slater (1975a, 
1976), Cannon (1976) and Hudson and Carney (1976), such recent 
contributions as Knight and Newman (1976) and De Blij and Best(l977) 
stand out as lonely and largely inarticulate voices. The 
neo-Marxian critique is directed at orthodoxy in general but 
also applies to specific studies of internal spatial organisation. 
Slater (1975a) lays most of the blame for the redundancy 
of orthodox approaches at the door of geography's "quantitative 
revolution" and its unquestioning application in the Third 
World: 
"Instead of a concentration on theoretical issues embedded 
in any substantive attempt at explanation of social 
reality, relative sophistication in the measurement 
and description of a set of abstracted relationships 
has become the major gauge of scientific worth." (p 161) 
Slater designates this as an inverted methodology. Other 
characteristics of this "abstracted empiricism" are an overriding 
concern with surface descriptions of spatial patterning at the 
expense of exploration of underlying social process, a failure 
to grasp the inter-connections between spatial structure and 
political economy, and uncritical derivation of theory from the 
social sciences. 
Slater (1973) identifies three orthodox models of analysis 
of Third World space common in geography in the 1960's and 
early 1970's. These are (i) spatial differentiation (economic 
dualism,centre-periphery models), (ii) spatial diffusion 
(modernization studies), and (iii) spatial integration (models 
of national integration,growth pole models). The particular 
emphasis of these approaches is the construction of elaborate 
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descriptive models of contemporary space-economies based on 
the operation of supposed spatial processes and on offering 
inadequate prescriptions for resolution of growing Third World 
regional and social inequalities. Johnson (1970) undoubtedly 
represents the worst excess of this methodology in an 
intensely ahistorical study which expresses a concern to 
identify "the dominant organising principles of organised 
space" in the Third World. Johnson falls far short of his 
stated mark. 
Both Brookfield (1975) and Slater (1975a) are highly 
critical of the "modernization" school in geography represented 
by the work of Gould (1964,1970), Soja (1968), Witthuhn (1968), 
Riddell (1970), Soja and Tobin (1972) and, in the Swaziland 
case. Lea (1972) . It is significant that this school has 
been silent in the last four years. The early concerns of the 
school were to identify spatial patterns of "modernization" 
in the Third World. Modernization , as defined, was alarmingly 
Eurocentric and deeply ideological. In fact, the choice of 
variables to describe modernization were invariably representative 
of colonial and capitalist artifacts; but the theory was seen 
to break down in its equation of development and modernization. 
That the spread of modernization would lead to greater social 
and economic egalitarianism and the destruction of regional 
inequalities was perfunctorily assumed and never questioned in 
the light of experience. Modernization exposed to the light 
was seen to imply the introduction of capitalism to pre-capitalist 
social formations and to function to the benefit of development 
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at the metropole to the detriment of the peripheral country. 
The school had some of the trappings of an historical 
approach but Riddell's (1970) study of the diffusion of 
modernization is only superficially historical. It assumes that 
all things Western are beneficial to development and therefore 
gives no history to the indigenous society or economy; particul-
arly the manner of its weakening and destruction under 
the impress of capitalism. 
Duality, and its attendant centre-periphery model of the 
space economy, are core concepts in Fair,Murdoch and Jones (1969) 
and Maasdorp's (1976) description of Swaziland's space. For 
the former: 
"The geographic pattern of economic development in 
Swaziland comprises a number of social and economic 
enclaves, representative of the modern economy, and 
widespread economically backward areas of subsistence 
activity on the other." (p 39). 
The simplistic dualism which they propose and which Maasdorp (1976) 
extends is obfuscating for a number of reasons; 
(i) They propose the existence of two discrete, mutually 
exclusive entities for what is, in reality, a single social 
and economic whole. Relations between "backward" regions/social 
groups and "modern" regions/social groups represent,according 
to Slater (1973): 
"The functioning of a unified society of which these 
are two poles which originate in the course of a 
single historical process " (p 23). 
Holistic emphasis would grant a history to the so-called 
backward sector which might lead to the conclusion that its? 
backwardness should not be counterpoised with the modernity 
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of the capitalist centre but that it is, in a more profound 
sense a creation of it. This approach fails to take account 
of the actual mechanisms which gave rise to the dichotomy 
in the first place. 
(ii) While both authors admit to the weakening and destruction 
of the pre-capitalist economy in the early colonial period 
neither analyse the mechanisms underlying this process, and 
both unquestioningly assume that closer integration of all 
social groups and regions into the international capitalist 
system is the path to future development. 
(iii) Iliffe (1971), with reference to Tanzania, has argued that 
the whole country is directly or indirectly integrated into 
the capitalist system. This could also be argued for Swaziland, 
if we regard individual tenure land as a rural extension of 
capitalism and the Swazi nation land as essentially a peripheral 
labour-supply zone. 
(iv) A serious weakness of the centre-periphery model is its 
failure to identify the social and economic contradictions 
within the centre, which is by no means homogeneously egalitarian. 
The point is not to belabour the superficiality of the 
dualistic approach in relation to Swaziland but to point out 
that it gives little credence to the penetration and destructive 
impact of capitalism in the country. 
National integration of the assymetrical space economy is 
deemed a planning necessity by Fair,Murdoch and Jones (1969) to 
ensure "balanced regional development". This should incorporate 
a strategy to "spread modern development to the rural areas"(p 9). 
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This process is conceived within a framework which insists 
upon the inevitability of a development path following along 
patterns established in the western world. Most of the 
strategies suggested are designed to benefit foreign capital 
and not the local population. 
Brookfield's (1975) pertinent criticism is that orthodoxy 
tends to locate the Third World country in a "historical vacuum" 
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with no real history of its own. Slater (1977 ) extends 
Brookfield's criticism in a paper which takes orthodox approaches 
to task for their avoidance of the realities of the world 
capitalist economy : 
"One is struck by the total absence of any serious 
consideration, or in some cases even mention of, 
capitalism no analysis or even description is 
provided to enable a move towards a comprehension of 
the development and expansion of western capitalism 
and its profoundly significant effects on peripheral 
social formations. The specific historical position 
that these social formations occupy in the polarised 
structure of the world capitalist economy is evaded 
and yet without an understanding of their position, 
no analysis,whether it be concerned with spatial 
structure or not, can hope to advance beyond a 
superficial and mechanistic analysis of forms and 
appearances" (p 18). 
Such a criticism, while harsh, is exemplified in the descriptive 
historical approaches to colonialism adopted by Hellen (1968,1969), 
Witthuhn (19 76) and Crowder (1970). 
The school they are in argues that colonial administrative 
policies per se are fundamental to the evolution of landscapes 
in the colony which are likely to be obliterated in the post-
colonial period. This does not lead that far. There is no 
real suggestion of the factors influencing and reasons for 
such policies and particularly lacking is any analysis of the 
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historical relationship between capital and the colonial state. 
Christopher's (1971) empirical study of the evolution of land 
policy in Natal, under two different systems of white land 
settlement is of a similair genre. 
Mention should also be made of the 1960's debate between 
Floyd (1962), Roder (1964) and Hamilton (1965) about land 
alienation in Rhodesia. The point at issue is the agro-potential 
of black and white held land. The argument that Roder and 
Hamilton convincingly rebuff through consideration of historical 
evidence is that land alienation per se had no inimical effect 
on the indigenous society and economy since the whole country 
is of uniform agro-potential and that land perceived as desirable 
by capital was uninhabited by blacks. It is left to Arrighi (1970) 
to show how land alienation was a major measure responsible for 
the creation of a black labour force. Porter and de Souza's (1974) 
excellent summary of Arrighi highlights the fact that with a 
penetrating historical analysis contemporary land control 
patterns assume a quite different significance when tied in with 
the expansion of international capitalism. 
The sparse and often ineffectual writing of geographers 
on African history prompts one to cast the eye over methodological 
stances of social and economic history writing. Such work is 
profoundly aspatial in intent and execution but invariably 
focusses on the social and economic processes and structures 
which the geographer cannot afford to ignore if understanding 
is to penetrate beyond the naive. Arrighi (1970) on the 
proletarianisation of the African peasantry, Polanyi (1971) on 
the structure of pre-capitalist economies, Rodney (19 72) and 
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Amin (1972) on the process of underdevelopment, and Wallerstein 
(1974) and Cohen and Daniel (19 75) on dependency theory are mere 
samples from a burgeoning literature which aims at a critical 
re-interpretation of colonialism and imperialism and reiterates 
the importance of firmly locating any particular country of 
study within the broader context of the world political economy. 
At the empirical level, Pachai's (1973) otherwise vapid 
study of colonial legislation in Malawi suggests, by implication 
rather than explicitly, that a reorientation towards constructing 
the links between capital and the colonial state would be a 
fruitful exercise in explaining colonial policy. Henderson (1974), 
for colonial Zambia, stresses the close relationship between 
the colonial state and the large mining corporations and also 
argues for a redefinition of the roles of white settlers and 
black populism in determining colonial policy. Both Austen (1975) 
and Neil-Tomlinson (1977) propose that isolation of the mechanics 
of capitalist expansion in the late 19th Century would provide 
a clearer insight into the colonial legacies of the colonial 
states. It is left to SlaterrH. (1971,1975), in penetrating 
case studies of the changing methods of capital to appropriate 
surplus in colonial Natal, in response to changes in the regional 
political econmy, to suggest how such a rationale might be 
implemented in practice. 
Studies by Thompson and Aldoff (1975), Gann (1975) and 
Hammond (1975) focus attention on the official economic policies 
of the colonial state with reference to Africa for France, 
Germany and Portugal respectively. A particularly penetrative 
analysis by Peemans (1975) of capital accumulation in colonial 
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Belgian Congo reveals the particularly active role adopted by 
the colonial state in facilitating the inflow of Belgian 
capital and the expropriation of peasant surplus. In sum, these 
recent studies indicate that new interpretations are not 
confined to British colonialism and imperialism in Africa. 
Nevertheless, the social and economic history fields have 
their own orthodoxies as evidenced by a number of works on 
Swaziland. Swaziland in general and the period under consideration 
in this thesis have been badly neglected research areas to date. 
Boyce (1947) was the first of a rather weak series of descriptive 
accounts of the period 1870-1915. Following in this tradition 
are Whittington and Daniel (1969), Mashasha (1973), Drooglever 
(1976) and Nyeko (1976). Nothing presented goes much beyond 
reproduction of official published sources from the period and 
the detailing of various colonial legislation. With an overemphasis 
on political rather than economic history little attempt is 
made to develop an appropriate theoretical framework for studying 
the actions of the colonial state. Thus locating the country 
in the broader historical context of the expansion of capitalism, 
a fundamental location to explain many of the internal social, 
political and spatial dynamics, is ignored. Youe (1977) is the 
first to take halting steps in this direction. His focus is 
on a comparison of British colonial policy towards black 
attempts to regain expropriated land in Rhodesia and Swaziland. 
Even this study is inadequate, however, because it fails to 
give due credence to the role of metropolitan capital in 
Swaziland in the period concerned. 
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Both theoretically and empirically this study therefore 
attempts to break new ground in the study of Swaziland's past 
and present. 
What is called for is an alternative methodology with 
an historical perspective for examining the spatial structure 
of colonialism and development under capitalism. Two inter-
linked directions are taken in the search. First to the 
attempts by geographers to derive and expand an holistic theory 
of imperialism and ,second, to a consideration of structuralist 
approaches to spatial organisation in the Third World. 
2.3 GEOGRAPHERS AND THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM 
With regard to the theory of imperialism Slater (1977) 
writes: 
"When studying the geographical literature published 
prior to 1970 one finds very little evidence indeed 
of an awareness of the theoretical importance of 
imperialism" (p 3). 
Blaut (1970,1975), Folke (1973), U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977) 
have all published cases for the inclusion of a general theory 
of imperialism in geography. Their argument is first a negation 
of the purely politico-historical definitions of imperialism 
favoured by political historians and, in geography, the 
Hellen school: 
"In this view imperialism is seen purely as a political 
phenomenon closely related to the nineteenth century 
concept of Empire. Consequently attention is diverted 
away from its economic and social elements" (Slater,1977 , 
Secondly, they call for the development of a rigorous 
neo-Marxian definition and concept of imperialism consistent 
with the refocus of scholarly attention on the international 
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capitalist system as an objective of research. A new theory 
of imperialism promises to be: 
"An alternative theoretical system which can enable 
us scientifically to explain the socio-economic 
phenomena which development geographers are concerned 
with but unable to account for " (Slater,1977 ,p 1). 
Thirdly, they argue that in the development of such theory, 
admittedly still in its infancy, it is insufficient merely 
to describe the process of penetration of the periphery by 
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capital as Porter and de Souza (1974) propose. A theory of 
imperialism would hope to explain the essentially expansionist 
nature of capital and the manner of its world penetration in 
the past and present. 
Several social scientists have produced summaries and 
extensions of the theories of imperialism to be found in 
Marx, Lenin, Hobson and Luxemburg. The nuances of this debate 
on the content of a theory of imperialism are not the concern 
here although all of the work by geographers on the theory 
give due consideration to these studies. The positive contributions 
to theory by geographers to date are limited to Blaut (1975), 
U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977). 
Blaut (1975), ever-conscious of the paucity of class-analysis 
in neo-Marxian geography, conceives imperialism as the export 
of the class struggle from the developed to the Third World in 
a manner castigated by U.S.G. (1976) and Slater (1977) . The 
spatial homogeneity of class explicit in Blaut's model is a 
basic failing and Slater (1977) even challenges Blaut's 
understanding of class as being inverted and non-marxist. 
Both U.S.G. (1976) and Harvey (1977) consider the inherent 
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expansionary nature of capital. The former draw their 
conceptualisation from the work of Emmanuel (1972) and 
Amin (1974) on the process of "capitalist accumulation" in 
specific historical contexts. Harvey (19 77) on the other hand 
attempts to rediscover a classic Marxist theory of imperialism. 
Of these, Harvey is the more useful and penetrating. His 
analysis of Marx leads to the conclusion that the phenomenon 
of capitalist accumulation is inherently expansionary. Thus 
he writes: 
"The Marxian theory of accumulation under the capitalist 
mode of production says that capitalism is bound to 
expand through both an intensification of the relationships 
in the capitalist centres of production and a geographical 
extension of those relationships in space" (p 281). 
Harvey (1977) claims that the theory as elaborated is an 
abstract one which awaits application in specific historical 
contexts. 
Slater's(1977) approach to a theory of imperialism is 
more eclectic. He derives his basic definition from 
Kemp (1967) : 
"The Marxist theory of imperialism is centred around 
the aim of explaining the immanent characteristics 
of the capitalist mode of production in its latest 
and most advanced stage, and in fact the theory uses 
the term not to signify the relationship between an 
advanced imperial country and the colonial areas 
falling within its formal empire, but to analyse a 
special stage of capitalist development" (p 5), 
and, more succinctly, direct from Lenin (1963) : 
"Imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism" (p 5). 
Slater tries to empirically address several of Lenin's 
assertions about the charactersitics of the monopoly stage. 
These include the concentration of capital, the merging of 
bank and industrial capital, the export of capital, the formation 
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of international monopolist combines and the territorial 
division of the world. Slater finds Lenin's contribution on 
the historical export of capital from the metropole to be 
5 " 
deficient as others have done before him. The relationship 
between imperialism and colonialism is then addressed. 
Summarising a lengthy argument, imperialism is seen to 
be a stage in the development of capitalism and colonialism,as 
territorial division and control, as an adjunct to but not 
prereguisite for imperialism. They should therefore not be 
seen as synonymous. European colonialism in Africa in the 
ninteenth century is seen as closely related to imperialism 
in that it provided the specific historical context for monopoly 
control of territory, for protection of capitalist interests 
and for anticipatory capitalist penetration. Acceptance of the 
last point would certainly challenge Robinson and Gallagher's (1961) 
widely held thesis that British colonialism in Africa was 
purely strategic, albeit to protect British capital investment 
in the east. 
While concurring with Slater's(1977) thesis that the 
focus of study of Third World social and spatial formations 
under western impact should be couched within a general theory 
of imperialism, the question of the linkages between imperialism 
and colonialism still lie largely unresolved both theoretically 
and empirically. The issue is addressed again in 2.6 where the 
role of the colonial state in capitalist expansion in ninteenth 
century Africa is considered. 
Slater(1977 ) finally quotes extensively from Luxemburg (1968) 
to argue that a holistic theory of imperialism must incorporate 
study of the impact of capitalism on pre-capitalist social 
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formations, modes of production and the spatial organisation 
of the Third World. To pursue this point further this 
review now turns to geographical studies which incorporate 
an explicit consideration of Third World spatial organisation 
within structuralist formulations. 
2.4 SPACE AND STRUCTURE 
The cue for the structuralist paradigm is taken from; 
Coutsinas and Pax (1977) : 
"We need to take into account past or present forms 
of the integration of the country into the dominant 
capitalist system. This integration is at the root 
of the explanation of internal spatial dynamics.... 
we should look for the determining factors of spatial 
organisation in Third World countries in the 
functioning of the dominant capitalist system" (p97), 
from Corragio (1977) : 
"There is a need to conceptually separate what constitutes 
material spatial manifestation from the social structures 
proper which regulate the production of such phenomena"(pl5) 
and from Slater (1975b) : 
"An approach to the explanation of spatial organisation 
and inequality might well be couched in terms of the 
historical development of a particular spatial structure 
....we must situate the phenomenon in an overall context 
of international capitalist expansion and focus on time, 
space and structure" 
Structuralism and structuralist approaches to spatial 
organisation in geography tend to draw their inspiration from 
approaches in the social sciences. To date,however, only a very 
few geographers have attempted to come to terms with the need 
for an articulated structuralist paradigm. Most obvious are 
the contributions of Gregory (19 76) and the earlier expositions 
of McTaggart (1974) and Olsson (1974). 
Taking the premise, as Gregory (1976) does, that the reality 
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of process and function cannot be unambiguously determined from 
form since underlying relationships, dialetical change and 
conflict are not mappable, prompts the conclusion that the 
focus of attention in explanation should not be unrelated 
spatial aggregates but related structured systems. 
Gregory (19 76) thus distinguishes between two common 
understandings of 'structure' in geography. The more orthodox 
view sees social structure as being made up of observed 
patterns of interaction, so that the term 'structure' refers 
to some visible ordered arrangement of parts or components. 
The structuralist view proper is that the elements of manifest 
reality must be mediated by a concealed structure. De George (1972) 
argues that : 
"If there is one common idea which ties together the 
many different forms of structuralism, from Marx to 
Freud to Piaget to Levi-Strauss, it is the conviction 
that surface events and phenomena,the explicit and 
the obvious, can be explained by structures and 
relationships which are below the surface,implicit, 
not obvious,out of conscious awareness. This attempts 
to move beyond (but by no means ignore) the empirical 
patternings derived from actual observation" (p 123). 
The importance for De George is that structuralism does 
attribute special significance to concepts such as mode of 
production and class contradiction. De George (1972) is also 
a salutory reminder to Gregory (19 76) who appears to be all 
for rejecting any actual observation of empirical patternings. 
Elements of structuralist approaches to spatial 
organisation in the Third World can now be considered. Buch-
Hanson and Neilsen (1977) conceptualise spatial organisation 
as "territorial structure". This is seen as both a condition 
for and tho rerult of the social and economic development of 
a society. They claim that oarli modf oi production (lr»url<jl. 
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pre-capitalist, capitalist, and so forth) forms its own spatial 
structure through dialectical interaction with various 
"elementary conditions" which further or hamper the development 
of such a structure. These conditions include the natural 
resource base distribution (the objects of labour as defined 
by the mode of production), the distribution and growth of 
population, the social superstructure (including the state) and 
the territorial structure of the pre-existent mode of 
production. The last condition is taken up by Santos(1977) : 
"A mode of production is expressed in space through 
a struggle and interaction between the new, which 
progressively dominates, and the old" (p 5 ) . 
The conceptualisation of exactly how the capitalist mode 
of production creates its spatial structure is only suggestive 
though the idea that spatial organisation is likely to be the 
most optimal for surplus appropriation and capital accumulation 
is a basic one. Harvey (1977) ,however, goes a step further 
and argues that the continued development of the capitalist 
mode of production is not a contradiction-free process in space : 
"In order to overcome spatial barriers and to annihilate 
space with time, spatial structures are created which 
themselves act as barriers to further accumulation. 
Capital comes to represent itself in the form of a 
physical landscape created in its own image to enhance 
the progressive accumulation of capital on an expanding 
(and intensifying) scale. The geographical landscape 
is both a crowning glory of past capita development 
and a prison which inhibits the further progress of 
accumulation" (p 273). 
Slater (1975a) elucidates a framework for explaining the 
nature of spatial structure under colonialism in areas where 
there is more than one mode of production with the capitalist 
mode becoming dominant and where, through the institute of the 
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colonial state, capital develops a unified control over the 
processes of production. In a rather abstract elucidation 
Slater identifies the following components of the capitalist 
mode of production which in combination and applied to a 
specific country would help explain the spatial configuration; 
(i) The uneven development of the productive forces (objects 
of labour, instruments of labour and the division of labour), 
(ii) The manner and pattern of surplus appropriation (including 
the type of surplus appropriated - either surplus value, 
merchant profit or surplus labour), 
(iii) Class structure ( comprising the expatriate or local 
capitalist class, the merchant class, the proletariat and 
the peasantry), 
(iv) The mode of utilising the surplus (including expropriation 
to the raetropole and the distribution of the remaining surplus). 
The role of the colonial state is an implicit theoretical 
element in Slater's schema. 
Slater (19 75b) attempts to build on this earlier model by 
identifying the specific mechanisms employed by capital to 
appropriate surplus (plantations, settler states and mining 
concerns). He also argues that as the capitalist mode of 
production penetrates, a distinctive spatial structure evolves 
and crystallises and spreads to new territory via the construction 
of a physical infrastructure. Using Luxemburg (1968), capital 
is seen to pursue the following ends; 
(i) Possession of the objects of labour ( land, raw materials), 
(ii) Liberation of labour-power from indigenous modes and 
co-ercion of labour into its service, 
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(iii) The introduction of a commodity economy. 
The colonial state is perceived as an apparatus erected in the 
metropole to ensure the stable political conditions reguired 
by capital to achieve these ends. Slater applies his historical 
schema of the plantation mode of production to Tanzania in 
an extremely enlightening exercise. Consideration of the 
settler-state such as Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia, the Portugese 
colonies and Swaziland is deferred to another date. Porter 
and de Souza's (1974) description of spatial evolution in Kenya 
is not much clearer on this point. Their excessive concern with 
identifying the general motive for European expansionism ("the 
drive for tropical raw materials") leads to an ignorance of the 
role of the settlers themselves in affecting spatial evolution. 
Santos(1975) introduces a further dimension to the argument 
in his conception that an essential facet of the capitalist 
mode of production is "spatial domination of one space by 
another" : 
"Spaces are being regarded as differentiated by the 
amount of capital they represent, by their produce 
and the amount of profit they bring in, and in the 
last resort,by their power to attract investments" (p 347). 
Santos argues that there is a need for an understanding of 
spatial domination and the "blatant inequalities" it produces. 
The idea that the capitalist spatial structure embodies within 
it "the process of the domination of man through the domination 
of space" is a useful one. 
Barrios (1977) whose primary concern is the political 
organisation of space, also suggests that the relations of 
capitalist domination are founded on the appropriation of physical 
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space. The implication of this is clear : land alienation in 
the colony was a means to control one of the objects of labour 
for the exploitation of capital (land) and one means to promote 
the creation of a labour force. 
Harvey (1977) is a fitting postscript: 
"The landscape which capitalism creates is seen as 
the locus of contradiction and tension,rather than 
as the expression of harmonious equilibrium" (p 274). 
A number of the concepts discussed above must be included 
in the construction of a model for the evolution of Swaziland's 
space. A suitable historical model for the structuring of these 
concepts and several other dimensions is to be found in the 
work of Brett (1973), Banaji (1973), Good (1976) and Friedland (19770. 
This is the notion of settler colonialism. 
2.5 THE COLON MODEL 
Banaji (1973) identifies two specific historical forms of 
the restructuring of an indigenous mode of production by 
capitalism; 
(a) Rapid integration into the world subjugation to the dominance 
of merchant and usurer capital, as in much of West Africa, and 
(b) The rapid destruction of productivity of the traditional 
mode of production by economic and legal mechanisms as part of 
an internal process of primitive capital accumulation. Most 
settler-states are seen to accord with this second form though 
it should be stated that even within the evolving settler-state, 
particularly in the early colonial period, there often existed 
conflicts between policies to control or undermine peasant 
production. 
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Good (1976) has attempted to construct a model of the 
second form, the settler-state or colon model, from an empirical 
and dialetical base. It derives from a consideration of the 
"important similarities" between settler societies such as 
South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya and Algeria. The model is divided 
into four sections; 
(a) The geographical and social origins of the settler class 
or petit-colon. 
(b) The aims of the petit-colon in regard to the objects and 
means of production, 
(c) The linkages between the petit-colon, metropolitan capital 
and the colonial state both within the colon and within the 
metropole, 
(d) The consequences for the indigenous mode of production of 
capitalism in the colon. 
First, the origins of the petit-colon are considered. 
Good (1976) argues that historically the settler-state generally 
emerged where militarism and domination of'indigenous society 
by force were particularly heavy. Force, for Good (1976), is not 
to be viewed as sadistic racist fury but : 
"An integral aspect of Europe's advancing industrial 
superiority with its purpose of gaining greater control 
over African land and labour" (p603). 
Bradby (1975) provides an interesting discourse on the 
associations between violence and the spread of capitalism in 
the Third World. Her contention is that force was not a sine 
qua non for the domination of capital and had little direct 
function in forcing the indigenous population to accept wage-
labour or participate in the money-economy. It was rather primari 
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a function of local resistance to metropolitan attempts to 
control and produce raw materials for home industry. 
Settlement was encouraged by the metropolitan state and 
capital for several reasons. Robinson and Gallagher's (1961) 
thesis is that the settler-state was a strategic "must", a more 
forceful claim to a particular region for the metropole 
desiring to protect interests elsewhere ( Africa for India). 
Good (1976) agrees that strategic motives certainly were one 
element underlying the encouragement of settler societies but 
re-iterates that in the context of international political 
economy the African settler-state was also viewed by state 
and capital as: 
"the natural as well as the most rewarding mode of 
imperialist capitalist expansion" (p60l). 
For the state, the economic strength of the metropole was 
consolidated by improved access to raw materials and by the 
provision of export markets for home industry. For metropolitan 
capital: 
"the settler as fully developed capitalist man was a 
loyal and energetic partner" (p60l). 
Good (1976) thus makes the assumption that the settler was 
drawn from a capitalist class in the metropole, with consequent 
links with metropolitan capital and an ideological commitment 
to the capitalist mode of production in the colon. These 
assertions need to be tested in empirical contexts. They also 
lead to the second section of the colon model. 
According to Good (19 76) the twin motivating aim of the 
petit-colon was to acquire control over land and raw materials, 
and over labour, as a means to primitive capitalist surplus 
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appropriation. Various mechanisms were employed by the petit-
colon to accumulate surplus. These included land speculation, 
extraction of rent from black tenants and the use of the black 
population as a cheap wage labour force. A major problem for 
the petit-colon was thus to free labour from the indigenous 
mode of production and to co-erce it into the service of capital. 
Good (1976) argues that land expropriation while an end in itself, 
also enabled the petit-colon to acquire control over labour. 
This had two dimensions. First, blacks left resident on expropriated 
land could either be ejected or if necessary immediately be 
forced into a new set of social relations by the imposition of 
rent or the extraction of labour service. Friedland (1977) 
elaborates on the second dimension. Through constriction of the 
area under black control the traditional system, perceived of 
as inefficient and backward, would become unviable. With 
concommitant economic scarcity the African was forced to enter 
into relationships with the petit-colon. That this was a motive 
for land expropriation is not,however, well-documented although 
historically this was seen to be the case. 
Friedland(1977) notes that the process was hastened by 
the imposition of political legislation such as a taxation 
system on blacks (head and hut taxes) forcing them either to 
sell productive surplus or to sell their labour. The apparent 
motive for taxation was to generate income for administrative 
costs; the inevitable result was the promotion of control over 
black labour by the petit-colon where blacks were forced to sell 
labour to pay taxes. 
Banaji(1973), in an otherwise doctrinaire statement,portrays 
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the penetration of capitalism under a settler-state as a form 
of primitive capital accumulation and as a transitory phase; 
"In the settler colonies in Africa the colonial mode 
of production emerged as a purely transitional and 
subordinate phenomenon,fuelling an internal expansion 
of the capitalist mode of production" (p 399).. 
This observation was historically verified in the South African 
and Rhodesian cases but elsewhere it was not. The difference 
requires explanation. 
Third, the links between the petit-colon, metropolitan 
capital and the colonial state are of some importance to Good's(1976) 
model. 
On the theoretical level,a number of geographers have 
advocated study of the relationship between colonialism and 
imperialism (2.3). The major concern here is a subset of that 
debate ; that is, to identify the ways in which the colonial 
state was used to further the ends of capital in what U.S.G.(19 76) 
have called the "age of classic imperialism" (1870-1914). 
Harvey (1976) provides an excellent synthesis of classic Marxist 
views of the state as applied to contemporary imperialism. 
U.S.G.(1976), drawing on similair sources,show how classically 
the colonial state is viewed simply as a co-ercive tool of 
capital with very little autonomy. Neo-Marxian writers give 
the colonial state much greater autonomy since it functions as 
a mediator and pacifier between conflicting capital interests 
and between different social classes in the colony (similair 
to the role of the state in the metropole). 
In the "age of classic imperialism" the colonial state 
is seen as an essential element in the process of expansion 
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of metropolitan capital and the tieing in of the colonies to 
the metropolitan economy. The role of the colonial state in 
this context is viewed by U.S.G.(1976) as; 
(i) The destruction of pre-capitalist economies through legal-
juridicial measures such as taxation, forced migration, land 
alienation and labour importation, to supply labour for the 
capitalist mode of production. 
(ii) The development of a transportation and communications 
system designed to enable areas to be best exploited by capital. 
(iii) The administration of colonies. Taxation of blacks was 
used to pay for the maintenance of subordinate administrative 
systems which forced blacks into the money-economy. 
(iv) The provision of loans and services, differential to white 
enterprise. 
General colonial state expenditure within the colony is 
viewed as of two types with the underlying purpose of facilitating 
capitalist enterprise under a facade of benefiting the black 
population. These are social investment, including infrastructure 
and education with the aim of increasing labour productivity 
and profits; and social expenditure, including investment in 
projects and services for blacks,to maintain harmony in the 
system, and on military and policing for the same purpose. 
Writers thus relationship between capital and the 
colonial state as essentially one of necessary collusion during 
this period. But what of the specifics of the colon model ? 
In the early development of the settler-state or colon 
the colonial state provided active support and was particularly 
interventionist. The basis of this interventionism was to facilitate 
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petit-colon control over land and labour. As a consequence: 
"Wide scale state intervention contributed to the 
evolution of a capitalist economy" (Good,19 76,p605),and 
"The British state was committed to capitalism in Africa 
as it was at home" (Brett,1973,p 79). 
The links between colonial state and petit-colon must, 
according to Brett (1973) be seen in the context of a managed 
economy to which both accepted a commitment. This pre-supposed 
the colonial state would take responsibility for general economic 
guidance and arose from the needs of capital for infrastructural 
investment which it would not or could not afford to supply 
itself. Thus, the colonial state provided infrastructure services, 
agricultural extension and research, and control of the legal 
framework of production and marketing; and the petit-colon had 
the reserved right to develop production,processing and marketing, 
through external capital or peasant production. 
Petit-colon demands, to which there was invariable 
acquiesence, were elaborated thus : 
"The aim was to ensure that the metropole made no 
liberalising concessions to the black majorities 
(since the common and overriding interest was in 
the exploitation of the black majority) and their 
basic method was constant reactive clamour and 
blocking manoeuvres" (Good, 1976,p6.11 ). 
Brett (1973) elaborates the political structure of the colonial 
state and convincingly demonstrates the priviliged access which 
the petit-colon was allowed at all levels of the hierarchy. 
Locally, with colonial state officials, and in the metropole, 
with the Colonial and Foreign Offices, through its links with 
metropolitan capital. So much so that : 
"The most pervasive and effective influence on 
economic policy was certainly exerted by the 
representatives of British capital directly or 
indirectly involved in Africa" (Brett,1973,p 63 )• 
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Brett (1973) identifies two further influences on colonial 
state policy. First, he argues that it is important to establish 
the personal linkages between colonial administrators and 
metropolitan capital. It is often summarily assumed that there 
were no such linkages. Such an assumption needs careful testing. 
Second,he attempts to identify the ideological impulse of 
the colonial ruling class. Their values were embodied in the 
assumption that : 
"The colonized peoples were not capable of governing 
themselves "under the strenuous conditions of the 
modern world" and that the relationship between the 
interests of colonised and coloniser was an essentially 
reciprocal and creative rather than an exploitative 
and contradictory one" (Brett,1973,p 41). 
This was a powerful ideological justification for the promotion 
of capitalist interests in the colony. 
Fourth,the model posits the consequences for the indigenous 
mode of production. Good (1976) perceives a much faster 
disintegration of the pre-capitalist mode and advanced articulation 
into international capitalism under the colon than under other 
circumstances. An obvious feature is seen as the growth of a 
new class structure based on capitalist social relations with 
the concomittant proletarianisation of the peasant. 
Banaji(1973) perceives the conseguences as more complex, 
however : 
"The capitalist subordination of the traditional mode 
of production required a certain restructuring of the 
latter, which by its very nature led to the disintegration 
of certain of their characteristic forms and intensification 
of others" (p 696). 
H dual process of dissolution and conservation is unelaborated 
but appears to represent the fact that some conservation was 
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inevitable since the petit-colon was unable to absorb the 
total black population into a labour force. 
Ignored by Good (1976) are the series of programmes 
instigated throughout the colonial period in Africa to force 
rural dwellers into cash-cropping as a further raw material 
source for capital.. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
This multifarious survey of current geographical approaches 
to colonial spatial organisation has suggested a number of 
elements essential for consideration in the course of this study. 
These can be summarised as ; 
(a) The sources and aims of capital with regard to land, raw 
materials and control of labour. 
(b) The nature of the linkages between metropolitan capital, 
the petit-colon and the colonial state. 
(c) The explicit and implicit roles of land alienation in 
pursuing the aims of the petit-colon, as well as the mechanisms 
of such alienation, and 
(d) The response of the indigeneous society to the dominance 
of the petit-colon and the colonial state. 
In the next Chapter,the focus is once again empirical as 
the historical origins of the period of early British colonial 
rule in Swaziland are traced. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EARLY INTERACTION : STATE, CAPITAL AND SWAZI 
"the country awaits the capitalist" 
Rev.Joel Jackson,1890 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter covers the period up to 1902 in Swaziland. It 
identifies the roots of processes which were to come to fruition 
in space in the post-Boer War period. The origins of the Swazi 
state are reviewed and the major characteristics of the pre-
capitalist mode of production outlined (3.2). The role of 
Swaziland as a political football in the development of the 
broader regional southern African political economy is then 
described (3.3). The penetration of metropolitan capital into 
Swaziland prior to 1899 is examined. Particular stress is placed 
upon the development of an incipient settler-state or colon, 
and upon the links forged by the early white immigrants with 
metropolitan capital (3.4). Finally, the historical base is 
summarised(3.5). 
3.2 CONQUEST AND CONTROL : DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZI STATE 
An important distinction can be drawn between the two 
methods of early conquest and control which prevailed in this 
area and to whose interaction may be attributed the origins 
of Swaziland's present extent and location. 
Under the indigenous system conquest was invariably by open 
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force, and once subjection was achieved integration and fusion 
of the conquered and conquerers followed. The following brief 
account of the emergence of the Swazi as a socio-politically 
organised state is drawn from research into the strong oral 
traditions of the Swazi by Matsebula (1972), Kuper (1952, 1961, 
1966), Marwick (1940) and Scutt (1966). 
The Swazi trace their origins from the great southward 
Bantu migrations from the eleventh to eighteenth centuries 
along the line Nguni - Tekela Nguni - Bembo Nguni. It was not, 
however, until 1750 that the bakaNgwane clan settled in what 
is now S.Swaziland at Eshiselweni ( "the Birthplace of the 
Nation"). Under Ngwane 111 (Appendix 2a), their conquest 
procedure, which was to characterise their subsequent expansion 
of control, was to eliminate pre-existent Sotho clans in the 
area who refused to submit to their authority and to absorb 
those who did. Around 1820 they where driven to the north 
by a temporarily more powerful clan where the principal 
homesteads were established. Map Six shows how the period 
1820-1870 was spent in consolidating their position under 
Sobhuza 1 and then Mswati. By 1845, Sobhuza had laid the 
foundations of the nation-building process and had extended 
his control by the vehicle of armed conquest over an area of 
some 18,000 square miles. The picture is of a diffusion of 
control from a central nucleus out over an area three times 
that of present-day Swaziland. 
It is not necessary to report in full the investigations 
into the Swazi pre-capitalist mode of production of Kuper (1961), 
Marwick (1940) and Hughes (19 72) except to highlight the roles 
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of land and labour under that mode. 
The homestead and extended family was the basic unit 
of production and consumption : 
"While the subsistence economy obtained the unit was 
almost entirely independent....each individual 
household was self-supporting and the need for trade 
was non-existent" (Kuper,1961,p 45). 
Division of labour within the unit was based on age/sex 
differences rather than technological specialization. Labour 
mobility existed on a local and hierarchical level. The 
aristocracy could demand communal labour from their subjects 
as tribute with no reward, while individual units could reguest 
labour from fellow units with an obligation to reciprocate 
and usually a festive reward. 
Wealth, conceptualised in terms of a complex mythological 
interplay between land, cattle and wives was unevenly distributed 
but no class structure along western capitalist lines could 
be identified. As Kuper (1961) writes? 
"There is no capitalist class with the monopoly of 
the means of production, no proletariat from whom 
the means are debarred and no leisured class that 
maintains itself on the labour of others" (pl37). 
Land was held by the King in trust for the Nation and rights 
to usufruct were allocated out down a socio-political hierarchy 
of chiefs and sub-chiefs. Individual ownership of land was 
non-existent and grazing land was held communally. Land was 
,however, representative of the power the rulers held over 
the people. 
Cattle were the real basis of wealth and status-prestige 
was accorded to quantity holdings. Certain circulation mechanisms 
ensured that this wealth was concentrated in the aristocracy; 
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particularly noteworthy being the lobola system involving 
cattle-wife exchanges. Wealth was largely a privilege of the 
aristocracy and, according to Kuper (1961), approved by the 
masses. Wealth was, however, a side-benefit of prestige and 
power not a condition for it as under the capitalist mode-
"The basis of power and prestige is birth not the 
accumulation of property" (Marwick,1940,p ) 
3.3 CONQUEST AND CONTROL : CONFLICTING IMPERIAL DESIGNS 
The Swazi were one of a minority of southern African 
tribes with whom early contact with whites was not marked by 
armed conflict. Economic conquest and subordination was no 
less effective here than elsewhere however. The last quarter 
of the ninteenth century marks the period of white penetration 
and the loss of political sovereignty by the Swazi. 
At this time in southern Africa, both Boer and Briton 
were demarcating their boundaries and defining their spheres 
of interest. The expansionist and republican policy of the 
Transvaal Government under Paul Kruger after 1877 is well-
attested by Robinson and Gallagher (1961), de Kiewet (1966), 
Moodie (1975), Leyds (1919), and others. The primary 
aspiration was to establish an independent outlet on the 
eastern seaboard free from British interference. Control of 
Swaziland was seen as an essential preliminary step to the 
building of a railway (Best,1965). Britain, with its own 
designs in southern Africa, had no apparent desire to annex 
an isolated country of dubious economic potential but was 
equally opposed to complete Boer control and the implied coastal 
55 
2 link. The early result of such conflicts of territorial 
interest were two conventions to which both states were party 
(Pretoria Convention of 1881, London Convention of 1884) which 
prohibited each from unilaterally annexing Swaziland and, in 
effect, guaranteed the independence of the Swazis within the 
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boundaries arbitrarily defined by a commission in 1880. Despite 
an enforced contraction of the area under direct Swazi control, 
the role of the newly-defined Swaziland as a pawn in a Boer-
Briton power struggle ensured the survival of the political 
autonomy of the Swazi state, for a time at least. 
As Hughes (1964) writes : 
"It could be said that Swaziland owes its present 
existence as a separate political unit to the 
historical accident that it lies in an area where 
the interests of Boer and Briton clashed during 
the ninteenth century. Neither was prepared to 
allow the other to gain any undue influence over the 
country; its independence was protected until nearly 
the end of the century by the mutual jealousies of 
powerful neighbours" (p 60). 
Throughout the 1880•s the South African Republic continued 
to press Britain for the annexation of Swaziland and followed 
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a number of strategies in pursuit of their ends. There were 
unofficial attempts by Boer groups to obtain documents of 
cession from the Swazi monarch. At another level, the 
Republic spent almost £ 90,000 on acquiring crucial concessions 
from the Swazi to control revenue collection and transportation 
in Swaziland. This was ostensibly to improve its bargaining 
power with the British state and private capital. Two agents, 
Harrington and Cohen, were employed by the Republic to obtain 
these concessions. Most crucially,however, Kruger repeatedly 
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petitioned Britain and in May 1889 offered to withdraw all 
South African Republic claims north of the Limpopo in exchange 
7 for control over Swaziland. The offer touched a responsive 
chord in British state and capital circles? 
"We should be much abused in this country if we let 
the Boers annex Matabeleland and Mashonaland....as 
they are rich territories, and concessions by Lo 
Bengula are held by some influential people; but we 
shall have to face considerable danger of conflict 
with the Boers if we bar them from extension to the 
North. I should be inclined to compromise with them 
by letting it be known that if they come terms with 
the Swazi king we shall not prevent them from protect-
ing and annexing Swaziland. This will bring them to 
the sea which is their chief desire" (8). 
A potential deal fell through when the Republic rejected an 
additional British demand that they join a Customs Union with 
Natal and the Cape Colony. 
Meanwhile,agitation within Swaziland and a conflict of 
interests between representatives of all three national groups 
(Swazi,Boer and Briton) led to a Swazi appeal to both states 
9 in 1889. Mbandzeni's inability to exert traditional authority 
over the white immigrants had earlier precipitated the introduction 
of administrative machinery to implement a form of dual control 
whereby Theophilus Shepstone, independently installed as Resident 
Adviser and Agent by the King, and a British-dominated "white 
committee" of fifteen property-owners were given a charter of 
self-government to administer the whites while still subject 
to the sovereignty of the King (Drooglever,1976 ; Matsebula 1972). 
The committee failed to exercise control. Inefficiency, Boer 
antagonism and factional interests mitigated against its 
authority and it was disbanded in 1890. 
Ostensibly in response to the protection appeal both states 
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agreed to a joint commission of enquiry. This was the De Winton 
Commission, which from the British point of view, was also charged 
with investigating the prospects for British capital in 
Swaziland. De Winton's brief from the Colonial Office was that; : 
"It is an essential feature of our policy that there 
should be no undue restrictions upon the advancement 
of British trade and enterprise in any part of South 
Africa " (11). 
The De Winton report was published in 1890 and is an extensive 
document detailing the proceedings of five meetings with 
representatives from different national groups, perceptions of 
exploitable resources and economic potential in Swaziland and 
suggestions for the protection of British capital interests. 
Temporary Boer residents were predictably in favour of incorporation 
into the South African Republic but British residents opposed 
it. The Boers had a numerically superior voice but "do not 
represent much capital". Swazi fears were allayed by reassurance 
of political independence. De Winton concluded that : 
"Matabeleland and Mashonaland are ten times larger 
than Swaziland. The land is rich in minerals and 
would be a good opening for British commerce,manufacturers 
and enterprise. To acquire control over these large 
and important territories for the British Empire rather 
than cling to doubtful possession of a territory 
difficult to protect, is a necessity. British commercial 
interests and the interests of investors of capital in 
mining or other enterprises in Swaziland could in 
addition be protected by treaty arrangements" (12). 
This view was actively supported in the upper echelons 
of British state and capital. It led to the promulgation of 
the 1890 Convention which provided a three-cornered provisional 
13 government in Swaziland pending further investigation. 
Kruger's Republic continued to press for annexation in the early 
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1890's and consolidated her internal control by purchasing 
concessions up to a value of ,£200,000 ( Table Five and Map Seven). 
Kruger could then argue that; 
"We hold all valuable concessions and we have the 
right to all the practical expenses of administration. 
The right to build railways,the roads,the posts, the 
telegraphs - all state rights are in our hands. Swazi-
land surrounded as it is on three sides by the Transvaal, 
represents merely an extension of our own system.... 
historically,geographically and administratively 
Swaziland is ours" (14). 
In 1894 Britain,under the powerful influence of Rhodes' 
designs, finally waived her objections, and abandoned the 
assurances to the Swazi nation in the interests of consolidating 
the strength of British capital north of the Limpopo. Without 
the necessity for Swazi consent and despite concerted protest 
from metropolitan capital in Britain, the 1894 Convention 
provided for Swaziland's becoming a protectorate of the South 
African Republic. 
The Swazi guarantees of independence were consequently 
sacrificed on the altar of British capitalist interests to the 
north. At the same time the Convention provided for the 
protection of British capital within Swaziland. 
As a postscript to this section it might be added that the 
Republic's railway designs were finally thwarted by British 
annexation of Tongaland in May 1895; a move which incidently 
was to have severe repercussions on the development of a colon 
in Swaziland after 1910. 
The South African Republic administered Swaziland until 
the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. At this time all whites 
were ordered out of Swaziland by their respective governments. 
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TABLE FIVE 
CONCESSIONS ACQUIRED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC 
A.MONOPOLIES 
COST (£ ) 
RAILWAY 12,000 
SURVEYING 2,000 
POSTAL SERVICES 12,000 
CANALS & NAVIGATION 4,000 
TELEGRAPHS & ELECTRICITY 7,000 
RAILWAY BARS 2,000 
Cost £ 39,000 
B.REVENUE 
LICENSING 50,000 
CUSTOMS REVENUE 3,000 
PRIVATE REVENUE CONCESSION 12,000 
Cost / 65,000 
C.LAND CONCESSIONS 
P 2 (/4000), PI and P6 (/45,000), P23 (^3,700). 
L5 (/ll,800), L6 (^2,800), L8 (^600), L60/61 (/4000), L64 (^860) 
L75/76/77 (^3700). 
Total Number : 16 Total Cost :/88,7l0 
D.MINERAL CONCESSIONS 
M9. 
Source : c 7212 (Appendix lb) 
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3.4 THE COLON : DEVELOPMENT AND METROPOLITAN LINKAGES 
In this section the processes of early white penetration 
of Swaziland are traced, including the methods employed to 
gain control over the objects of labour (land and mineral 
resources). Two sets of linkages are then outlined; those 
with metropolitan capital and those with the two rival colonial 
states. 
Swaziland was isolated from the mainstream of white 
migration in southern Africa and contact with whites was limited 
before 1850. Thereafter, rapid penetration of the area was a 
function of the desires of Boer pastoralists from the Transvaal 
and British mining prospectors, traders and agriculturalists. 
For the Boer, winter grazing for sheep was perceived as superior 
to that of the Transvaal,and transhumance became common practice : 
"For a good many years Swaziland has been the favourite 
grazing ground of the Boers. In the winter time a number 
of them with their flocks move to the warmer veldt of 
the lower country and have been allowed to squat there 
by the King for the winter months. Some of them have 
obtained grazing licenses from the King,the consideration 
given being a horse or heifer. Granting of licenses has 
gone on for eight years but only in the last four have 
the Boers come in any number"(17). 
The annual influx of Boers reached 1000 by 1890. 
Gold was discovered in 1874 in the north-west of Swaziland 
and this prompted a rapid influx of Britons in the 1880's : 
"The news that gold was found fired men's imagination with 
the idea that Swaziland was a veritable Eldorado. The 
finding of a few small reefs and some alluvial tin sufficed 
to send adventurers into the country in swarms,and there 
was a constant stream of potential concessionaires going 
and returning from the royal kraal" (18). 
In the wake of the miners followed a large number of traders, 
farmers and speculators, fiercely competetive and acquisitive in 
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the drive for profit. The permanent white population, including 
1 9 dependents, rose to 500 by 1890. 
Paying lip service at least to the sovereignty of the 
Swazi over their own resources and to avoid overt physical 
conflict the incipient petit-colon sought some sanction for 
its projected exploitation. The years 1877-1890 marked a period 
of intense concession-granting by the Swazi King Mbandzeni,as 
he was pressured by whites trying to obtain his mark on the 
often complex, legally-prepared concession documents they were 
brandishing. The use of concessions as as obtuse mechanism 
to obtain black sanction of the appropriation of desired rights 
was common throughout Africa at this time (Pedler,1975 ; Slinn,1971). 
The method undoubtedly reached its worst excess in Swaziland. 
Concessions obtained by whites, which ceased to be granted 
after the' death of Mbandzeni in 1890 on the order of the rival 
colonial states, were as follows; 
(i) Grants of grazing rights over specific areas for periods 
of up to 50 years (there were 76 of these), 
(ii) Land grants in freehold or leases of land in perpetuity (31), 
(iii) Agricultural rights over specific areas for periods up 
to 99 years (138), 
(iv) Mineral rights over specified areas (54), 
(v) Trading rights over defined areas (7) 
(vi) Speculative industrial monopolies (60) 
(vii) Miscellaneous rights including the right to collect the 
King's revenue, rights to customs duty exemption and the 
Unallotted and Lapsed Land and Mineral concessions. 
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The remuneration accruing to the Swazi elite from the 
granting of concessions was estimated as £ 150,000 between 
1885 - 1888 and from 1890 - 1899 the munificent annuity was 
/12,000. By 1900 the rulers had received £ 270,000 from 
,.20 
concessionaire interests. 
The temporal distribution of the concessions is illustrated 
in Figures 2 and 3. The marked peaks in the late 1880's in 
Figure 2 are a reflection of increasing white immigration and 
21 levels of aquisitiveness. Figure 3 is a partial surrogate 
for white mobility. The predominance of grants in the winter 
months. May to August, is consistent with the Boer pattern 
of temporary residence for winter-grazing. The more even 
non-Boer distribution is a function of more permanent residence 
in the country. All concessions, except the monopolies,contain 
explicit spatial clauses and the guaranteed protection of 
22 
•native rights'. 
The excesses which this speculative drive to control the 
objects of labour precipitated are highlighted by Forbes (1938) 
(Appendix 2b), and by a retrospective glance at this era in 
1909 : 
"Practically the whole country was covered two,three 
or even four deep by concessions of all sizes,for 
different purposes and for greatly differing periods. 
In but few cases were even the boundaries defined;many 
of the areas have been subdivided several times,and 
seldom were the boundaries of the superimposed areas 
coterminous. In addition to this,concessions were granted 
for all lands and minerals previously unallotted.Finally 
over these three or four strata of conflicting interests 
there had to be preserved the rights of the natives to 
live,move,cultivate,graze and hunt" (23). 
Nevertheless it has proved possible to construct a map of 
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prior-granted concessions which reveals the spatial configuratiion 
of different types of land grant ( Map Eight). Of particular note 
is the consolidated block of grazing concessions in the south-
west of the country. 
A number of scholars have speculated on the excesses of 
the concession granting process (Boyce,1947 ; Drooglever 1976). 
The irregularities and dubious nature of the whole procedure 
are often referred to from various first-hand accounts. Drooglever 
(1976) goes further and argues that the appointment of white 
advisers (Shepstone and Miller) by the King had the opposite 
effect to that intended and that both took advantage of their 
post for personal benefit and became channels of co-ercion for 
24 
white interests as a whole. 
From the Swazi viewpoint (Matsebula,1972) there are claims 
that the King would have had little conception of the rights 
demanded by whites (minerals, industrial processes and exclusive 
land ownership), that his intention was to grant usufructury 
rights in accordance with the traditional framework and that 
the King took advantage of short-term material benefit in 
recognition of the inexorable domination of whites in the region. 
As he himself expressed it: 
"You are getting rich from my country and I should be 
able to do the same....we must eat before we die" (25). 
The whole process was obviously facilitated by the autocratic 
decision-making role of the King and the investiture of ultimate 
control of land and labour-power in him under the traditional 
mode of production. A primitive form of co-option thus enhanced 
the appropriation by the incipient petit-colon of the objects of 
i w 25a 
labour. 
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The need to legitimise the appropriation in the eyes 
of any prospective colonial state inevitably arose and here 
there is a need to briefly examine the linkages with metropolitan 
capital and the colonial states during this era. For the transient 
Boer population : 
"They are anxious to convert their grazing rights into 
rights of ownership" (26). 
While the Boer national group, as Moodie (1975) and Lincoln (1977) 
argue, were increasingly to adopt the capitalist mode of production 
as their productive norm, at the stage of penetration of 
Swaziland this was probably more nascent than realised. Yet the 
objectives of the Boer faction were in essential concurrence 
with those of British based capital at this time. For the Boer, 
confining his activities to extensive pastoralism, unfettered 
land control was a necessity. Land alienation also later appears 
to have represented a means of gaining control over Swazi labour 
to channel to the farms of the Eastern Transvaal. 
For the Briton : 
"Companies are now being floated and refloated in England 
on the frail tenure of Mbandzeni's grants and money 
amounting to millions will shortly be invested by the 
English public on properties of doubtful security"(27). 
In 1890 De Winton was conscious of the factionalism and overt 
social conflict within the incipient colon and suggested, in 
response, the organisation of a legal tribunal to arbitrate 
in cases of conflicting rights. The white residents pressed for 
wider legal powers for the court in meetings with De Winton, 
demanding the permanent establishment of all rights and title 
and that concessions granted should be recognised by any future 
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government. The acquiesence of the two colonial states in consort 
28 is embodied in Article 2 of the 1890 Convention. The court was 
duly established, sat in what is now Manzini from October 1890 
to January 1891, and confirmed legal title to all concessions 
29 
supposedly approved by the Queen Regent. 
The incipient petit-colon thus successfully concluded the 
first stage of its appropriation with the sanction of the colonial 
states; 
"These concessions have been validated by the Court 
established for their examination under the 1890 
Convention and Great Britain was a party to the 
Convention and is bound to respect them" (30). 
Two unsuccessful attempts were made around this time by 
capital interests to control the country as a chartered state. 
Prior to 1889, Cohen, later an agent of the South African Republic, 
was employed by a firm of financiers (Porges & Eckstein) to 
obtain controlling concessions in Swaziland with a view to 
31 
obtaining a charter for the firm. The failure of this scheme 
is attributable to the similair rival interest of the Republic. 
The second attempt revolved around the acquisition of the 
Unalloted and Lapsed Land and Mineral concessions on which the 
Umbandini Concession Syndicate (later the Swaziland Corporation 
Ltd.) was floated. The activities of this Company are examined 
in depth in Chapter 4. 
On the basis of achieved legitimacy of their concessions 
the British faction forged links with metropolitan capital to 
obtain the necessary capital backing to exploit their acquisitions. 
Twenty companies were floated in England on the basis of mining, 
agricultural and industrial monopolies. By 1894 these comprised an 
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aggregate capital o££3 million and represented over 5000 
British shareholders (Table Six). Original concessionaires 
resident in Swaziland invariably became local managers but 
were ultimately responsible to Britain-based boards on whom 
sat numbers of well-connected capitalists. It is clear that 
all of the share capital was not immediately invested in 
Swaziland but as early as 1890,^25,000 p.a. was flowing into 
the country. 
The major obstacles to mining development did not therefore 
lie in the area of capital scarcity. Instead the main hindrances 
were seen to be the lack of a transportation system and 
32 
"the drawback of a scarcity of African labour" . As Miller 
wrote in 1900: 
"During 1897 labour was unprocurable and several mining 
companies were forced to close down" (33). 
Despite the strong metropolitan links and the intense 
lobbying which these links facilitated the British faction lost 
their attempt to influence the British colonial state against 
the annexation of Swaziland by the South African Republic, and 
had to be content with the 1894 Convention guarantees of the 
protection of British capital. The concerns expressed in the 
metropole in protesting the proposed South African Republic 
34 takeover covered a number of issues. 
There was the obvious desire to protect invested capital 
and to ensure that future capital flows in and out of the country 
would not be adversely affected. Then, as far as the mining 
fraternity were concerned, there was a great fear of the imposition 
of the Republic's gold mining taxation system in Swaziland. A 
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TABLE SIX 
BRITISH BASED COMPANIES OPERATING IN SWAZILAND IN 1892 
COMPANY SHARE CAPITAL(£) SHAREHOLDERS 
Acton's Concession Ltd. 
Bird's Swaziland Concession Ltd. 
Swazi Goldfields Ltd. 
Havelock Gold Mining & Exploration Co. 
Indimba Land Exploration Co. 
Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co. 
Swaziland Gold,Exploration & Land Co.Ltd. 
Forbes Reef Gold Mining Co. 
Southern Forbes Reef Co. 
Piggs Peak Estate & Gold Mining Co. 
Wyldsdale Gold Exploration & Devnt. Co. 
Umbandine Concessions Syndicate. 
Pullen's Concession Co. Ltd. 
Horo Syndicate 
Ruby Creek Syndicate 
Seaforth Mining Co. Ltd. 
Unity Gold Mining Co. Ltd.(London), 
Komati Goldfields Syndicate. 
Swaziland Mercantile Association. 
Ryland (Swazi) Gold Mining Co.Ltd. 
36,000 
30,000 
250,000 
120,000 
16,750 
150,000 
150,000 
400,000 
250,000 
250,000 
250,000 
50,000 
250,000 
100,000 
25,000 
15,000 
100,000 
30,000 
100,000 
354 
150 
138 
160 
37 
353 
170 
995 
118 
1700 
126 
Source : c 6200, c7212 (Appendix lb). 
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further threat was perceived by the holders of industrial and 
revenue monopolies from any administration which would seek to 
acquire them. A more widely discussed issue was that the trade 
of the South African Republic would eventually be diverted away 
from the British colonies in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, despite local and metropolitan lobbying, the 
annexation was concluded. To the British colonial state it was 
a function of the inefficiencies of dual control, the geographical 
location of Swaziland and the Republic's control of revenue 
concessions. But as Miller ruefully admitted in 1900,: 
"In the 1890's Africa's most powerful voice, Rhodes, urged 
the handing over of Swaziland to Boer mis-rule to secure 
capitalist development for the territory north of the 
Limpopo" (35). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The historical process of capitalist penetration of 
Swaziland attempted prior to British colonial rule provides 
a clear illustration of the domination of the local population 
at international and sub-national levels, in the pursuit to 
consolidate control over land,labour and minerals and to begin 
to extract surplus. The links of the early white settlers of 
Swaziland with metropolitan capital interests are demonstrated 
in 3.4. Major obstacles to the inflow of capital are seen to 
be the broader political uncertainties due to Swaziland's place 
within the broader regional political economy in a state of flux, 
the essentially spatial conflict of interests between whites in 
the country caused by the excesses of the concession granting period, 
and the inability of capital, in and of itself, to force labour 
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out of the indigenous economy and into a new set of social 
relations under capital. All three issues begged resolution 
before capital could begin to extract the surplus desired. 
74 
CHAPTER FOUR 
COLONIAL STATE AND CAPITAL IN INTERACTION AND COLLUSION 
"Some four millions of capital and the livelihood of those who 
are resident and interested in Swaziland depended on His Honour's 
announcement", Times of Swaziland,1908. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a chronological framework is first outlined 
and the primary colonial state policy-makers in relation to 
Swaziland are identified (4.2). The aims and objectives of 
capital in Swaziland in the period 1902-1909 are then presented (4.3), 
and the structuring of the colon in pursuit of these aims is 
described (4.4). The ideological acquiesence of the colonial 
state policy-makers is examined (4.5) and the influence and impact 
of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd. in this period is analysed (4.6) 
4.2 CHRONOLOGICAL SYNOPSIS : 1903 - 1909 
The administration of Swaziland was inherited by Britain from 
the defunct South African Republic after the Boer War and validated 
by Order-in-Council of 1903 (Appendix 3a). 
Despite being labelled from the first as a 'protectorate',the 
precise colonial status of Swaziland vis a vis the Crown was never 
actually defined (Youe,1976). To all intents and purposes,however, 
its status was that of a dominion colony under the Colonial Office. 
The 1903 Order-in-Council vested control of Swaziland's affairs 
in the Governor of the Transvaal and after,1906, in the Governor-
General of South Africa who was also High Commissioner for the 
2 
Protectorates despite being resident in South Africa. Perusal 
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of the 1903 Order-in-Council reveals the high degree of decision-
making autonomy invested by the Colonial Office in the High 
Commissioners ,,Milner and Selborne,in administering Swaziland 
(Hailey,1953,1956) (Appendix 3b). The historical record bears 
this out. Both Milner and Selborne exercised considerable power 
in the colonial resolution of Swaziland's perceived problems. The 
role of these two is therefore a crucial one in examining colonial 
state policy. Both were ultimately responsible to the Colonial 
Secretary but, in practice, the contact was limited to keeping 
the Secretary informed of decisions and to those instances where 
the full weight of the colonial state was required to reinforce 
3 
decisions (see Chapter 6.3). 
Within Swaziland, at a lower level of the administrative 
hierarchy, a Resident Commissioner and four District Commissioners 
4 
were appointed by the High Commissioner, m practice, the Resident 
Commissioner was a mediator between the High Commissioner and 
Swaziland residents, informing them of colonial state policy and 
monitoring response for the High Commissioner. Familiarity with 
the local scene also made him a considerable information input 
into the decision-making of the High Commissioner. Thus,for 
instance,Coryndon's influence is clearly seen in Selborne's policy. 
The Swaziland Concessions Commission also performed the role 
of an information source for policy-making. 
Colonial state policy-making in Swaziland was therefore 
highly decentralised, localised and individualistic. 
The immediate purpose of the British colonial state in 
Swaziland, since armed subjugation was not an issue, was to bring 
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some arbitrationary order to the visible legacy of capitalist 
penetration of the previous two decades. Milner visited Swaziland 
in 1903 to familiarise himself with the local conditions and 
commissioned J.F.Rubie to prepare a set of recommendations for 
colonial state policy in Swaziland. Rubie's suggestions formed 
the basis of the first major administrative proclamation in 
5 
1904. Under this Proclamation a 5 man commission was appointed 
(Swaziland Concessions Commission) to (a) define the boundaries 
of all land and mineral concessions, (b) expropriate from 
the holders at pre War value all industrial and trading monopolies, 
(c)arbitrate on the nature and priority of claims between 
whites, and (d) provide the Swazi with the use of that land 
"to which they are entitled." 
The country was subjected to a detailed field survey in 1905 
and the detailed decisions of the Commission re the expropriation 
of monopolies and conflicting white interests are recorded in 
their 1906 and 1908 reports (Appendix lb). Under the 1904 
Proclamation all land concessions for 99 years duration or for 
50 years with right of renewal became freehold farms,as did all 
perpetual land grants. All concessions of less than 50 years 
duration were confirmed as leaseholds conferring exclusive and 
comprehensive land rights on the holder. In cases of spatial 
overlap the procedure was to determine the basal concession 
which gave fullest rights to the surface (usually the prior-dated 
ones) and to define any leases registrable as servitudes against 
it. 
Two superimposed networks of basal concessions were 
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consequently defined- one of mineral concessions, the other 
of land holdings. These are shown in Maps Nine and Ten. 
Skiborne visited Swaziland in September 1906 to consult 
the Swazi rulers and the whites and as a result the controversial 
Partition Proclamation of 1907 was issued. This Act allowed 
for the setting aside of one-third of the area of the country 
for Swazi reserves; leaving the remaining two-thirds under the 
7 
control of white landowners and the Crown. It also provided 
for the appointment of a Special Commissioner to carry out the 
land partition. George Grey was enlisted from C.Africa by 
Q 
Selborne for the purpose. The partition was effected between 
9 
January and December 1908. 
4.3 THE PROSPECTS FOR CAPITAL 
From contemporary published accounts it is possible to 
construct a picture of the optimistic perceptions of the petit-colon 
as regards the prospects for the capitalist mode of production 
under the British colonial state. 
The keynote to the era is provided by the rationale of the 
Swaziland Corporation : 
"The weight of the Corporation's influence will go towards 
the opening of its lands and minerals with the sure 
confidence that the exploitation of these holdings will... 
earn the speediest profits for shareholders" (10). 
The mineral wealth of Swaziland was still something of an 
unknown quantity in the period 1903-9. Certainly there was little 
sign of the "orgie of enthusiasm" (Miller,1937) of the 1880's but 
the apparent failure of the mining companies to pay the expected 
dividends in the 1890's was rationalised away. Miller (1900) 
attributed the failure to (a) poor mine management, (b) political 
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uncertainty, (c) high transport costs for mining machinery and 
(d) the absence of a railway. The first two were considered to be 
transient problems and a railway was thought to be immanent (Best,1965). 
The Swaziland Corporation annual report of 1906 posits the lack 
of capital for underground mining as a further causative factor 
12 
of failure in the 1890's. This too was not viewed as an 
insurmmountable obstacle. 
A more serious potential handicap was, as before the War, 
the production of a regular black labour-supply : 
"The most serious handicap to mining is the scarcity 
of native labour" (13). 
The Swaziland black mining labour force was to reach 1087 in 
14 1906 and 2017 in 1910. At a later stage, the mining fraternity 
was to see their small labour supply severely affected by the 
powerful capitalist competitors for labour on the Witwatersrand. 
Thus, in 1911, Miller wrote : 
"A battalion of labour recruiters from South Africa has 
invaded and disorganised the local labour supply" (15). 
Apart from mining, there was an increasing awareness of 
the environmental potential of Swaziland for large-scale 
agricultural production. This was frequently articulated as was 
the perceived role of the Swazi in these potential developments; 
"The low country will one day produce cotton and tobacco 
on so large a scale that great areas will be put under 
the plough. The middleveld is suitable for all classes 
of sub-tropical produce, including citrus, and the 
highveld will become the home of the stockraiser. If 
European energy and capital are devoted to the agricultural 
development of these productive areas the prosperity of 
the native will follow. He will soon learn to imitate 
what the higher race initiates and a close industrial 
inter-mixture of the two peoples would assist towards 
the regeneration of the native race" (16). 
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Or again, with a note of qualification : 
"The soil and climate of Swaziland are suitable to the 
growth of products which would not rely solely upon a 
local market for their disposal. Possibly 50% of Swaziland 
is adapted for the cultivation of plantation produce such 
as tea,coffee,tobacco,fibrous plants and for cattle rearing 
....but a railway is necessary to the development of 
agriculture on a large scale" (17). 
One of the reasons for such faith in the plantation potential 
of the country was the perception of distinct locational 
advantages : 
"We are within 60 miles of the finest port on the East 
African coast and 40 miles of a railway communicating 
with the populous districts which will grow in consuming 
power more rapidly than it will in supply" (18). 
It was also founded on the results of experimental agricultural 
work on a variety of cash-crops, ranching and timber by both the 
« 
Swaziland Corporation and the Henderson Consolidated Corporation. 
I 19 
Cotton,in particular, showed promise of£5 per acre profits. 
Success would, it was anticipated, attract capital from further 
afield : 
"On this plantation we will be able to build up an industry 
and be in a position to attract American planters by showing 
that Swaziland offers wide scope for the cotton grower"(20). 
Any impediments to the realization of profit were considered 
resolvable. Best (1965) describes the Milner-Davies railway 
proposals of 1902-5. This railway was to join Johannesburg 
with Lourenco Marques via central Swaziland and the whites in 
Swaziland were accutely aware of the implications of this scheme 
21 in providing market accessibility. The creation of a labour 
force, as with mining, was considered a necessary pre-requisite 
for plantation development but here too there were grounds for 
optimism. 
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With reference to prospective cotton plantations: 
"We do not anticipate difficulty in getting raw hands 
to pick cotton. If we can make the work popular there 
w 11 be an inexhaustable labour supply"(22). 
Competition for labour was anticipated from outside Swaziland 
as well,however, though this concern was best articulated by 
Selborne : 
"The whole interest of the Boers of the Eastern Transvaal 
lies in the direction of Swaziland since all of them want 
to open up trade with Swaziland and increase their supply 
of Swazi labour"(23). 
The promotion of private settlement schemes was viewed as a 
means to realise the prospective agricultural development by the 
introduction of a large settler management class, as well as to 
24 increase the speculative value of holdings. 
The primary pre-condition to agricultural exploitation and 
the deployment of a managed black labour force was,however, the 
confirmation of control and titular security over land by the 
colonial state. Thus : 
"The concessionaires had not deemed it advisable to commence 
the development of their concessions until they knew what 
servitudes the concessions carried and what their boundaries 
were" (25). 
The objectives of the petit-colon at the outset of this era 
can be summarised from this section as the consolidation of control 
over raw material sources, the creation of a local labour force 
and the application of further foreign capital to extract surplus 
via mining and plantation agriculture. The colonial state had 
an integral role to play in the fulfillment of these objectives 
as well as in providing a suitable transport and service 
infrastructure. 
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4.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE PETIT-COLON 
The permanent white population of Swaziland was 890 in 1904 
26 
and 1083 in 1911. This implies a rapid in-migration after the 
emigration of the Boer War period. The temporarily resident 
population of sheep farmers from the E.Transvaal reached upwards 
of 500 during this era, with their annual influx of 200,000 to 
27 300,000 sheep. The petit-colon was consequently sharply 
differentiated along lines of nationality and mobility. 
Another disseminating influence within the petit-colon was 
the individualistic nature of white interest in Swaziland. 
Centralization of control had developed only in the mining industry 
where 75% of concessions were corporately controlled. Only 14 
land concessions were owned by companies and there were 56 British 
and 152 Boer owners. The Boers had achieved some small measure 
of unification with 68 concessions being syndicate-controlled. 
The argument to be sustained here is that internal differences 
and antagonisms within the petit-colon, so evident in the pre War 
period, were now subsumed in the interests of a common quest to 
consolidate control over land and labour. A consolidated front 
was a necessity for collective bargaining with, and lobbying of, 
the coloni al state. 
The unifying voice for white interests was the local 
representatives of foreign capital. Table Seven lists the 
companies registered as operating in or as interest holders 
in Swaziland in 1905. The aggregate share capital for these 
companies was over/4 million.The companies with the most active 
capital involvement in Swaziland were also the most vocal, 
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TABLE SEVEN 
COMPANIES IN SWAZILAND.1904 
COMPANY 
Henderson Consolidated Corp. 2,000 
Swaziland Corporation Ltd. 
Swazi Goldfields Ltd. 
Toweli Gold Mining Co.Ltd. 
Swazi Coal Mines Ltd. 
S.Swaziland Gold Co. Ltd. 
Piggs Peak Gold Mining Co. 
Swaziland Tin Ltd. 
Anglo-Swazi Co. Ltd. 
Mercantile Association 
Consolidated Concessions ltd. 
Pullen's Concession Co. Ltd. 
Usutu Tin Co.Ltd. 
McCreedy Tins Ltd. 
Acton's Concessions Co.Ltd. 
Swaziland Gold & Land Co. 
A & I Estate & Exploration Co. 
S.A.Tin Co. Ltd. 
African Estates & Mining Co. 
Rylands Gold Mining Co. 
Indimba Land & Exploration Co.Ltd. 
New Goldfields Syndicate 
Henderson Forbes Gold Mining Co. 
Johnston Syndicate 
Swaziland Monopolies Syndicate 
Chester Diamond Drilling Co.Ltd. 
SHARE 
CAPITAL (/) 
,000 
500,000 
250,000 
250,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
75,000 
70,000 
50,000 
50,000 
36,000 
15,000 
7,500 
SWAZI 
EMPLOYEES 
403 
166 
900 
60 
128 
CONCESSIONS 
I. L. M. 
3 
11 
5 
2 
7 
2 
1 
1 
10 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
27 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
Sources : Rubie's Report of 1903 (Appendix lb), 
Swaziland Concessions Commission Report (J 906) 
K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.11 MS 418. 
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in particular the Swaziland Corporation and the Henderson Consolidated 
Corporation. 
Local officials of the companies were given easy access to 
Milner, Selborne and ,particularly, Coryndon; often 
by-passing the appointed Commission in the statement of their 
demands. To consolidate an effective lobby, the various capitalist 
interests,as well as individual farmers, formed the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in 1903. The Chamber saw itself involved 
in : 
"The persistent fight to rescue Swaziland from native 
absorption and to maintain through years of inoperation, 
cost and loss,those properties which by purchase and 
judicial confirmation were European property"(28). 
A Swaziland without whites and without capitalist development was 
an anathema to the Chamber. The Chamber's elected representatives, 
of which A.Miller,Chairman of the Swaziland Corporation, was a 
prominent personality, met regularly and published an annual 
progress report. On 21 October 1905, the Chamber was assured 
of the support of the E.Transvaal faction and on 28 October 1905, 
that of the farming community of Swaziland which had earlier 
29 banded itself together into a number of Farmer's Associations. 
In addition to the Chamber we have to reckon with the 
considerable, consolidated and vociferous advocation of their 
"rights" by the white residents. Personal representation, written 
petitions and the Times of Swaziland were the major channels of 
protest. The Swaziland Corporation published the Times as a 
continuous monitor of events and as a voice for white sentiment 
and interests. The paper undoubtedly played a significant role 
as a channel of information communication and concrete expression 
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of the interests of capitalist development in the country. Apart 
from comprehensive reports of events and issues of interest to 
concession-holders, the editorial policy of the paper shows a 
distinct white bias in which the aspirations of the Swazi were 
frequently criticised and the effects of white settlement and 
foreign capital invariably feted. The need for solidarity of 
aspiration and attitude within the petit-colon led to the 
conclusion in 1908 that : 
"The paper has exercised a powerful influence upon the 
public life and commercial development of Swaziland"(30). 
4.5 CAPITAL AND STATE LINKAGES 
A basic postulate of this study is that the colonial state 
played a fundamental role in the early capital penetration of 
Swaziland. This emerges both explicitly and implicitly at various 
points in Chapters Four through Seven. Bearing in mind the 
highly de-centralised decision making of the colonial state in 
relation to Swaziland (4.2), it is of value to draw out the 
linkages between capital and colonial state officials as background 
to the more specific discussion which ensues. To this end, personal 
linkages with capital interests are first discussed and then 
some privately and publicly articulated general attitudes towards 
capitalist development and the role of the Swazi in such development 
are elucidated. 
Marlowe (1976) contains a lucid exposition of Milner's links 
with metropolitan capital during his South African commission,the 
ways in which his obsessive concern with British capital interest-, 
in southern Africa affected his policy-making and the fact that 
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after leaving the colonial service he spent several years in 
31 the direct employ of capital. Marlowe contains no specific 
reference to Milner's Swaziland dealings but his negotiations 
with the Swaziland Corporation (4.6) indicate a fundamental 
empathy with the aims of capital in Swaziland. 
Selborne's entire career was in politics and the colonial 
service and there is consequently no overt personal linkage with 
capital,as with Milner. The revelation of possible non-apparent 
32 linkages awaits the publication of a definitive biography. The 
only discernable connection in the Swaziland case was with a 
British-financed settlement scheme for whites (5.3) which appears 
to have had a significant effect on his partition policy. 
Both Coryndon and Grey had very strong links with British 
capital prior to their Swaziland commissions. Stokes and Brown (1966) 
document Coryndon's period of employment by the British South 
Africa Company in Rhodesia and Palmer (1977) and Yaue (1978) 
consider the relationship between Coryndon's linkages with 
capital and his attitudes towards capitalist development. 
Brelsford (1965) and Coryndon (1914) show that Grey's work in 
Swaziland was his only colonial commission. The remainder of 
his career was spent in the service of capital in Central 
Africa (Appendix 3b). 
Selborne made few,if any, public declarations of policy 
towards development in Swaziland. In private,however,statements 
of support for capital interests were frequent. A characteristic 
of Selborne, in particular, in relation to the Swazi was his 
3 3 
extreme cultural and racial arrogance and dislike of the nation. 
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Thus he said to a delegation of farmers in 1907: 
"The Swazis are inferior...mentally,morally and 
intellectually. Continued contact of the European 
with them is necessary to raise them out of barbarism... 
it is our duty to elevate the native from his lowly 
state and make him useful for State and society. The 
first step is to teach him diligence, orderliness 
and obedience" (34). 
To Grey he later wrote : 
"They are indeed a most uninteresting people;stupid 
and sulky" (35). 
To the Colonial Secretary,Elgin,he said : 
"The Swazis are the most barbarous,least advanced,the 
least intelligent and the least reasonable of all 
natives living under the tribal system. Civilisation 
has made no progress with them, and at the head of the 
tribe is the Chief Regent who differs from the tribe 
in being clever but whose moral standard is lower than 
its average member"(36). 
Selborne's strong dislike for the Swazi Queen Regent can be 
traced to her opposition to the policies of the colonial state 
(Chapter Six). 
Coryndon,on the other hand, displays no such overt 
arrogance though his paternalism is clear in dealings with 
the Swazi. But as Youe writes: 
"Coryndon is often dismissed as a reactionary follower 
of Rhodes who was pro-settler and therefore anti-African. 
In fact,his attitudes were not that simple though his 
racial arrogance cannot be denied. He was 'pro-economic 
development* rather than pro-white or anti-black. In 
Swaziland he thought the whites were better suited to 
develop the land" (37). 
Coryndon's private and public expressions of support for capital 
were frequent. For instance, in his arrival speech in 1907 he 
saw his role in Swaziland as "expending all energy in the 
development of Swaziland" and he perceived the Swaziland situation 
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as : 
"A triumph of chaos. The complications which have 
hampered its development are fast disappearing and 
we can now work to transform the country into the 
home of a well-ordered,prosperous and contented 
British community" (38). 
Coryndon's attitude towards retaining the investment of the 
Swaziland Corporation in Swaziland can be seen as symptomatic 
of his general ethos (4.6). The role of the Swazi in 'development' 
was also apparent to Coryndon. In discussing •arious land 
partition schemes he argued for one which would hasten the 
breakdown of tribalism and which would ensure an evenly 
distributed labour supply which could be kept in closer contact 
with white demands. 
Grey's 'development' attitudes are clearly seen in the 
proceedings of his partition work (Chapter Five). 
Thus while there were no overt colonial state- capital linkages 
specifically in Swaziland (with the possible significant exception 
of Selborne) the general rationale of colonial state officials 
was clearly to further the aims of capital in Swaziland. This 
becomes apparent in considering the case of the Swaziland 
Corporation (4.6) and the land partition question (Chapter Five).39 
4.6 MONOPOLY EXPROPRIATION : THE CASE OF THE SWAZILAND CORPORATION 
In 1903 Rubie had recommended to Milner that all trading 
and industrial monopolies should be expropriated from the owners 
with compensation and that all land and mineral concessions 
40 
should be confirmed. The grounds for this differential 
treatment of concession;; are elucidated by Rubir. Historical!•„
 t 
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the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the monopolies 
were considered sufficient enough grounds for their expropriation. 
Socially, the confirmation of monopolies was regarded not to be 
in the public interest,however vaguely that was defined. The 
primary grounds were,however, economic ones. Thus, the need to 
maximise revenue for administration would be inhibited by the 
confirmation of importation monopolies and the trading/industrial 
monopolies were considered contrary to principles of laissez-faire 
4 
competition and therefore "a hindrance to legitimate development". 
The reasons for the expropriation decision were largely uncontested 
by capital though lobbying for liberal compensation was a feature 
42 of the Swaziland Concession Commission enquiry. 
The real objectives of capital lay elsewhere. These objectives 
were seriously transgressed by Rubie's recommendation that two 
concessions known as the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession 
and the Lapsed and Unallotted Minerals Concession should also 
be expropriated with compensation. These two concessions are 
reproduced in full in Appendix 3c. The response to Rubie's 
recommendation from the holders of the two concessions, the 
43 Swaziland Corporation, was immediate and persistent. The 
two concessions were of far-reaching implication and, if validated 
by the colonial state, would have confirmed the Corporation 
in the immediate control over three extra mineral and seven 
extra land concessions. It also implied that with the passage of 
time, the Corporation would eventually control all mineral rights 
and well over one million acres of land as concessions expired 
and lapsed. The speculative possibilities for the Corporation 
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under this monopolistic form of control were clearly immense. The 
colonial state, however, perceived a threat to its power in this 
form of monopolism and the Corporation was given access directly 
to the Governors,Milner and Selborne, so that the issue could 
44 be resolved. 
The Corporation considered that it bargained from a position 
of some strength: 
"This Corporation holds the chief commercial and 
financial position in Swaziland. It has been and is 
the pioneer company in that country"(45), 
and, 
"Swaziland and the Swaziland Corporation are synonymous 
terms under the British flag the Corporation will 
earn the reward that its capital,consistently directed 
in the exploitation of this country entitles it to"(46). 
The claimed holdings of the Corporation are given in Table Eight. 
Map Eleven was constructed to show the potential expansion of the 
Corporation's control over land if the Lapsed and Unallotted Land 
Concession had been confirmed. 
A.M.Miller,local manager of the Corporation, met with Milner 
in Pretoria on 28.12.1904 after the promulgation of the 1904 
Proclamation to present a case for the Corporation. Milner was 
compliant and compiled a joint memorandum with Miller outlining 
a deal with the Corporation. The interpretation of this memorandum 
was later to be a matter of some dispute. The Corporation 
undoubtedly saw it as an agreement though the Colonial Secretary, 
Elgin, later dismissed it as merely a tentative directive to 
47 the Swaziland Concessions Commission. Miller was consequently 
anxious to push through with the agreement but was thwarted by 
the wider forces that led to Milner's resignation in 1905 and the 
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TABLE EIGHT 
SWAZILAND CORPORATION HOLDINGS, 
A.MONOPOLIES 
Printing and publishing, Gas and electricity,Construction of animal 
Pounds, Banking, Lithography, Treatment of Tailings, Liquor Import, 
Liquor Manufacture (25%), Iron Manufacture (33%), Tobacco Import (25%), 
Diamond drills (25%). 
B.MINERAL CONCESSIONS . „ , . , „ , 
AreavAcres; 
M.75 Forbes Reef 55,050 
M.33 Horo 263,040 
M.36 McNab's 66,560 
*M.l Albu & Davis 9,600 
*M.27 Kannemeyer's 190,080 
(* Claimed as lapsed under the Lapsed and Unallotted Minerals 
Concession.) 
C.LAND CONCESSIONS 
L.153 Peebles 170,000 
L.177 Du Pont/Cummings 7,000 
L.10 Steyn's 13,000 
** Campbell's 32,000 
** Umvurulisn's 2,500 
** Bell's 100,000 
** Beatrice's 69,700 
** Mather's 20,000 
Total 414,200 
(** Claimed as lapsed under the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands 
Concession.) 
^.SUMMARY OF LAND HOLDINGS CLAIMED (Claimed : 1,245,160 acres) 
1. Land to be surveyed 414,200 3. Areas affected by 111,500 
_ _ , , . . „ _,, ,nr, personal ri ghts 
2. Land lapsing in 12 yrs 92,600 firing on death 
in 25 yrs 79,600 * 
->r nc ccn of owner 
in 35 yrs 65,560 
in 40 yrs 14,000 4. Grazing areas over 464,300 
which Co.claims rights 
Source : Swaziland Corporation(1903),Annual Reports K.C.L.MS MIL 1 08 3. 
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48 inception of Selborne as Governor. 
The memorandum itself (reproduced in Appendix 3d) contained 
an undertaking by the Corporation to forfeit all their monopolies 
and the two Lapsed and Unallotted concessions in exchange for 
the confirmation of ownership to five mineral concessions and 
title to a maximum of one million acres of land and an agreement 
to encourage white settlement of Corporation land holdings. 
The Swaziland Concessions Commission reported to Selborne 
on 7.7.1905 in a report critical of the Corporation for making 
no attempt to prove the value of their monopoly concessions as 
other corporate interests were doing at the time. The Commission 
nevertheless recommended to Selborne that the idea of a land 
grant to the Corporation in settlement of their claim was a 
reasonable one, on the condition that the Corporation's claims 
about the extent of their actual and potential holdings were 
substantiated by the General Survey,then in progress. Selborne 
did not appear to be in favour of the ad hoc proposals of the 
memorandum and agreed with the Commission that the survey should 
49 be completed first. The Corporation agreed to suspend their 
claims until 1907 though Miller accused Selborne of back-tracking 
on Milner*s memorandum. 
When the British directors of the Corporation petitioned 
the Colonial Office in early 1907 they were informed that Selborne 
would not negotiate further and that they should proceed with 
their claims through the Concessions Commission. The decision 
of the colonial state was acidly criticised by Miller in February, 
52 
1908. Despite the temporary closure of channels to the po?icy-
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makers of the colonial state : 
"Mr Miller attended all sessions of the Commission.... 
and most actively pressed the claims of his company 
to lands unallotted or lapsing at a future date"(53). 
Selborne appears, at least in 1907, to have been acting 
under advice from the Colonial Office. The Colonial Secretary,at 
one stage, advised him of the inadvisability of a generous 
arrangement with the Corporation and of a non-pecuniary 
54 
settlement. Selborne instructed the Concessions Commission 
to begin evaluating the Corporation's holdings including the 
55 two controversial concessions. 
The evaluations of the Commission were based on the guiding 
principle for the general expropriation of monopolies; that is, 
to minimise compensation costs for the administration. Thus 
only the pounds (/204) and the banking concessions (/5,109) were 
compensated and the value placed on the Lapsed and Unallotted 
/ 56 Lands Concession was/30,450. This total evaluation contrasts 
sharply with the Corporation's own evaluation of this concession 
at/ll6,000.57 
In September 1908 the Corporation was offered^35,763 as a 
cash settlement for their claims or in lieu of cash an area of 
5ft land of 350,000 acres, location undefined. ° The Corporation's 
British shareholders were incensed but were inclined to accept 
59 the cash compensation. The colonial state, ex officio, did 
make one last unsuccessful attempt at appeasement;Coryndon offered 
to approach Selborne about increasing the land offer by 200,000 
acres since : 
"It seems a pity that the long and intimate connection 
of the Swaziland Corporation with the country should be 
severed without an effort being made to retain these 
interests of vours" (60) 
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The Corporation were unmoved and were left with their mineral 
holdings,50,UoO acres of land (Map Eleven) and a cash payment 
to pay off their litigation debts. As a direct result the share 
capital of the Corporation was reduced to j^ 2 million and the 
Corporation considered devoting all its future attention to 
. . 61 
mining. 
The failure of the Corporation to achieve finally the 
degree of land control solicited was ultimately attributed by 
the Corporation to the replacement of Milner by Selborne as 
ft"? 
High Commissioner. No unequivocal evidence was uncovered that 
Selborne was acting under direct orders from the Colonial 
Secretary although the Secretary did remark,somewhat enigmatically, 
in late 1907 that : 
"His Majesty's Government would find great difficulty 
in defending an arrangement which seems to be too 
generous to the Corporation."(63) 
Rather, Selborne seems to have taken a more thorough and pragmatic 
approach to the whole problem, desiring that a precise definition 
of Corporation holdings should be obtained. To this end he 
appears to have preferred to work through the appointed Swaziland 
Concessions Commission in search of a solution. It was the 
Commission's recommendations that eventually dictated Selborne's 
policy and the Commission were far from generous in their 
treatment of the Corporation's case for the following reasons. 
First, the Commission challenged the circumstances surrounding 
the acquisition of the Lapsed and Unallotted Concessions. These 
(jero s^^n to bo highly dubious, as was Miller's role in their 
acquisition though Miller himself strenuously denied the accunaticr 
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Second, although the Corporation repeatedly claimed liberal 
treatment on the grounds of its opening up of Swaziland to 
British capital, the Commission argued that the capital was 
predominantly prospective and not realised. It was concluded 
that the Corporation therefore held its interests for speculative 
purposes. ThJrd, while the colonial state preferred that a 
private company should take responsibility for the opening up of 
a white settlement programme, it was argued that : 
"It is inadvisable to have large areas of single 
ownership of land as the experience of Transvaal and 
Rhodesia show that settlement and development is 
impeded by this form of ownership"(65). 
Monopolism of the form advocated by the Corporation as conducive 
to capitalist development was conseguently abhorted by the colonial 
state as, in fact, not in the best interests of capitalism 
in Swaziland. 
4:7 CONCLUSION 
The examination in this chapter has been of the aims of 
capital in relation to control over land, labour and mineral 
resources for prospective mining, plantation agriculture and 
white settlement schemes in Swaziland. The consolidation of 
a formerly-disparite petit-colon in pursuit of the common goal 
of achieving dominance over the forces of production was, it is 
argued, a noteworthy feature of the early years of British 
colonial rule. Articulation of demands in collusive interaction 
vi th the colonial state was facilitated by the local and 
"'etrcpoli ta'> i r ^ rosen t^ t Ives of foreign c<-pi+"al. The Sva73^r' 
Corporation, in particular, is seen to have a fundamental role in 
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this laying of the groundwork for the articulation of the Swazi 
into a new set of social relations under the capitalist mode 
of production. The case of the Swaziland Corporation per se in 
its attempts to obtain monopoly control is presented to highlight 
a particular facet of interaction between capital and the colonial 
state, where despite basic ideological empathy conflict arose 
on the best means of implementing capitalist development in 
Swaziland. 
The actions of the colonial state as a mediator between 
the petit-colon, the implementation of its inflexible demands and 
the Swazi, in the translation of the capitalist ideology into 
space is presented in Chapters Five and Six. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE 
"There is nothing haphazard in the partition" 
Times of Swaziland,1908 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the access of capital interests to the 
colonial state is first considered in relation to petit-colon 
lobbying with regard to the question of alternative spatial 
schema for land control (5.2). Then, the spatial implementation 
of the provisions of the 190 7 Partition Proclamation by the 
colonial state is considered. The selection of a suitable 
proportional division of land between black and white is 
examined and the attitudes of the colonial state towards crown 
land are shown to have worked to the advantage of the petit-colon 
(5.3). The explicit and implicit principles underlying the 
spatial division of land are then analysed in some detail (5.4). 
Some summarised comments on the social and economic structure of 
space are then proferred (5.5). 
5.2 ALTERNATIVE SCHEMA 
A reading of the sources shows that five different schema 
were proposed to effect an alienation of land in Swaziland and 
create reserves for the Swazi. In this section, each of these is 
examined in turn; identifying its protagonists, critics and 
the reasons for its acceptance or rejection by the colonial state. 
100 
Such an exercise highlights the interplay between capital and the 
petit-colon and the colonial state,represented by the Concessions 
Commission, the administrators Milner,Selborne and Coryndon, and 
the Colonial Office in London. Initially,however, there is a need 
to consider two foundational issues upon which the schema were 
built. These issues which confronted the colonial state were, 
firstly, whether to effect a general expropriation (cancellation 
with compensation) of land and grazing concessions from the 
holders, and ,secondly, when this course of action was decided 
against whether to partition the land surface between black 
and white or to allow both to occupy the land concurrently. 
Rubie's report (Appendix lb), on whose recommendations 
Milner's policy was based, considered a general expropriation 
of land and grazing concessions by the colonial state, along the 
lines of the industrial monopoly expropriation, to be both 
undesirable and unnecessary. It would involve the administration 
in additional expense and , in addition : 
"The requirements of the public interest can hardly warrant 
a general expropriation" (1). 
"Public interest" was conceived in the narrowest sense as that 
of capital and the petit-colon. Thus, for Milner, expropriation 
was a dead issue and he became a clear advocate of a land partition 
which would give white and black mutually exclusive ownership 
to different portions of the land surface : 
"Milner's idea was to divide the country up so that each 
concessionaire had a piece of ground over which the 
natives had no right and in return from this immunity 
from native interference to give up a portion of his 
concession"(2). 
A general expropriation of all concessions was consequently 
101 
3 
rejected by the colonial state in the 1904 Proclamation. Although 
Selborne later mentioned it again in a letter to Elgin in 1906 
he indicated that he too could not seriously countenance 
expropriation as a viable strategy to further white interests . He 
also indicated that it would place an intolerable burden on 
4 local revenues. 
Selborne's major dilemma in pursuit of a solution to "the 
problem which has vexed me more than any other" was whether 
to follow the course of partition favoured by Milner and pressed 
for by the petit-colon or to favour a concurrent black-white 
landholding until the expiry of the concessions when the land 
would return to exclusive Swazi ownership. Prior to September,1906, 
and his official visit to Swaziland, Selborne still countenanced 
concurrency but deemed it inadvisable on several counts* In 
particular, he saw a natural increase of the Swazis and the 
likely increase in white immigration as eventually posing 
insurmountable difficulties for white enterprise under concurrency : 
"Indeed as long as the present system of joint occupation 
exists it will be impossible to develop the country 
agriculturally" (6). 
On his return from Swaziland, with his views reinforced by those 
of the petit-colon, he considered a Spatial division of land 
between black and white imperative since without it : 
"Whites would eventually leave and men who were valuable 
in civilising the country would be lost"(7). 
Selborne appears to have given particular weight to the 
arguments of the Swaziland Chamber of Mining,Commerce and Industry 
g 
against concurrency. The Chamber argued that a bureaucratic 
legal structure would be a pre-requisite to ensure whites 
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"the unrestricted right to exercise all rights in the original 
concessions" and to prevent the wholesale immigration of blacks 
from the Transvaal into Swaziland. In addition, they argued that 
the possibilities for exploiting resources would be minimal : 
"The concessionaire feels he cannot make beneficial use 
of his rights without risk of native disturbance. They 
are convinced no progress and no development of natural 
agricultural resources can take place unless rights are 
seperated"(9). 
One white resident was more vitriolic : 
"They are the laziest,dirtiest and most degrading of all 
Bantu tribes...the undoubted resources of the country 
can only be developed by European brains and industry. 
Solve the concession problem and light would dawn. The 
Swazie will never fulfil God's command to subdue the 
earth;'From him that hath not must be taken away even 
that he hath' must take its course, and this fair land 
so long made hideous and vile must be entrusted to the 
European whose watchword is 'Forward Swaziland' "(10). 
Other criticisms of concurrency were that the whites would 
not have security of title to land on which to make capital 
investments, that the mobile Swazi would "spread out" and leave 
no land suitable for white agriculture and that grass burning 
by the Swazi would destroy white grazing and crops. A type 
comment on the perceived negative impact on white enterprise 
was : 
"The property of the concessionaire is worthless. What 
is the good of the concessionaire turning out cattle 
if the natives could do the same,eat the grass and 
introduce disease" (12) 
A crucially reiterated criticism of concurrency was that 
the farmer would have no control over his labour supply under 
13 such an arrangement. A partition was considered a necessity 
by the petit-colon and the colonial state was assured of white 
support if they retained at least 60% of the land surface and the 
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power to retain Swazis on their land if required as a labour 
T 14 supply. 
For Selborne, the only real advantage of concurrency was 
that Swazi rights would only gradually be eroded and : 
"Their imagination would be confronted with no sudden 
loss of rights over great tracts of Swaziland" (15). 
This was related to his only uneasiness with partition which 
revolved around the possibility of effecting it without violent 
Swazi reaction. He argued that built into any partition scheme 
should be certain provisos which would minimise the chances of 
unrest. These included that there should be no forced removal 
of Swazis to reserves and that Swazis wishing to move should have 
a minimal distance to travel. 
An implicit colonial assumption of both Milner and Selborne 
was that the petit-colon rights to the land surface superceded 
those of the Swazi and that partition was a concrete spatial 
exercise which would afford greater control over both land and 
labour. The Rand Daily Mail of 5.1.1905 commented : 
"On the question of delimitation there has been a certain 
tendency to lay stress upon what the Europeans are 
prepared to give the natives and to say little about the 
rights of the Swazi themselves". 
It is now possible to move on to a consideration of various 
alternative mooted partition schema. Clause 20 of the 1904 
Proclamation stated that : 
"Nothing in this proclamation shall in any way affect the 
continued use and occupation by natives of the land now 
in their possession and of all grazing or agricultural 
rights to which they are entitled....but it shall be 
lawful for the Commission to set apart a portion of any 
concession for the sole and exclusive occupation of 
natives and thereupon all rights of the holder shall cease 
in respect of the portion of land so set apart but the 
remaining portion of land shall not be subject to any such 
use and occupation." 
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The initial interpretation of Milner's directive by the 
Swaziland Concessions Commission is embodied in the first 
partition scheme of 1905, popularly called the "Spotted Dog 
Partition" at the time. 
PROPOSAL ONE : THE CONCESSIONS COMMISSION PARTITION SCHEME,1905 
In all deliberations of the Commission the assumption was 
that the majority of the land surface (excluding crown land) was 
the property of the petit-colon and hence that the Swazi 
should retain "all grazing or agricultural rights to which they 
are entitled" was explicitly construed as being merely as much 
land as was required for the immediate purposes of each Swazi 
family. 
To determine this requirement the Commission sat in Pretoria 
in 1905 to consider evidence from South Africa. Two South African 
Native Affairs officials were questioned by the Commission as to 
"native requirements". Their findings are presented in Table 
Nine. Taberer's strictures must be interpreted in the light of 
his belief that : 
"It is against the interests of the country and the 
natives themselves to provide for more than the 
present generation" (17). 
He argued that surplus population could then be directed to 
labour centres. Krogh appears to have been more lenient in his 
attitude to future expansion. At this stage, however, the Commission 
tended to agree with Taberer. A white delegation was informed 
that : 
"The Swaziland Concessions Commission has ordered what 
are the Swazi•s present requirements we make no 
provision for the future at all"(18). 
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TABLE NINE 
NATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICIALS PERCEPTIONS OF BLACK 
LAND REQUIREMENTS 
Agricultural Land
 # Grazing Total Total 
Required(acres/family) Required Required Swazi 
(acres/head) (acres/ Reqd. 
family) (acres) 
J.C.KROGH 
M.M.TABERER 
30 
8 
2.1 
2.0 
50 
28 
837,000 
500,000 
* Both officials set family size at 7. 
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In the deliberations of the Commission two issues specific 
to Swaziland were ignored. First, the continental rinderpest 
epidemic touched Swaziland in the late 1890's producing stock 
losses estimated at 65,000 between 1901-4 : 
"Within a short period the country was practically 
denuded of stock" (19). 
It was impossible to trace any reference to suggest the Commission 
took this into account. 
Second, given the prevailing level of Swazi technology and 
farming practice, family variables such as size and stockholding, 
the hierarchical structure of traditional society, and particularly 
the factor of environmental diversity, the advisability of 
producing a single land requirement which would be indiscriminatly 
applied could well be questioned. Table Ten shows the land 
actually found under Swazi use in the two locations for which 
they collected data when in Swaziland. The differences with 
Table Nine are salutory. 
With the Native Affairs figures in mind the Commission 
envisaged setting apart land on each defined concession for the 
Swazis resident on that concession. The Commission went to 
Swaziland from July to December,1905, to effect this piecemeal 
partition in the field on two concessions which had been defined 
by the general survey. 
The scheme was aborted in December,1905, as a result of 
consolidated protest from the petit-colon : 
"It is seldom that an outburst of public opinion so 
unanimous and widespread greets a public act in 
this country" (21). 
Protest against what was perceived as the random scattering of 
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TABLE TEN 
LAND UNDER BLACK USE IN SWAZILAND 
Families Acres Used Acres/Family 
MBABANE AREA BLOCK 1 
2 
3 
4 
9 
24 
7 
16 
673 
2592 
914 
1174 
74 
108 
130 
78 
LOWVELD BLOCK 279 24534 88 
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small Swazi allotments over concessions can be crystallised into 
four issues. First, it was claimed that the scheme was a blatantly 
uneconomical and time-consuming mode of solution. Second,equality 
of treatment was demanded. Under the Commission scheme it was 
unlikely that an equal proportion would be deducted from each 
concession. Third, it was claimed that the creation of a "great 
native rabbit warren" would promote conflict between white and 
22 
black. Fourth,it was forcefully argued that white agricultural 
development would be inhibited. 
Thus,Forbes,of the Henderson-Forbes Gold Mining Co..claimed 
the whites would be deprived of all quality land. Penfold,of the 
Henderson Consolidated Corporation, desired that whites should 
have free access to water resources and consolidated blocks of 
land. Miller, of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd.. was more vocal : 
"The impracticality is that if the farms are cut up by 
small areas for natives in a country where the native 
is an absolute savage (with associated practices) the 
farming development of the country is at an end"(23). 
Selborne agreed with such sentiments and abandoned the scheme 
initiated under Milner in early 1906. 
Having obtained an assurance from the colonial state that 
a partition was to be effected, the petit-colon were not loath 
to profer suggestions of their own for its implementation 
(Proposals Two and Three). 
PROPOSAL TWO : THE PETIT-COLON LOCATION PARTITION SCHEME 
A proposed alternative solution by the petit-colon was 
to set apart large'locations' or reserves for the Swazi into 
which they could be forcibly moved if necessary. Generally, 
either a single block or four blocks of land were proposed as most 
109 
suitable .The scheme was officially proposed for the first time 
in Commission sittings in early 1905 and is elucidated in 
a newspaper editorial of a later date : 
"Four large blocks should be expropriated. One in the 
south to accomodate natives living south of the River 
Usutu, one in the east, one in the west for the hill 
residents and one in the north for those north of the 
River Komati" (24). 
The forced removal of large numbers of Swazis to these 
reserves was a fundamental tenet of this scheme, leaving the 
remainder of the land surface in petit-colon possession and 
free for capitalist agricultural development. The petit-colon 
were also concerned,however, about how to retain alack labour 
for their usage. The production and control of a labour force 
was a basic consideration in their proposal that the total area 
of the reserves be 50% of that which the Commission considered 
necessary for the whole population. Swazis could then be forced 
to move to the reserves or be kept on white land as tenants. 
This scheme does not,however, appear to have been 
seriously countenanced by the colonial state (either the 
Commission or Selborne) since it patently violated Selborne's 
fundamental principles of partition that there should be no 
forced movement of Swazis and that potential voluntary movements 
to reserves should be of minimal distance. 
PROPOSAL THREE : THE PETIT-COLON HIERARCHICAL PARTITION 
This scheme, to which all petit-colon interests gave 
assent, embodied an implicit recognition on the part of the 
whites that the traditional hierarchy should be recognised in 
25 any partition. The concommitant advantage to the whites from this 
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perceived appeasement of the indigeneous power structure was 
seen as greater control over the rank and file Swazi. Two 
similair hierarchical plans were mooted at different times. These 
are presented in Table Eleven. 
In Plan One it was proposed that the 30 acres per family 
be held in consolidated blocks on the borders of each white farm 
which was over 6000 acres in area. These blocks would initially 
be for the Swazis resident on that farm but Swazis resident on 
farms of less than 6000 acres could move to these blocks over 
a proposed period of five years. Thus, there would be a labour 
pool on the periphery of each large land-holding. 
In Plan Two all white farms were to have blocks for 
Swazis,irrespective of their size. Each farm was to have one 
block and it would be formed by a constant proportion of land 
being deducted from each farm. The blocks would be on the 
borders of the farms,as with Proposal One, and the Swazis outside 
the blocks would be given three years to move to them. The 
advantage of this scheme over Plan One was that each farm would 
have its own labour pool, irrespective of its size. 
In both Plans the power controllers of the Swazi were to 
be allotted land held by the Crown. 
The similarities of these Plans to Proposal Two will be 
appreciated but they had the distinct advantage of creating 
reserves for surplus labour while retaining a proportion of the 
Swazi populace on,or close to, white farms as an immediately 
exploitable labour force. If it was deemed desirable that some 
Swazis would remain on the farms as tenants,this possibility was 
also provided for. 
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TABLE ELEVEN 
HIERARCHICAL LAND PARTITION PROPOSALS 
A. PLAN ONE 
13 dignitaries : 5000 to 6000 acres each 
Swazis : 30 acres per family 
Total Swazi land : 574,000 acres 
B. PLAN TWO 
Queen Regent : 12,000 acres 
District Chiefs : 18 blocks of 3000 to 6000 acres 
each 
Swazis : 60 acres per family 
Total Swazi land : 1,097,400 
Sources : Plan One - Times of Swaziland.21.10.1905 
Plan Two - Memorandum from Chamber of Mining,Commerce 
and Industry to Selborne,29.9.1906,SNA J205/06. 
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The grounds of the colonial state for the rejection of 
this scheme was again the desire to avoid unrest by minimising 
necessary African movement. The confirmation to as many Swazi 
as possible of land actually in their possession was viewed 
27 by Selborne as an essential starting point for security. The 
Swazi should also be given the choice to move at least for a 
period of time. But as Selborne patronisingly wrote in 1907 : 
"The chief object of reserves is not to compel all 
natives to go into these areas but to move of their 
own free will. As a rule natives make little use of 
these reserves. The native choses his Master and looks 
up to him for help,advice and protection....it is our 
duty to elevate the native from his lowly state to 
become useful for State and Society"(28). 
The response of the petit-colon to the rejection of the 
proposals highlights the rationale behind them : 
"These proposals,if adopted,would have opened the country 
to the full tide of European capital and energy"(29). 
But for Selborne,it was not an outright rejection. He acknowledged 
his debt to the Plans in the formulation of his final solution: 
"I considered and accepted their basic plan and built 
on it" (30). 
In particular he noted their willingness to part with one-third 
of the area of their concessions. 
PROPOSAL FOUR : THE SWAZI PROPOSAL 
The response of the Swazi to the deliberations in which their 
say was minimal is considered in greater depth in Chapter Six. 
However, the Queen Regent reportedly proposed a scheme which came 
31 in for vitriolic attack from the Times of Swaziland. The 
proposal was that one-third of Swaziland be transferred to the 
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Transvaal in return for an annuity of </4,000 and the reservation 
of the remaining two-thirds for the Swazi. 
The idea does not appear to have been seriously countenanced 
by the colonial state since it ran counter to petit-colon and 
state interests but it does indicate the oft-expressed Swazi 
32 desire to retain total control over a consolidated land surface. 
PROPOSAL FIVE : THE SOLUTION OF THE COLONIAL STATE:GREY'S PARTITION. 
The actual scheme chosen for the spatial implementation 
of land alienation under capitalism was attendant upon the final 
delimitation of concession boundaries by the general survey and 
is embodied in the Partition Proclamation of 1907 (Appendix 4a). 
Among the salient points of the Proclamation were the 
disbanding of the Concessions Commission and the appointment 
of a single Commissioner to effect a partition (Article 3), 
provision for the deduction of one-third of the area of each 
concession for the creation of Swazi reserves (Article 4), the 
confirmation to whites of either freehold title or leasehold 
title to the remainder of each concession(Article 7) and a five-
year period of grace for the Swazi to move to the reserves (Article 6). 
To force the Swazi resident on white land either to move to 
the reserves or to accept a tenancy relationship with the white 
landowner, a tax or labour tribute was exactable by the landowner 
after the expiry of the five-year period, payable on pain of 
eviction (Article 6). 
This scheme is considered in some depth in 5.3 through 5.5. 
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5.3 QUANTITY DIVISION 
An outcome of the abandonment of the Concessions Commission 
partition scheme (5.2) was petit-colon realization that any 
scheme incorporating similair principles of quantity-division 
would leave them in control of much less than 50% of the land 
surface. A one third : two thirds division between black and white, 
while construed as unnecessarily generous to the Swazi, was 
determined upon as an alternative principle for bargaining with 
the colonial state. To ensure internal cohesion and harmony within 
the petit-colon, it was proposed that a similair proportion be 
33 deducted from each holding. 
Selborne complied with the proposal, having anticipated 
greater difficulty in obtaining such an agreement, and ratified 
it to them in a memorandum on 12.10.1907, and in a statement 
of policy on 6.1.1908 : 
"At the request of the concessionaires,not that of the 
Swazis,I am dividing the country. In my opinion they 
are quite right to clamour for partition,because the 
concessions over the land are worthless as long as the 
natives have unrestricted right to prior use.... it was 
the concessionaires themselves who offered to me to 
surrender one-third and I accepted the offer on the 
understanding they should retain the balance of the 
concessions for their own use" (34) 
A significant condition articulated by the petit-colon in their 
offer was concerned with utilization of the Swazi as a labour 
supply : 
"A division of rights is necessary. The Europeans will 
agree to this if not more than 30% of the land is taken 
for the natives, if they do not cause trouble and if 
the Swazies are allowed to remain on white land as a 
labour supply" (35). 
Selborne's unprotesting compliance implied that a mere 25.2% 
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of the land surface would be retained for Swazi reserves but was 
to be interpreted in the light of the large pre-partition crown 
holdings of 1,056,619 acres available for disposal by the colonial 
state ( Map Twelve). 
If all crown land had been transferred to Swazi possession, 
over 50% of the land surface would have been under their control. 
The Swazi were fallaciously led to believe that this was colonial 
state policy for a period of time. Colonial Secretary,Elgin, 
addressing a Swazi delegation in November 1907 said : 
"It is provided that there shall be a deduction of one-
third of its area from every land concession. That is 
an enormous deduction to make .... and I believe that 
taken in conjunction with lands belonging to the crown 
it will make so ample a provision for native occupation 
that half the land will be in their occupation"(36). 
At the local level,Coryndon made the same assumption : 
"In addition to the one thirds there are large areas of 
crown land which will be available for native settlement. 
Therefore the Swazi will see that the first thing the 
British Government did was to give half the country 
back to the Swazis"(37). 
Other forces were at work to prevent the wholesale transfer 
of crown land coming to pass. First, Selborne had instructed the 
Partition Commissioner,Grey, to provide enough land for the 
accomodation of the whole Swazi tribe and the "reasonable expansion 
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of the tribe by birth not immigration". Grey later estimated 
that one-third of the total area of the country was sufficient 
to fulfil this condition (5.4). Little store was set by the 
wholesale transfer of crown land ; only as much as was required 
to bring the Swazi holding up from 25.2% to one-third. In the 
final analysis this was 35% of crown land. 
Second, a number of colonial state officials held highly 
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critical views of tribalism,traditional culture and the efficiency 
and utility of the traditional mode of agricultural production ; 
in particular, of shifting cultivation and extensive pastoralism. 
Land alienation and restriction of cultivable and grazing area 
was viewed as a concrete means to effect basic changes in the 
traditional mode : 
"By limiting the area available for native agriculture 
and pasturage, land will be improved by the necessity 
for closer grazing and less primitive methods of cultivation 
and will therefore be able to bear a larger native 
population than now on it. The present practice of 
shifting agriculture and impoverishing the soil will 
then cease" (39). 
This constituted a powerful justification for limiting the 
designated area to one-third. It also implied that the colonial 
state was perfectly justified in expropriating two-thirds of the 
land surface for "modern","efficient" capitalist agriculture 
under the petit-colon and that the traditional society would 
inevitably benefit from being tied more closely to cash-cropping 
in the money-economy. 
Third, the colonial state began to perceive crown land as 
a realisable asset - a mechanism to generate income for the 
administrative costs of the country and ,incidentally as a mears 
for consolidating the petit-colon via a joint capital-state 
settlement scheme. Sale of crown lands to individual whites 
and corporate interests generated an income of j£ 58,000 between 
JT 40 
1910-15 and a further/79,000 between 1916-25. In 1909, the 
Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme was founded as a joint exercise 
between state and capital to "acquire land suitable for the 
settlement of Britishers in Swaziland". Th« purchase of 67,000 
118 
acres from the crown at a nominal price by "anonymous public 
spirited men assisted by Lord Lovat and the Earl of Selborne" 
instigated a scheme which deprived the Swazi of any realistic 
41 chance of obtaining crown land from the colonial state. 
A simple calculation reveals that the Swazi were allocated 
36.9% of the land surface instead of a rounded one-third. This 
differential could be set down to operational error but was it 
transpires a curious attempt at window-dressing by Grey and 
Selborne, which strikingly portrays the mentality which the 
colonial state brought to bear on the land question as a whole. 
Grey suggested to Selborne that he could add some unproductive 
land to the demarcated one-third to make the partition appear 
more generous to the Swazi than it in fact was. It appears that 
this suggestion was designed to pacify the belief that Elgin 
had made a promise to the Swazi about the amount of land they were 
to receive. Selborne replied : 
"I think it well, where you could easily do it, to add 
to the native reserves a lump or two of land. I under-
stand that the land thus added would not be of good 
quality or capable of supporting a large population and 
that in addition it would be a shop-window addition;but 
I think it a legitimate and not unwise thing to do under 
the circumstances. It is legitimate to add some poor 
land to forestall the ignorant criticism that we are 
taking away two-thirds of the land surface from them"(42). 
Grey's agreement to this explains the discrepancy, although he 
was later to note that he had not been able to add as much as 
43 he had hoped without incurring compensation costs. 
At partition,therefore, the petit-colon was given control 
of 49.2% of the land surface, consolidated further to 58% by the 
later purchase of crown land. 
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5.4 PROCEDURAL CRITERIA 
The translation of the principle of land expropriation into 
physical space was effected by George Grey,appointed by Selborne 
as Partition Commissioner,between January and December 1908 in 
44 
continuous consultation with both Selborne and Coryndon. 
Thirty two reserves were eventually demarcated after an 
extensive field survey. These are shown in Map Thirteen. The 
apparently haphazard patchwork has little obvious order and it is 
therefore expedient at this stage to identify the set of procedural 
critera . with which Grey worked and to determine to what extent 
it is a function of a structure of capitalist articulation. This 
set,culled from a number of different sources, is presented here 
in numerical form for the sake of clarity. 
(1) The question of explicit boundary demarcation was one 
which pre-occupied Grey and Coryndon. At Coryndon's request 
Grey attempted to use rivers and streams as clear demarcation 
lines : 
"Wherever possible I have adopted well defined watersheds, 
watercourses or rivers as boundaries of native areas,such 
boundaries will be easily understood and recognised by 
the natives" (45). 
Thus of a total boundary length of 1690 miles, 613 was perenial 
river. The greater proportion of the remaining boundaries was made 
up of concession boundaries. 
Grey also foresaw the possibility of the necessity for more 
definitive boundaries with white agricultural development : 
"Whereas rivers may be suitable now,in a few years when 
white land is better occupied and stocked many difficulties 
will arise particularly if the white farmer wishes to fence 
he would have to fence out water. I recommend that if a 
white farmer wished to fence and still use water he may 
submit a line of fence which crosses the river two or more 
times but which ensures a fair proportion of river is on 
each side of the fence" (46). 
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(2) Selborne assumed that by confirming land already being 
utilised to the Swazi (see 6), a partition would produce a situation 
in which greater than one third of "fertile land" would be in 
their possession. Grey later claimed that "fifty per cent of the 
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most fertile portions of Swaziland are in native area". 
Crush (1975) has argued,however, that Grey's claim is difficult 
to substantiate (Table Twelve). 
In the field Grey tried to obtain information from Swazi 
Chiefs about the land they were cultivating and which they 
considered most desirable for agriculture, for inclusion in 
the reserves. The response to his request was uniform : 
"Generally I was given little or no information by 
the Chiefs I visited. Usually they explained quite 
civilly that without the Chief Regent's orders they 
were unable to point out the land they most required"(49). 
Consequently Grey could only make his own evaluation of land 
the Swazi considered desirable though he was confident of his 
own perceptions : 
"I am confident that my partition will be found to have 
provided for all the requirements of the native and 
that the interests of the Swazi have been made known 
to me as well as if they had co-operated" (50) 
Nevertheless the reserve network thus contains no overt expression 
of Swazi land desirability. 
(3) The partition pattern is,however, related to Grey's 
perception of the four environmental provinces identified in 
Chapter One : 
"The middleveld is the most thickly inhabited district and 
has a greater capacity for carrying a large native population 
than any other portion of Swaziland. The severe winters of 
the highveld and the prevalent malaria in the lowveld seem 
less desirable to the nation than the middleveld while 
the natives appreciate the valleys of the highveld and the 
fertile middleveld, the concessionaires value more than any 
TABLE TWELVE 
GREY'S PARTITION : LAND QUALITY AND EQUITY 
TOTAL 
ACREAGE 
(Murdoch) 
GREY'S NATIVE 
AREAS ACREAGE 
AS Good soil -
BS Fair soil -
CS Poor soil -
DS V.Poor soil 
ES Until.soil 
AT Good soil -
BT Fair soil -
CT Poor soil -
uT V.Poor soil 
ET Until.soil 
suitable slopes 
suitable slopes 
suitable slopes 
- suitable slopes 
- slopes < 14 
too steep slopes 
too steep slopes 
too steep slopes 
- too steep slopes 
- slopes 14 1, 
390,000 
260,000 
720,000 
880,000 
260,000 
70,000 
140,000 
250,000 
200,000 
140,000 
GT Soil ratings A-D,too steep 1,800,000 
slopes 
HM Until.soils,all slopes(ES,ET) 1,400,000 
AN Good soils,all slopes(AS,AT) 460,000 
148,396 
63,342 
222,042 
412,919 
87,676 
29,256 
37,536 
70,564 
52,210 
340,259 
529,285 
427,935 
177,652 
% OF EACH LAND 
CAPABILITY 
CATEGORY IN 
NATIVE AREAS 
38.05 
24.36 
30.83 
46.92 
33.72 
41.79 
26.81 
28.22 
26.11 
29.84 
% OF TOTAL 
NATIVE AREA IN 
EACH LAND 
CAPABILITY 
CATEGORY 
10.1 
4.3 
15.2 
28.2 
6.0 
2.0 
2.6 
4.8 
3.6 
23.2 
H 
29.43 
30.57 
38.50 
36.1 
29.2 
12.1 
Source : Crush (1975) p. 43, based on land capability survey by Murdoch (1970). 
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other area, the highveld grass for winter grazing.At 
the present time most concessionaires value land more 
for its pastoral than agricultural possibilities and 
they therefore have a large proportion of lowveld"(51). 
Thus as Table Thirteen shows, the Middleveld was Grey's 
favoured zone for reserve demarcation ; based, it might be added, 
on Grey's perception of the desires of capital which do not 
entirely accord with the stated aims of capital, outlined 
elsewhere (4.3). The Middleveld was not to be the exclusive 
preserve of the Swazi,however, since white interests were 
generally paramount : 
"In the middleveld I have suceeded in keeping out of 
native area two large stretches in which a considerable 
white farming population might find settlement"(52). 
A contemporary observer of Grey's work made an additional comment 
upon the relationship of the network to the environmental 
provinces: 
"The Commissioner in his work has obviously proceeded on 
a method, and that method has been to define the alternate 
European and native areas on latitudinal lines - that is 
as near as possible strips of land running from the 
western to the eastern border"(53). 
No such articulation could be located in the writing of Grey,however. 
(4) Grey determined that any land already under white 
occupation and cultivation in 1908 was automatically precluded 
from the reserves. Thus in Grey's preliminary fieldnotes,which 
were sent to Selborne,there are references such as : 
"The best agricultural land and much good grazing land 
is left to the white owner....the white owner should be 
well satisfied with the portions;the most accessible are 
left to him....the portion left to the concessionaire 
contains some of the finest grazing country in Swaziland, 
is well watered and contains good agricultural land"(54) 
(5) The basic network of defined concessions within which 
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TABLE THIRTEEN 
LAND PARTITION BY ENVIRONMENTAL PROVINCE 
PROVINCE. % OF SWAZI LAND IN 
EACH ZONE. 
% OF EACH ZONE 
DEMARCATED AS 
SWAZI LAND. 
HIGHVELD 
MIDDLEVELD 
LOWVELD 
LEBOMBO 
22.6 
44.3 
27.6 
5.5 
100.0 
29.3 
48.5 
33.6 
27.3 
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Grey was to effect a partition undoubtedly exercised a set of 
spatial constraints on the possibility for producing consolidated 
or symmetrical reserves. That Grey exercised his perogative not 
to deduct a rigid on third from every concession represents,in 
part,an attempt to circumvent these constraints. A further 
complication would have arisen if concession sub-divisions had 
been considered. Information on subdivision was only supplied by 
the petit-colon on one concession and all others were assumed 
to be discrete wholes by Grey. 
The one third portions, together with the crown land being 
used, were arranged to form compact blocks wherever the network 
constraints permitted, under instruction from Selborne : 
"I have attempted to make the native areas as large as 
possible and at the same time to cut off exactly a third 
of all land interests" (55). 
Grey consolidated 32 blocks from the portions of 181 defined 
concessions, though with a considerable size range (2,900 to 
259,000 acres) and a mean size of 45,700 acres (Appendix 5b). 
Selborne's directive to Grey in consolidation was that : 
"The native areas must not be in one place nor in a very 
few blocks. Neither should they be numerous small portions 
dotted and mixed up with white farms which would lead 
to friction and the diminished value of the white farms. 
Avoid the evils of undue concentration and undue 
dissemination" (56) 
The stated rationale for a degree of consolidation was thus 
(a) to minimize prospective black-white friction, and (b) to 
preserve aggregated blocks of land for unfettered white enterprise. 
Coryndon, while acknowledging the so-called evils of dissemination 
held a degree of fragmentation to be desirable for a number 
of reasons; (i) "the natives are easier to supervise and control", 
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(ii) tribalism could be more easily broken up, (iii) the "material 
development" of the Swazi would be more rapid and thorough if they 
were kept in closer touch with the surrounding white population, 
and (iv) the supply of black labour would be more evenly distributed 
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and could be more rapidly developed by closer contact with demand. 
From the comments of Selborne,Coryndon and Grey it is arguable 
that the spatial pattern is a function of policy which pre-supposed 
the expediency of cultural,social and economic domination of 
the Swazi by the petit-colon. It also reflects the desire of the 
colonial state to promote the articulation of the Swazi into 
the capitalist mode under a new set of social relations. 
The desire of the colonial state to minimise the possibilities 
of social and political instability, and fulfil its role as a 
politically stabilising force,has already been seen as introducing 
the principles of (i) no forced movement of Swazi to the reserves, 
and (ii) minimization of potential distance to be travelled for 
those who did chose to move (5.2). Accessibility of reserves to 
all Swazi is a further element in the consolidation of blocks 
by Grey. Thus no point on white land is greater than ten miles 
from the nearest reserve. 
Notwithstanding it was always a clear assumption of the 
colonial state that the great majority of alienated Swazi would 
chose to remain on expropriated land and enter into tribute 
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or labour contracts with the petit-colon. 
A further factor encouraging consolidation was that while 
there was a consensus that traditional agricultural practices 
should be curtailed, unless blocks were consolidated "natives 
would be deprived of freely moving their kraals which they so much 
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value" (59). Psychologically, according to Selborne, the mass of 
Swazi were to feel no immediate deprivation or constriction of 
rights. 
(6) The security motive was also worked out in other 
directions. Grey was directed by Selborne to reduce to the 
smallest proportion possible the potential disturbance of 
existing homesteads. The rationale was to maximise the number of 
Swazi who would experience no residential change or overt and 
immediate change of social and economic status in relation to the 
petit-colon. Thus the most densely populated zones were a 
pre-requisite for demarcation. In general, Grey attempted to 
incorporate as many Swazi as possible within the reserves. For 
this purpose, maps were drawn to show population distribution on 
which an estimated 80-90% of the homesteads were marked. Grey's 
comment on these maps highlights the difficulty faced in effecting 
this principle : 
"It will be seen how evenly distributed the population 
is, and how unavoidable it will be that a large proportion 
of it must be left on those parts not laid out in native 
areas"(61). 
In consequence, of 6787 plotted homesteads, a total of 3914 (58%) 
were within the reserves. That Grey was able to concentrate 58% 
of the Swazi population on 36% of the land is explicable in,terms 
of expropriation flexibility : 
"While choosing as native areas those parts of Swaziland 
most thickly inhabited by natives I have at the same time, 
wherever possible, formed the areas out of exact thirds 
of concessions. Owing to local population density I have 
at times been forced to recommend the expropriation of 
whole portions of concessions in excess of one third"(62). 
Where population was less dense Grey tended to take less than a third. 
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Thus Grey still left 42% of the Population in residence on 
alienated land, subject to the five years voluntary movement 
rule, and in a subordinate social and economic situation vis a 
vis the petit-colon and capital. 
(7)The colonial state was invariably conscious of the 
strongly hierarchical social structure of the Swazi and the 
concentration of power in the upper echelons of the hierarchy. 
Appeasement of the Swazi rulers was thus a basic tenet of colonial 
policy. The motive was basically in conformation with the 
security- esire of the state and capital, and is built into 
the spatial apportionment of Grey. As discussed above (5.2) the 
suggestion of the petit-colon for appeasement was a differential 
land division which favoured the royal household. Selborne 
conceived an alternative method which was more subtle but probably 
just as effective. 
Grey was instructed to ensure that every royal homestead, 
chief's homestead,royal cattle post and royal burial ground was 
within the reserves. How fundamental this factor was is 
confirmed by perusal of Grey's notes in which the identification 
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and location of these elements looms large (Appendix 4c). Selborne's 
assumption was that if neither royals nor regional chiefs were 
required to move their locations Swazi protest as a whole would 
be considerably muted. The success with which this criterion was 
fulfilled is illustrated in the construction of Map Fourteen, which 
shows how closely the distribution of elements of the traditional 
65 
social structure are correlated with the demarcation of reserves. 
Of 124 chiefs only one was left outside the reserves and all 
royal households,royal cattle posts and burial grounds were included. 
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In one instance a royal grave was too remote to be included in 
a reserve without also cutting out "thousands of morgen of valuable 
grazing ground" so a small enclave was declared around the grave. 
The arrangement of the implementation of the partition around 
elements of the traditional spatial and sacredotal structure by 
the colonial state to implicitly further the interests of capital 
was not an immediately obvious procedural criterion. More obvious, 
and to be anticipated, was the arrangement around the incipient 
colonial infrastructure. 
(8) At this early stage of colonial rule, both a transportation 
system and an urban system were in a state of infancy but even 
the prospective development of an integrated infrastructure 
exercised an influence on the spatial array. This is particularly 
obvious in two areas (Map Fifteen). Potential urban centres -
Mbabane,Manzini,Forbes Reef,Piggs Peak,Mankiana,Dwaleni and Stegi-
were all clearly surrounded by land under petit-colon control 
although the reserves were all proximate enough to ensure the 
ready availability of an urban labour supply for commerce and 
industry. No positive relationship was proposed or could be 
detected between the road network of the time and land division, 
but there is a correlation with a prospective railway line. The 
railway, still in prospect in 1908, was seen by Grey as of minimal 
relevance to the reserves and he thus attempted to maximise 
petit-colon accessibility to the proposed line of rail. Map 
Fifteen shows this clearly where 80% of the route is over white 
controlled land. 
Grey's final exercise after demarcation according to the 
above criteria, was to produce carrying capacity figures for the 
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reserves. This was to determine how the reserves in toto could 
bear an increase in total Swazi population. Grey estimated that 
the reserves could bear an increase of 159,278 or 52%% of the 
population. The theoretical assumptions which he used to determine 
carrying capacity are given in Appendix 5d and the projected 
carrying capacities for each of the reserves is listed in 
Appendix 5b. The capacity of each reserve is related to his 
perceptions of the areas in the light of his theoretical agricultural/ 
grazing land requirement estimates : 
" I considered each area selected sep rately and apportioned 
it a definite amount of land per family,varying with the 
quality of agriculture and grazing land and the amount 
of rocky barren hillside or wasteland. The unit apportioned 
to each family varies from 15-60 morgen per family"(67). 
No attempt was made by Grey to relate carrying capacity in each 
reserve to the actual population resident there at the time 
of partition. He did however argue that though the carrying capacity 
figures would inevitably be reached at some stage in the future 
it would take a considerable time since : 
"Most farmers will try to keep the natives which they 
have on their land" (68). 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
An examination of the historical backdrop to land partition 
in Swaziland reveals how the spatial array is structured by a 
set of procedural criteria implemented by the colonial state 
which closely accord with the interests of promoting white 
agricultural development and of articulating the Swazi into such 
a mode of production. As Enraght-Moony,Resident Commissioner,1903-7, 
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wrote : 
"The European desires to expropriate the best ground 
for himself, to stop indiscriminate cultivation and 
to displace any natives not required for his own 
purposes"(69) 
The colonial state facilitated these desires at almost all points. 
The patent inequality of alienation of two thirds of the 
land surface to the crown and less than 600 whites , while 
constricting over 100,000 blacks to the remaining one third is 
explicable both in terms of the desire to expropriate land for 
direct white utilisation and as being a concrete means to break 
down the self-sufficient traditional mode of production and to 
acquire control over its labour-power. Constriction was perceived 
as a means to enforce and hasten change of the basically self-
sufficient traditional agricultural base towards the money-economy 
and to promote dependency on the petit-colon for taxation costs 
and the essentials of life, by the sale of labour. Thus it was 
necessary to leave a potential labour force on white land, to 
create reserves for surplus labour and to institute measures to 
force the Swazis resident on white land to sell their labour to 
the petit-colon. 
At the detailed level this chapter has identified how the 
physical arrangement of space embodies several inter-linked sets 
of criteria designed to facilitate exploitation of land and 
labour. Thus the spatial pattern is related to Grey's perception 
of the needs of capital. The desire for consolidation of reserves 
is seen to be a function of a desire to create an optimal pattern 
for minimising reactive political response from the Swazi and 
hence to hasten the penetration of white settlement and capital. 
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The manipulation of the traditional spatial and sacredotal structure 
by the colonial state to promote political stability and the 
linking of the land pattern with the incipient colonial infrastructure 
were further inducements to capitalism in the colon. 
It should be noted that the policy-making of the colonial 
state was both a function of and a medium for the ongoing process 
of foreign domination of the country. Many of the decisions were 
based on prospective developments under capitalism many of which, 
however,eventually failed to materialise. But at this optimistic 
time in which spatial patterns were erracibly imprinted on the 
country the mood of the colonial state was aptly summed up by 
Grey himself, 
"I have been the instrument that has locked up much 
beautiful and fertile country from which the European 
is forever to be excluded" (70). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PERIPHERAL RESPONSE : VOICES OF THE SWAZI 
"Our land is being taken from us without reason. 
We think it is being done because we are a separate 
race. The land is ours." 
Swazi Queen Regent,1908. 
"I am convinced the settlement is both just and sound." 
R.C.Coryndon,1908. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Perceptions of the process of political, social and economic 
domination by the colonial state, the petit-colon and capital are 
undocumented for the mass of Swazi. The concentration of power in 
the upper strata of the traditional hierarchical social system 
meant that it was at this level that protest was articulated and 
interaction with the colonial state occurred. This interaction is 
well documented and talk of "swazi" attitudes,perceptions and so on 
must be interpreted as those of the ruling group for the nation 
as a whole. 
First the channels of protest and the views of the Swazi on 
colonial state policy on a number of land-alienation connected 
issues and the stance adopted by the colonial state to counter 
protest are considered (6.2). The intrigue and manouevering which 
underlies this stance are then examined in relation to the 1907 
Swazi Delegation to Britain (6.3). The almost total failure of 
the Swazi to shift the monolithic colonial state in any policy 
matter is in marked contrast with its accomodating position vis a vis 
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the petit-colon and capital interests. The failure is seen to lead 
to attempts to re-appropriate land through the open market. The 
reactive response of the petit-colon to this strategy reveals again 
the fundamental empathy between colonial state and capital (6.4). 
6.2 CHANNELS AND ISSUES OF PROTEST 
The Swazi rulers were allowed formal access to officials of 
the colonial state under enforced conditions of subservience on 
a limited number of occasions. There was a delegation to Milner 
in December 1904, two petition-bearing delegations to Selborne 
in Pretoria in July 1905 and May 1909, a delegation to Gladstone 
(Selborne's successor) in 1913, the Malunge delegation to England 
in December 1907, and public meetings within Swaziland with 
Selborne in September,1906, and on a number of occasions with Enragt-
Moony and Coryndon. 
The issues of protest were relatively constant and were 
reiterated as colonial legislation continued to be passed. They 
can be crystallised into a number of areas ; 
(1) The fundamental protest of the Swazi constituted challenges 
to the political rights of Britain to exercise colonial rule in 
Swaziland. The independence clauses of pre War conventions were 
freguently cited to criticise the 1903 Order in Council by which 
Britain assumed control of Swaziland and to criticise all subsequent 
legislation in Swaziland by the British colonial state : 
"The limitation of boundaries (for reserves) is an abhorrence 
to the Swazi Nation,and to alienate their land,as is proposed 
will be to treat them as a conquered people,which they are 
not" (2) 
The colonial state gave little credence to this challenge of its right 
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to rule. The will of the state was inviolate in such matters. 
(2) The Swazi were also critical of the means used by the colonial 
state to generate income for administration and the costs of 
partition. In effect, the Swazi were being forced to pay the 
costs of actions by the colonial state to which they had fundamental 
objections. The taxation structure imposed by the state in 1903 
was overtly criticised, as was the sale of crown lands (5.3) and 
the expropriation of concession rental revenue by the colonial state. 
Prior to the Boer War, the South African Republic held the Private 
Revenue Concession in which all concession rentals were collected 
by them in exchange for an annual payment of ^ 12,000 to the Swazi. 
No payments were made after 1899 and in 1904 the Swazi conseguently 
claimed ,^60,000 and the continuation of payments. The colonial 
state blandly denied the debt, cancelled the concession and 
expropriated all concession revenues on the grounds that the mass 
of Swazi would benefit rather than just the ruling elite - a dubious 
claim since virtually all early revenue went towards partition 
. 4 
costs. 
(3) More closely related to the land question were calls for 
the cancellation of all concessions on the grounds of non-payment 
of rental during the Boer War. In effect, this was a call for a 
blanket cancellation which was summarily rejected by the colonial 
state under contrary pressures from the petit-colon and capital. 
The stance commonly adopted was to claim the authority of the 
5 
1890 Concessions Court. 
(4) The 1907 Proclamation and the alienation of land which it 
provided for provoked bitter and impassioned response from the 
Swazi. Thus images such as "being killed", "living in darkness" , 
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"cutting up the land", "being pushed into the mud", and "being 
stripped naked" are common in Swazi articulation of events. R.T.Coryndon, 
the Resident Commissioner, was called Msindazwe or "he who weighs 
down,sits heavy upon, encumbers or clogs the land". 
Frequent appeal was made to the history of concession granting 
and to the white manipulation of Mbandzeni and his intentions in 
granting concessions : 
"The dividing up of our land is a thing we feel very much 
especially since land was only leased and was never parted 
with irrevocably. The land was lent and should return at 
the expiry of the time for which it was lent"(7) 
and, 
"If the Government were serious they would produce documents 
to show that Mbandzeni sold the land. He lent land to whites. 
The High Commissioner said the land was sold. I asked him 
if "buy" and "lend" are the same word"(8). 
The reiterated claim was that under the Swazi system land was a 
national property and consequently inalienable. Land was therefore 
by intention and definition only leased to whites under the terms 
9 
of the traditional system. 
It was at this point of diametrically opposed social 
interpretations of the role of land in the productive process that 
the will of the colonial state triumphed. Land had to be alienated 
for capital and the petit-colon and the necessary actions were 
taken despite vociferous Swazi objection and a total refusal to 
co-operate at the local level with Grey's partition. 
The stance which the colonial state adopted towards the Swazi 
was that of an arbitrator between conflicting but equally -valid 
rights to land. Thus Selborne said to a Swazi delegation in July 
1905 : 
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"Both Swazis and whites claim rights to land. I must 
seperate these rights. We want to help you keep as much 
land as you can use, and more, quite undisturbed by the 
white man" (11). 
Comments of this genre continued to be made by Selborne and Coryndon 
in dealings with the Swazi throughout this period. The idea that 
the colonial state was acting in the best interests of the Swazi 
was patently a misrepresentation of its true role and cut little 
ice with the Sv&ai. The Queen Regent, at least, could detect 
the'hidden hand' of capital in colonial policy : 
"Our land has been taken from us without reason. It is 
Mr.Miller and Mr.Forbes who have done this", 
and, 
"Were the people also sold 7 My people are being taken 
away from me too" (12). 
At the local level there are no data available on Swazi 
migratory response to land expropriation, although Annual Colonial 
Reports of the period note no mass exodus from white land between 
1909 - 1914. At the expiry of the five year period of grace, 
eviction notices were served on only 964 families by white 
farmers, leaving, it is estimated over 35% of the Swazi population 
on white land. These were immediately forced to enter a new set 
of social and productive relations with the petit-colon by the 
13 imposition of a standardised tax of £l and labour tribute. 
6.3 COLONIAL OBSTRUCTIONISM AND THE 1907 DELEGATION 
Continual reference by colonial state officials to the 
authority vested in them by the home government prompted a Swazi 
desire to appeal to this higher authority. For instance,Coryndon, 
in informing the Swazi of Selborne's partition decision had oaid : 
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"We have laid all the facts before His Majesty King Edward Vll 
and he has decided what is to be done. His Excellency(Selborne) 
now desires me to tell you that the King has decided to 
make a final partition of rights between you and the 
concessionaires" (14). 
The attitudes and actions of colonial state officials,Selborne 
and Coryndon, in attempting first to obstruct a delegation and 
then to minimise its impact display the view of the colonial state 
towards the aspirations of the Swazi : 
"Their history has never taught them the futility of 
resistance to the unyielding decrees of a consistent 
administration"(15) 
Both Selborne and Coryndon saw the Swazi Queen Regent as a potentially 
powerful threat to the effecting of a smooth land expropriation for 
the petit-colon : 
"The failure of the delegation will be a severe blow to 
the influence of the Regent, whose influence is at 
present the cause of most of our administrative difficulties"(16) 
Initial attempts to negate her influence included a proposal by 
Coryndon to depose her and install the under-age Sobhuza as Monarch 
(rejected by Selborne) and the close monitoring of all correspondence 
17 
with the legal advisers to the Swazi. 
Swazi pressure throughout 1906-7 for a delegation to Britain 
was repeatedly opposed by Selborne. He confidentially requested an 
order from London which he could use to support his views on 
partition : 
"I am sure that the only results of a deputation to London 
will be harmful and cause increased trouble and fresh 
misunderstandings. I hope you will be able to send me a 
really stiff reply which can be communicated to the Regent 
to the effect that the decision was the King's and that he 
is surprised and displeased that the Chief Regent should 
question that fact or try to reopen the matter,that the 
decision is inevitable and that there is not the least use 
in her thinking that a deputation to London would have any 
effect in repealing it or modifying it"(18) 
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An apparent change of heart was purely a function of realization 
by the colonial state that a carefully manipulated delegation might 
work to their advantage and serve to pacify the Swazi. Thus a 
delegation was allowed to visit Britain from December 1907 to 
February 1908. 
The timing of the announcement of the 1907 Proclamation was 
deliberately delayed until the Swazi ploughing season in October 
with the thought that the mass of Swazi would be too pre-occupied 
19 to take much notice of it. Colonial agreement to a delegation 
was purposefully announced just prior to the publication of 
the 1907 Proclamation since : 
"The knowledge that the deputation is going to London 
will act as a safety valve when the decision about land 
partition is received"(20). 
The Queen Regent, as most vociferous critic of the administration, 
21 
was barred from the delegation. The delegation was repeatedly 
informed that the purpose of its visit to London was to pay 
22 homage to Edward. It was predetermined that no concessions would 
23 be made to the Swazi. The delegation was refused financial 
assistance by the administration and had to raise their own funds. 
Once in Britain, Selborne prohibited the flow of further funds 
to the delegation so as to curtail the length of their stay : 
"The delegation should not stay long in England in case 
their case comes to the attention of and is exploited by 
negrophilist interests"(24). 
The delegation was given an audience with the Colonial 
Secretary,Lord Elgin, to present their case and were met with 
blunt expressions of support for Selborne's policy and the 
25 immutability of colonial laws. Marwick,a District Commissioner in 
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Swaziland, who was sent with the delegation reported success in 
keeping the delegation away from'negrophilists'. 
The delegation returned : 
"We are still not satisfied. We were told in England that 
our petitions would not be granted,but we will continue to 
cry to the Government we did not know we were killing 
ourselves by going under the British Government" (27). 
The manouevering of the colonial state to effect maximum benefit 
from the delegation at minimal cost is well-documented. They failed 
to mute Swazi protest entirely and the Regent was far from 
discredited, but protest was never to erupt into acts of violence 
against the state or petit-colon and in 1909 the Regent declared 
that the issue would be shelved until Sobhuza came of age. 
With the implementation of land partition by Grey the Swazi 
turned to other channels to attempt to regain control over land. 
At this point there was a direct conflict with the interests of 
the petit-colon again and the colonial state is seen to intervene 
in response to white protest to undermine a perceived threat 
to capital. 
6.4 LAND REPATRIATION AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PETIT-COLON. 
The failure of the Swazi to make any appreciable impact on 
colonial policy prompted a decision to instigate a land re-purchase 
programme in 1909 : 
"I felt I must lose no time. I told the Council that all our 
weapons had failed and now with our own strength we must 
set out with determination to buy back as much land as we 
can of our Swaziland" (28) 
Raising funds was a national effort and all Swazi males were urged, 
29 in 1909, to seek employment and pay/ 5 to a land purchase fund. 
The Swazi collected almost ^ 40,000 from this source. Attempts were 
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made to supplement this figure with loans from South African banks 
until the colonial state intervened,ostensibly to, protect the 
30 Swazi from debt. Yet : 
"To our great surprise the administration interfered in 
every way to discourage capital,despite offering us no 
financial assistance themselves"(31) 
Eventually 77,000 acres were purchased but not before the colonial 
state had passed legislation to give it control of any further 
32 land transfers. 
Legislation against Swazi land purchase was a direct function 
of petit-colon protest against the repatriation of land considered 
suitable for white settlement : 
"There is an intense feeling among the Europeans against 
the indiscriminate purchase by natives of land suitable 
for European settlement. The Europeans will organise 
meetings in all parts of Swaziland and will call upon the 
Government to regulate purchases"(33) 
The resultant legislation gave the colonial state control over any 
Swazi funds collected for land purchase and the right to veto all 
prospective purchases. The constriction proved such a complete 
disincentive to the Swazi that land repurchase ceased after 1916 
until the 1940's. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Swazi were doomed to failure in their 
struggle against the forces of capital and the colonial state in 
consort. That they confined themselves to orthodox, non-violent 
channels of protest probably ensured their survival as a protected 
dependency of Britain, but failed to carry sufficient weight to 
thwart the inexorable march of capitalism in the region. 
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Land alienation in particular was an imperialistic act clearly 
and deeply resented by the Swazi. Yet, once effected, and in 
association with other acts of the colonial state such as the 
imposition of a harsh taxation system, the actual and potential 
articulation of the Swazi into a new set of productive relations 
under capital became virtually inevitable. 
It could hardly have been anticipated by the petit-colon that 
the Swazi would enter the land market to regain land and inadvertantly 
promote the desire of capital, at least in the broader regional 
context, to exploit labour.For the petit-colon,however, assured of 
an adequate labour supply without this additional incentive, 
entrenching land control was a more important concern. The petit-colon 
in its own interests consequently forced the Swazi out of the land-
market and thus considerably curtailed the flow of labour to South 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1914-68) AND AFTER 
"The claws of the white man sank deep into the soil of Swaziland" 
David Forbes,1938. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this penultimate chapter there is a much less detailed 
treatment of the evolution of spatial organisation in Swaziland 
from 1914 to the present. In so doing it is intended to examine 
the major characteristics of the evolving relationship between 
capital,the petit-colon,the colonial state and the Swazi as the 
structure upon which the organisation of space is built. 
The failure of the petit-colon to capitalise on the land partition 
is seen to be a function of minimal infrastructural support from 
the colonial state and the peripherality of Swaziland in the South 
African space-economy (7.2). The advent of multi-national corporation 
capital after 1940 is seen to produce a re-orientation in colonial 
state attitude towards its role in the "managed economy". The role 
of multi-national capital in entrenching the existing pattern of 
land control and the superimposition upon it of a new pattern 
of capitalist development is then considered (7.3). Actual shifts 
of land from petit-colon to Swazi in the colonial period through 
two colonially approved schemes are then examined. Both are seen 
to flounder on the conflict of social and economic values between 
the colonial state and the Swazi Nation (7.4). Some comment is then 
proferred on the independence period. The question of the relationship 
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between land control patterns and the commitment of the new ruling 
elite to the capitalist mode of production in Swaziland is addressed 
(7.4). 
7.2 THE FATE OF THE PETIT-COLON 
We have attempted to demonstrate that early colonial spatial 
organisation in Swaziland was a fundamental product of the penetration 
of foreign capital in the age of "classic imperialism". This is not 
immediately obvious without an accurate historical analysis since 
a distinctive feature of the pre 1940 period was the failure of 
capital to appropriate the surplus promised in the heady 1885-1915 
period. The petit-colon's metropolitan linkages were gradually 
eroded and the petit-colon itself ossified into a small, isolated 
petit-bourgoisie, unproductively controlling large areas of 
Swaziland and utilising black labour on a small scale. 
Figure Four is a clear indicator of this process. Tin mining 
and cotton growing were the only fields in which metropolitan 
linkages were sustained in the 1920's. Exports of tin to the Straits 
Settlements continued into the 1930's, reaching a peak in 1924-6. 
Gold mining was never to reap the promised dividends. Commercial 
agriculture in tobacco,cotton and beef cattle was confined to a 
small number of enterprises, and exports, fluctuating annually, 
remained at a low level. Sporadic wattle-growing in the 1920's was 
the only other export source. Various petit-colon instigated white 
settlement schemes floundered and large areas of purportedly settlable 
2 
land lay idle. The petit-colon per se did,however,continue to exercise 
an inordinate influence on local colonial policy through an elected 
3 body,the European Advisory Council. 
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The failure of the petit-colon to realise the prospective 
developments of the early colonial period (4.3) can be partially 
related to the failure of the colonial state to provide the 
necessary infrastructure for capitalist development. Best (1965) 
traces the failure of railway schemes in 1918,1921,1924 and 1946. 
In 1928 the state offered incentives to white farmers in the form 
of a loan fund but the petit-colon's inability to generate income 
for the administration meant that local costs continued to be met 
by crown land sales, grants in aid from the Imperial Treasury and 
heavier black taxation. Hailey(1956) notes that in the 1930's the 
4 
Swazi were the heaviest taxed blacks in the sub-continent. The 
reluctance of the colonial state to undertake capital expenditure 
on infrastructure in Swaziland may be related to lack of funds but 
was certainly a function of the belief that transfer of Swaziland 
to South African control was inevitable. 
The peripherality of Swaziland in the incipient southern 
African space economy also helps explain the fate of the petit-colon. 
South African producers viewed Swaziland as a market for goods and 
7 
a labour source but as a potential agricultural competitor. Thus 
poor market accessibility for petit-colon producers was exacerbated 
by the monopolistic control of road transport within South Africa 
by the South African Railways system. Best(1965) notes the tariff 
structure worked to the disadvantage of Swaziland producers forced 
to use this as the sole means of transport to South African markets. 
In addition, the Union state acted forcibly on several occasions 
to protect its own producers from outside competition. From 1910-16 
there was a total embargo on beef from Swaziland and from 1924-32 
there were stringent veterinary controls and a weight embargo. 
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Tobacco producers in Swaziland were forced by South African interests 
to join a marketing co-operative which forced many to drop the 
crop and production slumped. Cotton, grown under the aegis of the 
Empire Cotton Growing Association (Wood,1927) by companies such 
as the Swaziland Corporation, faded after 1926 due to falling 
world prices and poor market accessibility (Doveton,1937). Free 
South African access to the Swaziland consumer market and the small 
size of that market effectively prevented the development of any 
manufacturing industry. 
The petit-colon's failure precipitated no appreciable spatial 
re-organisation of land control,however, despite continued Swazi 
pressure to the contrary. The whites continued to enjoy a protected 
relationship with the colonial state and principles of individual 
ownership and private property had been deeply ingrained. These 
were entrenched with the advent of multi-national corporation 
capital after 1940. 
7.3 RENEWED METROPOLITAN LINKAGES 
Metropolitan capital,on an altogether different scale, and 
quite extraneous to the petit-colon penetrated Swaziland in the 
post 1940 period (Best,1967,Harrington,1957,Hendy,1953). Penetration 
of capital and associated control over an enlarging Swazi proletariat 
9 
was under the benevolent umbrella of the colonial state. The 
British parastatal body, the Colonial (later Commonwealth) Development 
Corporation initiated a number of capital and labour intensive 
projects in association with British (Tate and Lyle, Lonrho, 
Courtauld's, Turner and Newall, and Libby's) and South African 
(particularly Anglo-American) private capital in mining and plantation 
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agriculture. As a direct result Swazi economy and society in 
the colonial and post colonial periods have become ever more firmly 
tied to international capitalism. 
Penetration of capital had a strong spatial component since 
integral to the success of these prospective developments in generating 
profit was the acquisition of land for plantations. Between 
1945 and 1960 400,000 acres were purchased on the open market for 
a total cost of <£l.6 million. purchase was within the pre existent 
spatial framework (that is, no land was obtained from the Swazi) and, 
in effect, tied up over 10% of the land surface under the direct 
control of foreign capital (Map Three). Purchased land in four 
distinct localities became the spatial focii for capital and colonial 
state infrastructural expenditure, creating zones of intensive 
capitalist surplus extraction towards which black labour was 
12 drawn from the rural areas. 
The petit-colon was largely by-passed by the advent of 
multi-national capital,except in so far as they were able to 
capitalise on land speculation in the 1940's and 1950's, and 
became a static,peripheral community holding large areas of land 
in an increasingly vulnerable political situation as the colonial 
state began to relinquish its political control over the country 
13 in the 1960's. Nevertheless in the historical context it 
had exercised an inordinate influence over the organisation of 
space in Swaziland* 
7.4 SHIFTS IN LAND CONTROL 
Figure Five shows the shift in land control during the colonial 
period in favour of the Swazi but still leaving 40% of the land 
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SHIFT OF LAND CONTROL DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
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surface outside Swazi control in 1968. Consideration of this shift 
of control reveals further significant facets of state policy 
during the colonial period and highlights the interplay between 
the colonial state and the Swazi regarding land repatriation. 
Official Swazi protests to the colonial state under King 
Sobhuza 11 were made at regular intervals in 1921,1926,1941 and 
14 1958. The major points at issue were basically reiterations 
of protest made in the 1902-15 period (Chapter Six). Challenges 
continued to be made to Britain's claim to the historical right 
to rule and legislate in Swaziland, particularly in 1926 when 
the right of rule was challenged in the Privy Council. Such claims 
were summarily dismissed until the post war era of decolonisation. 
At the core of all Swazi argument was the expression of grave 
injustice over land expropriation and the desire to regain total 
control over the land surface for the exclusive use of the Swazi 
nation. With no political power to challenge the structure of 
landholding and to effect autonomous radical change, such as 
nationalisation of land and abolition of the land market system, 
the Swazi attempted to use the open land market as the only available 
mechanism for regaining land. Chapter Six showed how the colonial 
state, under pressure from the petit-colon, stymied early Swazi 
attempts to enter the land market but by the 1940's other factors 
had come into play. 
Daniel (1962) writes : 
"Whereas before the Swazi could move over the whole of 
Swaziland in 1907 they were confined to one third of its 
area. Not only did they have to produce as much food 
on less land but they had to adapt themselves to a money-
economy. The fact is that the Swazi had to forsake the 
customary system of shifting agriculture and develop 
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something new in its place. That they had neither knowledge 
skills or resources to do this was overlooked at the time 
of partition". 
The final point is a contentious one but it should be reiterated 
that the destruction of shifting agriculture and pastoralism was 
a fundamental tenet of state policy. The effectiveness of this policy 
is identified by Fair,Murdoch and Jones (1969) : 
"Along with the introduction of the Swazi to wage earning 
the traditional economy showed signs of weakening and 
modification in other directions. Absenteeism of able-
bodied men and serious imbalances in family and tribal 
organisation and productive capacity were inevitable as 
the total impact of these events was compounded"(p 30) 
and Marwick (1940) : 
"The natives are heavily taxed. This means that the natives 
have had to change from a subsistence to a money economy, 
If they are not able to sell their own produce (they often 
do not even have enough for their own requirements) or 
their cattle (which they have a deep prejudice against 
doing) their only other asset is their labour. This means 
they must seek employment to meet their obligations to 
the Government'.* 
By 1934, the Swazi were only producing 20% of their food 
requirements. It was considered axiomatic that disintegration 
of the indigenous mode of agricultural production would produce 
a concommitant trend towards cash-cropping for export. The assumed 
spontaneity of this process remained unfulfilled in 1940. This, 
taken in conjunction with perceived environmental degradation 
under increasing land pressure and falsely seen as a function 
of the perpetuation of "inefficient","inherently destructive" 
traditional methods of production, instigated colonial attempts 
to hasten the articulation of peasant production into the capitalist 
system : 
"The Swazi must learn the new methods of civilised 
agriculture and abandon shifting agriculture"(16) 
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In addition, the colonial state was faced with the problem of the 
existence of a non-employed population of 25,000 Swazis on 
white land in 1936. With the proposed advent of multi-national 
capital the necessity for forced evictions was foreseen. 
Tlie method for the solution of these supposedly intractable 
problems as an elaborately conceived, large scale experimental 
land resettlement scheme. Success of this scheme, it was assumed, 
could lead to the wholesale reorganisation of land and agriculture 
in Swazi reserves as well. Acquisition of land by the colonial state 
18 
was a prerequisite for the scheme. Land was purchased in several 
localities by grants under the Colonial Development & Welfare Act, 
supplemented by crown land which was still unsold to whites. 
Rigorous control of settlement, spatial organisation and functional 
land allocation, basic infrastructure, crop and technical inputs 
19 and marketing was proposed. Strict control of grazing,stock numbers, 
rotations,soil conservation and rights of occupancy were also 
suggested. Award of individual land tenure was considered a basic 
adjunct to the success of this scheme. 
Although 364,875 acres were set aside (including 130,000 of 
crown land) for the whole programme only 120,000 was eventually used 
and a mere 1766 families or 8830 people settled. Total state 
expenditure on the scheme was £230,000 (Map Fifteen). 
The reasons for the abandonment of the scheme by the colonial 
state are unresearched though Hughes (1972) has suggested some 
possibilities. He blames financial stringency, spoon-feeding of 
settlers, the influx of unauthorised settlers,the inability of the 
state to enforce its rigorous settlement and production regulations 
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and the experimental bias of the programme as contributory causes. 
Hughes assumes that while the implementation may have been faulty 
the underlying assumptions were legitimate and desirable. Thus, for 
instance, that providing security of tenure automatically raises 
productivity or that the aim of Swazi producers should be cash crops 
for export is assumed rather than questioned by Hughes. Research 
into Swazi perceptions of the scheme would undoubtedly shed greater 
light on the failure of the scheme to force Swazis into cash-cropping. 
To the Swazi nation the scheme could be counted something 
of an inadvertant success since a further proportion of the land 
surface was unlocked to Swazi use and eventual control at no extra 
cost. 
Consistent with stated Swazi policy,in 1941 Sobhuza 11 proposed 
the re-entry of the Swazi into the open land market. The colonial 
21 
state agreed to this proposal. The reasons for agreement are to 
be found in the state's interpretations of the Swazi proposals. These 
were to raise funds by culling cattle from all Swazi stockholders 
and selling the proceeds. Alarmist views on the 'explosion' of 
Swazi stockholding were prevalent and the scheme appeared to provide 
a method to control stock with Swazi agreement and to instil new 
22 
attitudes about the economic potential of cattle. 
With certain restraints, such as the necessity for cash purchase, 
the state assisted in the culling and sales of stock for this LIFA 
fund,as it was called. Almost 219,000 acres of land was eventually 
purchased on the open market experiencing dramatic speculative 
price rises as a result of the advent of the multi-nationals (Map 
Sixteen).23 
The overall response of the mass of Swazi to the scheme is 
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difficult to gauge. Reluctance to contribute cattle has been 
attributed by Hughes(1972) to the burden on the small stockholder 
and to the fact that acquired land did not tangibly add to the 
24 
controlled areas of all chiefs who had subscribed to the scheme. 
The petit-colon saw the scheme as a Swazi reiteration of the 
values of traditionalism and called on the colonial state to abolish 
the Lifa Fund on the grounds of its detrimental influence on 
capitalist development in the country. Comments included : 
"The policy is not economic development in the interests 
of the Swazis but has a political aspect which should be 
discouraged(a).This is not an attempt to improve the lot 
of the Swazi but a political effort to buy out the 
European from the country(b).Allowing this to continue 
will discourage foreign capital(c)." (25) 
These views coincided with colonial realization that the 
scheme was not succeeding in fulfilling the aims of the state in 
supporting it. The motive of destocking was patently not being 
realised and the issue came to a head with disputes over the 
quality of beasts to be culled. From this point on it was only 
a short time before the state withdrew its support for the scheme 
as the underlying socio-political motive of the Swazi was re-appraised. 
The land question formed an integral part of Swazi negotiations 
for political independence in the late 1950's and the 1960's. As 
a result of a petition from Sobhuza to the High Commissioner and 
the appointment of a subsequent commission of enquiry both the 
remainder of crown lands and the land obtained for the settlement 
scheme in the 1940's were transferred to the Swazi. 
In 1968 the first Swazi Prime Minister,Prince Makhosini, went 
to London to discuss the question of a land shortage in Swaziland 
27 
and reguested a blanket grant for Swazi purchase of land. This 
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was refused in favour of a monitored grant scheme ( 7.5). 
It is instructive to consider the actions of the new Swazi 
power elite once political autonomy was obtained in 1968. In 
particular there is a need to elucidate Swazi response to the 
inherited structures which produced and maintained the pattern 
of land control and to examine any measures taken to regain land. 
7.5 THE NEO-COLONIAL MILIEU 
The Swazi state has made a small number of apparently 
significant moves to promote the repatriation of land in the post 
colonial period. The significance of these moves must be evaluated 
in the context of the commitment of the government to the international 
capitalist system. 
In 1972 the Land Speculation Control Act was instituted. Prior 
to this the colonial free market system in land prevailed. Thereafter 
all land transactions have been monitored through a Board. Citizens 
may buy and sell freehold title land virtually without restriction 
but non citizens are generally prohibited from purchasing, though 
exceptions are made for corporate foreign interests. Ostensibly 
the Act was to control rife speculation in land (particularly urban 
29 land ) by absentee owners in South Africa. It carries with it 
the idea of a gradual transfer of marketable land to Swazi 
citizens : 
"This establishes an institutional frame work which 
allows the repurchase of the freehold title land 
but at a pace slow enough not to adversely affect 
the commercial agricultural sector" (30) 
Direct or indirect attempts to force landowners to place land 
on the market have thus far been minimal and no forced expropriation, 
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with or without compensation, has been instituted or is likely 
to be under the present regime. 
The legislation, or lack of it, can be seen as epitomising 
the conflicts produced within Swazi society by the historical 
penetration of capital and the more recent commitment of the 
ruling elite to the western capitalist system : 
"For my part I have always recognised that external 
skills play a very important part in the development 
of the country's substantial natural resources; and 
I am confident that the entrepreneur will find in 
Swaziland promising opportunities and a highly satisfactory 
climate for investment" (King Sobhuza 11 ) (31). 
The traditional element in power still regards land repatriation 
per se as a National priority but the associated desire to retain 
existing and solicit further foreign capital necessitates that no 
actual or potentially destructive moves are made. Possible 
restructuring of the land market system has been rejected in favour 
of market manipulation through the Land Speculation Board. This 
accords with a general policy of gradualism in land transfer. 
Granted the confirmation of the inherited land market system, 
two methods have been deployed to raise funds for land purchase as 
it comes on the market. The first reveals the strong neo-colonial 
links with Britain by whom land purchase is regarded as an integral 
part of a general foreign aid programme. In 1968 the Swazi demanded 
a blanket grant to buy land ; a demand rejected outright by Britain 
in favour of an offer of a strictly controlled land repurchase 
programme to buttress the colonially-instituted rural development 
programmes in the country. Britain made/3 million available for 
land purchase which could be added to existing rural development 
areas or which the Swazi could prove would be "beneficially occupied". 
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By 1976, i0.5 million had been disbursed on 68,500 acres of land. 
Thus the ex-colonial state refused to buy land for any reason 
that would not support its foreign aid aims. But the echoes from 
the abortive settlement scheme of the 1940's must be strong as 
considerable difficulties continue to be experienced in effecting 
32 
rural development programmes. 
During the last two years the Swazi once again instituted their 
own collection fund. It is intended to use the royalties from 
foreign mining operations in the country to re-purchase land (Tibiyo 
FundK Details are sketchy but it appears that land has already 
been bought from this fund. I.L.O. (19 77) notes that land purchased 
is being witheld from the mass of people in favour of : 
"Commercial farms on which the aim is to introduce 
effective management to make the farms profitable 
enterprises" 
Usage of land so dramatically opposed to traditional precepts 
would undoubtedly be consistent with the commitment of the new 
elite to - capitalism in Swaziland. It would also tie in with 
what appears to be an increasing trend,individual Swazi entry into 
the land market to hold land under individual ownership with funds 
obtained from foreign bank loans. The attitude of the power 
controllers to this movement appears to be an ambivalent one. 
The uniguely privileged position which the petit-colon appears 
to enjoy after the first decade of independence must in one sense 
be interpreted in the light of the Swazi desire not to alienate 
foreign capital. It is also a function of the privileged access 
which the petit-colon built up with the traditionalist political 
party during the vulnerable period of the 1960's. Potholm(197l) 
has documented the role of the petit-colon in supporting the 
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traditional faction against anti-white Pan Africanists in the 
33 political struggles of the 1960's. This strategy was designed 
to ensure survival after independence and the strategy appears 
to have met with a modicum of success since a number of whites 
retained prominent positions in the first and second Independence 
34 governments. Despite the new autocracy since 1973, there is no 
reason to suppose these links have weakened. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted a brief overview of the remainder 
of the colonial period, after the years under particular review, 
and offered a few observations on the decade after British colonial 
rule had ended. These periods are being examined in detail by other 
35 
workers. An attempt has been made to trace the evolution of 
spatial organisation from the time of the definitive partition 
onwards. The virtual redundancy of the spatial pattern created for 
capital in the period 1903-1910 is highlighted by consideration of 
the fate of the petit-colon in the later period prior to 1940. 
The realisation of the resource and labour potential of the country 
for capital awaited the advent of the multi-national corporations 
in the post-war period,however, and it is to this advent that much 
of the spatial restructuring of the past thirty years can be attributed. 
The resiliance of traditional Swazi protest to land alienation 
is evidenced throughout the colonial period and continues into the 
present . Protest in the colonial period was kept in check by the 
institution of the colonial state in collusion with capital and the 
petit-colon. At the present time it is still confined by the 
contradictions of the neo-colonial situation the country finds 
itself in. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
"While the future's there for anyone to change, sometimes it 
is easier to change the past" J.Browne,1974. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is presented as a brief recapitulation of 
the rationale of the thesis (8.2), and the major findings and 
arguments within a model of settler-colonialism (8.3). A possible 
future scenario for spatial organisation in Swaziland is then 
speculated upon (8.4) and the thesis concludes with a note on 
future directions for study and practice in Swaziland (8.5). 
8.2 THE OBJECTIVES RE-ITERATED 
The research for this dissertation was prefaced by a set 
of basic geographical questions relating to the historical and 
contemporary organisation of space in Swaziland. These included 
enquiry into the factors accounting for the original pattern of 
black-white landholding in Swaziland, the manner and reasons for 
change during the colonial period and the contemporary pressures 
towards change in the pattern of holding. As the research focus 
crystallised,attention was primarily directed to the first of these 
three sets of questions and this is reflected in the space allocation 
of this study. The problem underlying the research i s,ncverthe".r-r.r. 
encapsulated within these sets of spatially-oriented questions 
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That is, to describe and explain the genesis of a visible pattern 
of land holding and control. 
The problem was by no means a novel one, notwithstanding the 
scanty research literature on Swaziland. Boyce (1947), Whittington 
and Daniel (1969) and Mashasha (1973) ostensibly set themselves 
similar tasks. Their focus of explanation appeared to be deficient 
in two major areas. First, in the tradition of Hellen (1969), 
Crowder (1970) and Witthuhn (1976) their analyses are largely 
or purely political. Little explicit or even implicit credence is 
given either to the powerful economic forces of expansionary 
capitalism which were drawing much of the world into the capitalist 
orbit in the ninteenth and early twentieth centuries or to the 
ways in which these forces might be expected to organise and reorganise 
space within the colonised world. So dramatic has been the post-1945 
impact of multi-national corporation capital that the role of 
capital in earlier eras has been obscured and left in a vacuum. 
Second, with regard to colonial state policy, the literature 
exhibits a tendency,in its more enlightened guises, to regard policy 
as "unfair", "culturally arrogant" and even "racist" ( Leibrandt,1376, 
and Matsebula,1972, in particular) but no attempt is made to relate 
?t to what it was in essence ultimately designed for; that is, the 
benefit of British capital interests and its associated metropolitan 
settler-class. The ideological assumptions underlying policy are 
left uncovered and the pragmatic effects of metropolitan economic 
interests on policy are ignored. 
The reasons for these deficiencies can in one sense be relater 
to an incomplete reading of colonial source materials. Study of the 
published and official data base can lead to an acceptance of policy 
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at its face value. Unofficial and private colonial correspondence 
and the untapped white settler data source cast quite different 
interpretative lights on policy. In another more fundamental sense, 
they relate to the failure to structure research in a broader 
framework which examines the phenomenon of nineteenth and twentieth 
century European imperialism and colonialism, and their linkages. 
The recent studies of Brett (1973) and Leys (1975) are salutory 
reminders of the necessity for this method of approach to African 
studies. 
In Chapter Two of this thesis, a number of new trends within 
the field of development geography were identified. With a total 
rejection of the'developmentalism' of the 1960's and a critique of 
orthodox development models has come a call for a thorough-going 
historicism in development studies. This suggests a point for a 
suitable marriage between development and historical geography in 
Africa. The potential contribution of the historical geographer 
in Africa to the development field is an apposite one. 
Tentative explorations in a theory of imperialism in geography 
take two directions : (a) examining the expansionary nature of 
capital in theoretical and specific historical contexts, and (b) 
examining the impact of capital on economy, society and, for the 
geographer, spatial organisation, in the pre-capitalist world. This 
thesis takes its cue from the second direction. Attention was 
directed, therefore, to a set of assertions about the impact of 
capitalism in the settler-state and its relations to the phenomenon 
of colonialism. These assertions have been tested for applicability 
in the Swaziland case. 
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8.3 THE COLON RE-VISITED 
In Chapter Two, a historical model of settler-colonialism 
was abstracted from the literature as a frame within which to 
structure this set of assertions. It is within this framework that 
some general and specific concluding statements can be made about 
the early socio-economic and spatial impact of capital and the 
colonial state in Swaziland. 
The particular advantage of the empirically-based model for 
areas in which metropolitan capital deployed a settler-class is 
that it gives general statements about capitalist expansion a 
specific and particular historical context which identifies the 
concrete social mechanisms operative in articulating these areas 
and their pre-capitalist modes of production into capitalism. Yet, 
as Banaji (1973) has re-iterated, the settler-state or colon was 
only one of a set of means adopted by European capital in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to restructure indigenous society 
and economy to meet its own ends. 
Conclusions from the study are presented within the four stages 
of the model outlined by Good (1976). 
First, the origins of the petit-colon were examined in Chapter 
Three. Origins in this sense refers only secondarily to geographical 
locale. That the Swazi, politically, did not go the way of all other 
black flesh in South Africa in the pre Boer War period is attributable 
to broader conflicts within the evolving regional political economy. 
Socially and economically, however, the differences between the 
two competing states as they affected Swaziland were minimal as 
both sanctioned and legitimised penetration by their subjects. The 
national duality of this penetration only superficially introduces 
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a complicating element into the model. One can locate the British-
based faction within a broader social class with its roots in the 
metropole, with strong links with metropolitan capital and which 
subscribed to the particulars of capitalist ideology (3.4,4.3,4.4). 
While of different geographical and socio-cultural origins, the 
objectives of the transient Boer population in Swaziland were in 
essential concurrence with those of the British faction at this 
time. Social conflict within the white community between 1885-1899 
essentially had its origins in individual and group competitiveness 
for monopoly control over the objects of labour and labour power 
itself, and only secondarily was it along the explicit racial-
national division of Boer-Briton. 
The aims and objectives of the petit-colon closely accord 
with the propositions in Good's (1976) model (Chapter Four). 
Utilization of peasant surplus does not appear to have been a 
countenanced strategy by capital in Swaziland. This is attributable, 
at least in part, to the essential subsistence-orientation and 
self-sufficiency of the indigenous mode so there was little visible 
productive surplus to appropriate. The alternative was a three-pronged 
monopolistic drive by British settlers to control mineral resources, 
land for plantation agricultural development and to create and control 
a black labour supply. A fundamental motive was therefore to extract 
surplus by supplying raw materials to metropolitan industry. Land 
expropriation, exclusive private ownership and concommitant labour 
control were concrete principles embedded in the objective of the 
British settler class (4.3). Both of Friedland's (1972) propositions 
about the potential role of land expropraition from the Swazi in 
producing a new set of social relations under capital are verified 
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in Swaziland (2.4). 
The interpolation of industrial and trading monopoly 
acquisition by the British settler in Swaziland, while purely 
an unsuccessful speculative venture, is a dimension ignored by 
Good (1976) which identifies a further monopolistic facet of the 
drive for profit. 
For the Boer, confining his activities within Swaziland to 
extensive pastoralism, unfettered land control was also a necessity. 
Land expropriation also appears to have represented a means of 
gaining control over labour to channel to the farms of the Eastern 
Transvaal. The aims of Briton and Boer in Swaziland were consequently 
essentially similar in this era. 
The third stage of Good's (1976) model examines the ways in 
which the colonial state facilitated the capitalist drive to 
control land, labour and resources. The role of the colonial state, 
at least in Swaziland, is to be found in neo-Marxian rather than 
classic Marxist positions. This allows explanation of the state's 
failure to sanction the Swaziland Corporation (4.5) and the industrial 
monopolies. Nevertheless, underlying a guise of claimed protectionism 
of the Swazi lay a fundamental commitment to restructuring the 
indigenous mode of production, to confirming the petit-colon in the 
exclusive control over land and mineral resources and to assisting 
in the provision of labour power for the new industrial enterprise 
via taxation and the sanctioning of tenancy relations. 
A feature of the model which requires refinement in the 
Swaziland context is the question of colonial state revenue and 
expenditure. The neo-Marxian critique contains a clear view of the 
role of colonial state expenditure in the colony (2.4). Less obvious 
168 
is the question of revenue generation to effect this role. It 
appears in the Swaziland case that a significant impact on policy was 
had by the colonial state requirement that local administrations 
be self-financing. Thus, expropriation of the Private Revenue 
concession and duty-free importation monopolies, the sale of 
crown lands, taxation of blacks, the appointment of a single partition 
Commissioner and the decision not to effect an expropriation of 
all concessions from the petit-colon can all in part be attributed 
to the need to minimise costs and to generate revenue. Colonial 
state expenditure in Swaziland is,however, consistent with the 
postulates of the model. The particular irony of the Swaziland 
situation is that the Swazi were forced to contribute the majority 
of the revenue to effect a scheme to which they were diametrically 
opposed. 
Banaji (1973) claims that the natural development of the 
settler-state is an internal expansion of the capitalist mode 
of production. In the Swaziland case, not only did the country 
fail to develop as a raw material base for metropolitan industry 
under the petit-colon but that this projected expansion, as in 
South Africa and basically because of South Africa, failed to 
materialise. This may also be attributed to the eventual failure 
of the colonial state to accept its share in the "managed economy" 
posited by Brett (1973) and Good (1976) (Chapter Seven). 
Detailed analysis of the articulation of the Swazi into the 
money-economy and capitalism under the petit-colon and colonial 
state lies outside the scope of this study. In Chapter Six this 
study concentrated instead on the reactive response of the Swazi 
to external domination and land alienation. Historically the outward 
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signs (destruction of self-sufficiency, migration for wage-labour, 
participation in the money-economy) are that fundamental changes 
were being wrought at an early stage. Any advanced class formation 
within the Swazi population was, however, delayed until the post-war 
era of multi-national capital. 
It is at this stage with the underlying social and ecomomic 
processes recalled that one is free to move outside Good's(1976) 
aspatial model to a consideration of the tangible working out of 
these processes in physical space (Chapter Five). Hence, the procedure 
of the colonial state in arriving at a suitable model for land 
expropriation, acceptable to all white interests can be described 
(5.2) and the details of partition can be examined (5.3-5.6). 
Here the voice of a consolidated petit-colon and the local 
representatives >of British capital (Swaziland Corporation, Henderson 
Corporation) with landed interests in Swaziland are seen to have had 
a significant role in determining policy formulation of the colonial 
state in Swaziland. The considerable de-centralization of colonial 
state control in relation to Swaziland should not, however, give 
support to what Brett (1973) has called "the myth of the practical 
official responding to fact rather than theory." The historical 
particulars of the Swaziland situation were in one sense unique ; 
the ideological impulse brought to bear on them by the colonial state 
certainly was not (4.5). The superficial geometry of the partition 
is historically structured by a set of procedural criteria deeply 
sympathetic to the principles of capitalist articulation and to 
capital control over land, resources and labour. This emerged in 
considering both the decision to effect a partition and in its 
detailed implementation by Grey. 
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The criteria used by Grey are all symptomatic of the colonial 
state desire to further the interests of capital in Swaziland. Of 
particular not* in view of the pacificatory role of the state 
postulated in Good's model was the security motive implicit in the 
partition. Actions of the colonial state in support of capital had 
caused violent response elsewhere. In Swaziland a desire to minimise 
the possibilities of violent protest is clearly seen in the partition 
procedure. The subsequent decision of the Swazi to protest within 
•legitimate1 channels was easily manipulated and controlled by the 
state. 
8.4 SPECULATION ON THE FUTURE 
The growth of discrete social classes within the Swazi population 
is a feature of development on the periphery of international 
capitalism (Fransman,1973). The growth of a cohesive Swazi 
proletariat in the post-war period of multi-national plantation 
agriculture and mining development was indicated by the social 
unrest of 1963, quashed by the colonial state, and unanimous worker 
support for Pan Africanist political groupings in the 1968 and 
1972 elections (Potholm, 1971). Concommitantly there has been the 
growth, particularly since Independence, of a middle-class urban-
based elite which has increasingly adopted many colonial economic 
and social structures as its own. The colonial structure of production, 
distribution and consumption is entrenched and the position of the 
foreign multi-national corporation is reinforced. 
Since this structure of production is unlikely to be 
substantially modified under the present regime in Swaziland, despite 
growing internal contradictions between the different social groups, 
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ancient and modern, it is possible to predict that there will 
be little dramatic spatial re-organisation in Swaziland either of 
physical space or the space-economy . What can be postulated 
instead is the manipulation of this structure by the new elite 
to work to its own material advantage and there are signs that 
this is occurring already( Jones,1977). 
The privilege of access which the white settler class enjoys 
with the traditionalist element in government is likely to wane with 
time and may do so dramatically if a new regime comes to power. 
While their future as a class may be increasingly endangered, the 
structures which maintain them, including the private property 
market, are not. The manipulation of the property market for 
returning land to traditional occupation and usage will undoubtedly 
continue to be a priority with Sobhuza 11 in power but it may 
increasingly be rejected, under the encouragement of British foreign 
aid and banking loans,in favour of manipulation for the benefit 
of the new middle class and of continuing to force the mass of 
Swazi into cash-cropping for the ultimate benefit of capital. 
8.5 FOOTNOTE 
Palmer and Parsons (1977) write that Swaziland is "particularly 
interesting to the economic historian as (a) compact laboratory of 
processes evident elsewhere" in its exemplification of white settler 
interpenetration and enclave development. Demonstrating this contention 
has not been a major task of this study but their point is well-taken 
and it is hoped that this study is a contribution not only to 
re-interpreting the Swazi past but the African past as a whole. 
For the present, R.T.Coryndon wrote in 1914 that " desperate 
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diseases require heroic remedies". It is a moot point whether 
contemporary Swaziland is in the grip of a "disease". The judgement 
that one makes will in any case be largely a function of ideological 
stance. The apparent prosperity and wealth of the country, glowingly 
described by such as Nxumalo (1972), undoubtedly diverts attention 
away from increasing internal social and economic contradictions, 
a growing spatial and social maldistribution of wealth, and the 
inherently destructive nature of the western-styled and foreign-
dominated development path as regards traditional culture,values 
and lifestyle. If these are the symptoms of disease then identification 
of root causes is a sine qua non which may not necessarily be 
achieved within the confines of orthodox development theory. If, as 
a counter-argument runs, the remedy lies in basic structural 
transformations, it is obviously the historic right of the Swazi 
themselves to apply a "heroic remedy". 
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Swaziland : Development,Dependence and Interdependence.A.A.G. 
Meetings.Salt Lake City.1977. 
6 In 1975, 40% of I.T.L. was under the control of absentee 
owners (Central Statistical Office (C.S.O.) : Census Of 
Individual Tenure Farms.1974-5). 
7 C.S.O. : Census Of Individual Tenure Farms.1973-4. 
8 There were 49,000 homesteads in 1972 and 152 regional chiefs 
(C.S.O. : Census Of Swazi Nation Land.1973). 
9 The national average is 91:100. Figures are calculated from 
the 1966 Census returns (H.M.Jones.Report On The 1966 Swaziland 
Population Census.1968). Age structure statistics suggest a 
much higher proportion of individuals in the 20 to 45 age 
bracket on I.T.L. than the national average. 
10 Thanks are due to Mr Mick Abel of the Ministry Of Agriculture, 
Mbabane, for permission to examine Swaziland's aerial photo 
coverage. It was unfortunately not possible to reproduce the 
photographs in this thesis to amplify the point. 
174 
11 C.S.O. : Census Of Individual Tenure Farms.1973-4. 
12 An estimated 30% of I.T.L. is considered to be "underutilised" 
in International Labour Office (I.L.O.).Reducing Dependence.1977. 
13 I.L.O. op.cit. puts the minimum figure at 2200 calories/person/ 
day. Also lamented is the lack of income to provide a minimal 
standard of household consumption and the inaccessibility of 
essential services to the bulk of the rural populace. 
14 After the 'metropolis-satellite' theorising of A,G.Frank, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment In Latin America.1967. 
15 C.S.O. : Annual Statistical Report.1975 
16 I.L.O. op.cit. 
17 I.L.O. op.cit. 
18 Per capita personal incomes in 1974 were $139 p.a. on I.T.L. 
and $53 p.a. on S.N.L. for Swazis. In the urban areas and 
including Swazis in multi-national corporation employ,the 
figure was $ 506 p.a. The per capita personal income for non-
Swazis living in Swaziland was $1782 p.a. (I.L.O.op.cit.Table 8.4). 
19 Swaziland Government.Second National Development Plan.1972. 
p 245-51. 
20 Thanks are due to Mr. Doug Levy,Surveyor-General of Swaziland, 
for directing my attention to the existence of these maps when 
the fact of their very survival was in doubt. 
CHAPTER TWO 
1 Both Soja and Riddell have retracted much of their earlier 
work. See E.W.Soja,Topian Marxism and Spatial Praxis.A.A.G. 
Meetings.New Orleans.1978. 
2 E.W.Soja,Review Of Brookfield's 'Interdependent Development', 
A.A.A.G..68:1.1978. in turn criticises Brookfield for seeing 
this as the primary flaw of orthodox perspectives. 
3 Union of Socialist Geographers, Study Papers> on Imperialism, 
contains a critique of the views of Blaut and Porter & De_Souza 
on imperialism. 
4 See P.M.Sweezy.The Theory Of Capitalist Development.1962. +-
T.Kemp, Theories of Imperialism.1967. E.R.J.Owen & R.B.Sutcliffe, 
(eds.).Studies in the Theory of Imperialism.1972. M.Barrat-Brown, 
The Economics of Imperialism. 1974, and V.G.Kiernan, Marxism and 
Imperialism. 1974. 
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5 Notably, C.Wilson, The Economic Role and Mainsprings of 
Imperialism, in P.Duignan and L.H.Gann.(eds).Colonialism in 
Africa.1870-1960. Vol 4 : The Economics of Colonialism. 1975. 
6 For extensions of this view see L.H.Gann, White Settlers in 
Tropical Africa, 1962, and M.P.K.Sorrenson, Origins of European 
Settlement in Kenya.1968. 
CHAPTER THREE 
1 Attributed, at least from the Swazi side, to a dream of Sobhuza 1 
in which dire consequences were predicted for the shedding of 
white blood (Matsebula,1972). 
2 A.Atmore and S.Marks, The Imperial Factor in South Africa : 
Towards a Reassessment, in E.F.Penrose.(ed.).European Imperialism 
and the Partition of Africa. 1975, present a convincing argument 
for the paramountcy of British capital interests in determining 
the direction of British colonial policy in South Africa at this 
time. But for the aims of the South African Republic, see N.G. 
Garson, The Swaziland Question and the Road to the Sea.1887-1895. 
1955. 
3 In 1881, Article 24 : "The independence of the Swazies within the 
boundaries of Swaziland, as indicated in the first Article of this 
Convention, will be fully recognised." This was made more explicit 
in 1884,Article 1 : "The independence of the Swazies,as recognised 
by the Convention of 1881, is confirmed, and no inroad on that 
independence shall be allowed without the consent of both her 
Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African 
Republ c." (See c.2998,3914, Appendix lb). 
4 See A.N.Boyce, The Swaziland Concessions and their Political 
Consequences,1876-1908, 1947, and R.W.F.Drooglever, The Role 
Of Offy Shepstone in Swaziland.1886-1895. 1976. Mr. A.N.Boyce, 
of Johannesburg,S.A., kindly loaned a copy of his work for 
personal study. Nyeko(1976) was unable to trace a copy in any 
South African library. 
5 In 1887, Mbandzeni refused to sign a document of cession 
presented by a Boer commando, despite its presentation under 
false pretences as a mining concession (C 5089 Appendix lb). 
6 Drooglever, op.cit.. shows that the Swazi Resident Adviser, 
T.Shepstone, was on the payroll of the South African Republic 
when the concessions were granted. 
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7 Details are carried in c 5089 (Appendix lb). 
8 Knutsford to Salisbury,28.1.1889,9.6.1889,9.6.1889 (c.5089). 
9 c.5089. 
10 c.6200,pp 65-75. 
11 c.6200,Introduction. The Commission consisted of Sir.Francis 
De Winton,D.J.Esselen,Capt.Baden-Powell(later founder of Boy 
Scouts),Colonel R.S.R.Martin,General Smit,General Joubert. 
12 De Winton's Report,c.6200. 
13 The administrative problems encountered during the period of 
dual control (Aug.1890 to Nov.1893) are discussed in C.7212 
(pp 1 - 166). 
14 Paul Kruger in an interview with The Times Of London.8.9.1892. 
Reported in Boyce, op.cit. 
15 The influence of capitalists Rhodes and Hoffmeyr in negotiations 
is elucidated in R.Robinson & J.Gallagher.Africa And The 
Victorians.1961.I.R.Phimister.Rhodes.Rhodesia and The Rand, 
Journal of Southern African Studies 1:1,1974,and J.S.Galbraith, 
Cecil Rhodes And His "Cosmic Dreams" : A Reassessment.Journal 
Of Imperial and Commonwealth History.1.1973. 
16 The 1893 Convention proved an embarrassment to both states. 
It gave the Republic leave to annex Swaziland on the condition 
of Swazi consent. Not only was Swazi consent unobtainable 
but the Swazi sent a delegation to London to protest the 
transfer. The 1894 Convention unilaterally waived this 
condition. See B.Nyeko,Pre-nationalist Resistance To Colonial 
Rule : Swaziland On The Eve Of The Imposition Of British 
Administration.1890-1902.Trans-African gournal of History.5:2.1976. 
The 1894 Convention contained the following articles; 
Article 11 Without the incorporation of Swaziland into the 
South African Republic,the government of the Republic shall have 
and be secured in all rights and powers of protection,legislation, 
jurisdiction and administration over Swaziland. 
Article Vll All British subjects residing in Swaziland,or having 
in Swaziland any property,grant,privilege or concession,or any 
right to,title to,or interest in,any property,grant,privilege or 
concession shall be secured in the future enjoyment of all their 
rights and privileges of whatsoever nature and kind. 
Article Xlll The Government of the South African Republic 
withdraws all claim to extend the territory of the Republic,or to 
enter into any treaties with any native or native tribes to the 
north or north-west of the existing boundary of the Republic,and 
undertakes to aid and support by its favouring influence the 
establishment of order and government in those territories 
ruled by the British South Africa Co. within the limits of power 
and territory set forth in the charter granted by Her Majesty 
to the Company. 
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17 Natal Witness. Special Report on Swaziland,11.5.1887, (c.5089). 
18 See C.C.Watts.Dawn In Swaziland.1922. 
19 Population statistics are from the De Winton report (c.6200). 
20 Times of Swaziland,21.11.1908. The d 12,000 p.a. was payment 
to the Swazi by the South African Republic for possession of 
the Private Revenue Concession. This concession permitted the 
holder to collect all concession rentals and dues for a payment 
of ptl2,000 p.a. to the Swazi. 
21 Both states agreed to invalidate concessions granted after the 
death of Mbandzeni on 13.9.1890 (article 5, 1890 Convention). 
22 83 concessions contain this guarantee in explicit form ( see 
Rubie's report,Appendix lb). 
23 Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1909. 
24 The majority of concessions were granted during the terms of 
office of T.Shepstone and A.Miller. Both acquired extensive 
personal interests and Shepstone was a witnessing signatory 
to over 150 concessions. An agreement with the Swazi gave 
him 50% of the income of the country for a period (£ 19,000) 
and it was thus in his interest for there to be a liberal 
granting of concessions. Drooglever.op.cit.. notes that this 
enabled him to pay off extensive personal debts acquired 
outside Swaziland. 
25 Mbandzeni to a meeting of concessionaires,1887 (c.5089). 
25a For contemporary co-option strategies of capital see Friedman(1972). 
26 De Winton Report conclusions (c.6200). S.Trapido,The South African 
Republic : Class Formation and the State; 1850-1900. University 
of London ,1971, incidently, presents a convincing case for 
the early commitment of the Boer to surplus extraction from 
black labour. 
27 De Winton Report conclusions (c.6200). 
28 See c.6217. 
29 On the death of Mbandzeni the Swazi were ruled by the Queen 
Regent,Labotsibeni,until Bhunu came to power in 1894. 
In the 1890 Convention(Article 2h), the Swazi nation were asked 
to prepare a list of concessions it approved of for the court. 
Shepstone prepared the list and obtained proclamations from 
the Swazi authorising the court and giving it the power to 
verify concessions not on the approved list. 352 out of 364 
concessions were legally confirmed. The Queen Regent ineffectually 
protested in 1894 that she was not a party to the proclamations 
nor the approved list and that she was unaware of the sitting 
of the court (see c.7611). 
30 Colonial Secretary to Sir H.B.Loch(High Commissioner),1.12.1892, 
c.7212. 
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31 See Times of Swaziland.4.10.1907.for mention of this scheme 
in an obituary to N.H.Cohen. 
32 Government Committe Report,1894,c.7611. 
33 See A.M.Miller.Swaziland.1900 
34 The following corporate interests all ;petitioned the Colonial 
Office around this time; Umbandine Concessions Syndicate, 
Acton's Swaziland Concession,Bird's Swaziland Concession, 
Havelock Gold Mining & Exploration Co. and the Chambers of 
Commerce in London,Glasgow,Leeds and Birmingham. The letters, 
petitions,etc. are published in c.7611. 
Ripon's enigmatic response to these petitions was, " I do not 
attach much importance to their opinion....knowing how they 
are manufactured", Ripon to Roseberry,4.9.1894, reported in 
Robinson and Gallagher.op.cit.p 414. 
35 A.M.Miller.op.cit. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
1 This confusion is highlighted by an extract from the Privy 
Council Appeal hearing of 1926 in the case "Sobhuza 11 v 
A.M.Miller" : 
Viscount Haldane : Is your proposition that we annexed Swaziland? 
Attorney-General : Not so as to make it part of our dominions 
but for all practical purposes,so far as jurisdiction is concerned, 
yes. 
Viscount Haldane : I do not know what you mean by that; either 
it became part of our dominions or it did not. 
Attorney-General : It did not ; it became part of our protectorates. 
Viscount Haldane : What do you mean,that we intruded into an alien 
country and went there and established ourselves like the 
Barbarians used to do and dominated the place ? 
Attorney-General : I do not like the analogy of the Barbarians; 
but we in effect assumed a jurisdiction which has been acted 
upon and submitted to by the native population and I submit that 
in all but name we are sovereign there;we have many of the attribute 
of sovereignty. 
2 In practice, Selborne as Governor of the Transvaal in 1906 
became Governor-General and High Commissioner. Thus control 
was vested respectively in Milner (1903-5),Selborne (1905-10) 
and Gladstone (1910-14). 
3 Colonial Secretaries during this period were Lyttleton(1903-5), 
Elgin (1905-8) and Crewe (1908-10). 
4 Enraght-Moony (1903-7) and Coryndon (1907-16) were Resident 
Commissioners in Swaziland. 
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5 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 3 of 1904. 
6 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 28 of 1907 
7 Crown land in the Swaziland case was land once owned by the 
South African Republic which became Crown property on the 
transfer of Swaziland to the Britain. It also comprised land 
which was not granted by Mbandzeni to concessionaires. 
8 Selborne to Grey (Confidential),1907, Bodleian Library (B.L.) 
MS.Selborne 71. 
9 High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908 and No 53 of 1909. 
10 Swaziland Corporation.Swaziland and The Swaziland Corporation.1903. 
11 In all ,£350,000 (110,000 oz.) of gold was recovered, primarily 
on the Forbes Reef Concession. But only one dividend was 
reportedly paid by the companies i.e. /10,000 by the Forbes 
Reef Gold Mining Co. ( Killie Campbell Library (K.C.L. MS.MIL. 
1.08.11). 
12 K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a. 
13 K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a. 
14 Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1906 to 1910. The total 
wage bill in 1906 was ,£18,000 or a mere /1.10s per worker per 
month. 
15 K.C.L. MS.MIL.1.08.3 MS 191a. See also Swaziland Annual Colonial 
Report,1911. 
16 Times Of Swaziland.18.5.1907. 
17 Miller,1900, op.cit. 
18 Swaziland Corporation,1903, op.cit. 
19 Swaziland Mining,Commerce & Industrial Chamber, Swaziland. 
California Of South Africa.1907. 
20 Swaziland Corporation Annual Report,1907, K.C.L.MS MIL 1.08.3 
MS 191a. 
21 A.C.G.Best.The Swaziland Railway.A Study In Politico-Economic 
Geography.1965.advances some possible reasons for the failure 
of this scheme. These include a new government in Britain, 
Portugese interference and political pressure by the Natal 
Government. True to the general tenor of the work the reasons 
advanced are primarily political ones. 
22 K.C.L. MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a. There is no suggestion of how 
it was intended to popularise the work. Certainly the proposed 
wage of 20/- per month .would hardly appear to be sufficient 
incentive. The optimism must be directly attributed to the 
imposition by the British colonial state of a tax of 40/- per 
male head in 1903. This was ostensibly to generate income for 
the administration(in 1906,80% of Government revenue) but served 
the purpose of forcing Swazi to accept wage-employment. 
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23 Selborne to Maydon (Confidential),3.4.1906,B.L. MS Selborne Box 170, 
24 Chamber of Mining,Commerce & Industry,1907, op.cit.. The Chamber 
planned to instigate a scheme to sell 2000 acre Highveld 
blocks at 10/- per acre, 300-500 acre Middeleveld blocks at 
20/- per acre, and 1000 acre Lowveld blocks at 20/- per acre. 
The speculation implicit in these proposed selling prices is 
worthy of note. In 1907 the Swaziland Concessions commission 
evaluated Highveld land and Middleveld land at 4/- per acre 
and Lowveld land at 2/- per acre. 
25 Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1907. 
26 Jones,1968.op.cit. 
27 Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1906. 
28 Swaziland Chamber Of Mining,Commerce & Industry.1907.op.cit. 
29 Times Of Swaziland.21.10.1905 and 28.10.1905. 
30 High Commissioner's Notice No 10 of 1908. 
31 Milner was also considered an ally of capital interests in 
Kenya around this time (Personal communication from Dr R. 
Bullock,University of Waterloo). 
32 A.R.Booth,Lord Selborne and The British Protectorates, 
Journal Of African History.10:1.1969. and D.E.Boyce & J.O.Stubbs, 
F.S.Oliver,Lord Selborne and Federalism.Journal Of Imperial And 
Commonwealth History.5:1.1976. are recent works on the work 
of Selborne in South Africa, Both mention that there is no 
biography in existence. 
33 Booth.1969.op.cit. points out that Selborne had a greater 
liking for the Basotho but even here paternalism was his 
hallmark. 
34 Selborne to a delegation of farmers,March 1907,Swaziland National 
Archives (S.N.A.) 45/07/140. 
35 Selborne to Grey (Confidential),10.10.1908, S.N.A. D09/2. 
36 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),30.3.1908,quoted by Booth,1969, 
op.cit.,p 137. 
37 Personal communication from C.Youe,March 1978. 
38 Rhodes House Library (R.H.L.) MSS Afr S 633 Box 10 File 1. 
39 It is possible that a further motive in encouraging capital 
was to increase revenue for the state, though this is 
undocumented. 
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40 Rubie's Report (Appendix lb),Sections 26-46. In ascertaining 
pre War value speculative val ue and the capital of joint 
stock company owners was ignored, The procedure was to ascertain 
the annual value of the rights to the holder,to capitalise such 
value for the remainder of the term of the concession at 6% p.a.. 
41 Rubie's Report,1903 (Appendix lb). 
42 Swaziland Concessions Commission : Report On The Expropriation 
Of Monopolies,1906 (Appendix lb). See also Times Of Swaziland. 
11.2.1905 to 13.5.1905. 
43 The history of the Corporation is apertinent one. Concessions 
obtained in the 1880's by J.Thorburn and A.M.Miller were 
floated into a Company in London on 29.5.1891, under the name 
of the Umbandine Concessions Syndicate, witha share capital 
of ,£50,000. This syndicate acquired sundry other concessions 
and in 1898 parted with its interest to a new company,the 
Swaziland Corporation Ltd., with a capital of «£ 3,000,000. 
In 1908 there were 850 British shareholders. A.M.Miller was 
the Swaziland Manager, responsible to a London Board of 
Directors . Source : Swaziland Corporation.1903.op.cit. 
44 Almost simultaneously Milner had declined to receive any 
representation from the Swazi except through the Resident 
Commissioner, Milner to Moony (Confidential),30.1.1905,SNA J190/05. 
45 Directors of the Swaziland Corporation to Selborne (Confidential), 
21.2.1907, SNA J 120/06. 
46 Swaziland Corporation.1903.op.cit. 
47 Elgin to Directors of Swaziland Corporation (Confidential), 
25.5.1907 (SNA J120/06). See Times of Swaziland.21.11.1908. 
for the Corporation view. 
48 J.Marlowe.Milner:Apostle of Empire.1976 traces Milner's growing 
disenchantment with British policy towards the place of South 
Africa in the Empire which eventually led to his resignation 
with a Liberal government coming to power in 1905. 
49 Swaziland Concessions Commission to Selborne,(Confidential), 
7.7.1905 (SNA J 190/o5) and Honey to Miller (Confidential), 
18.7.1905 (SNA J190/05). 
50 Miller to Honey (Confidential),20.10.1905 (SNA J190/05). 
51 Directors of Swaziland Corporation to Selborne,21.2.1907 
Colonial Secretary to Swaziland Corporation(London),23. 3.1907 
Selborne to Swaziland Concessions Commission,17.1.1908 
(SNA 45/07/2129). 
52 Miller to Honey (Confidential),3.2.1908. 
Miller to Coryndon (Confidential),5.2.1908 SNA 45/07/2129. 
182 
53 Swaziland Concessions Commission: Report Of Details,1908. 
54 Colonial Secretary to Selborne (Confidential),7.12.1907 
Selborne to Coryndon (Confidential),12.12.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129). 
55 Selborne to Commission,11.12.1907, SNA 45/07/2129. 
56 High Commissioner's Notice No 10 of 1908. 
57 Times Of Swaziland.21.11.1908. The difference between the two 
evaluations is explicable in that the Commission took the 
lapsed concessions clause to mean concessions lapsing within 
one year of the grant of the concession ; patently not what 
the holders had in mind. 
58 Rodwell to Miller,19.9.1908, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 229. 
59 Times Of Swaziland.21.11.1908.reports the final acceptance 
of the Corporation's shareholders. 
60 Coryndon to Miller (Confidential),12.10.1908, KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 
MS 281a. In 1909 Coryndon made an arrangement with the 
Corporation to exchange Corporation land in the Lubombo Mts. 
for crown land near Mbabane : 
"It is proposed that an arrangement be made for the mutual 
benefit of the Corporation and Government"(Coryndon,SNA D09/65a). 
61 Swaziland Corporation Annual Report,1909,KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a. 
62 Times of Swaziland.21.11.1908. 
63 Elgin to Selborne (Confidential),7.12.1907,SNA 45/07/2129. 
64 Swaziland Concessions Commission :Report Of Detailed Decisions, 
1908 (Appendix lb). See below 64 (Cont.). 
65 Swaziland Concessions Commission.1908.op.cit.. R.Palmer.Land And 
Racial Domination in Rhodesia.1977.shows how large land grants 
during the period of British South Africa Company rule proved 
a considerable hindrance to agricultural development in the 
early years of this century. 
64 (Cont.) The Report notes that Miller's duties as Agent & Adviser 
were to protect the King's interest"a duty which was apparently 
ill-discharged'.' At the time of the grant there was no evidence 
to prove Miller was interested in it. But 6 weeks later he 
acquired a 1/3 interest in it and for his interest he received 
1000 shares on the flotation of the Umbandine Concession Syndicate, 
of which he later became Manager. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1 Rubie's report.op.cit..Section 71. 
2 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),14.5.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
3 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 3 of 1904. 
4 As it was the total cost of the settlement of the concessions 
question was/171,000 (Annual Colonial Report,1910) 
5 See Selborne's correspondence with Elgin in BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
On 17.7.1906 Selborne was empowered by the Colonial Office to 
make and implement all decisions to resolve the land question. 
6 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),17.11.1906. Elgin approved 
Selborne's idea of a partition on 28.2.1907 in a telegram and 
30.3.1907 by letter, BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
7 Selborne to Elgin,(Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
8 Chamber of Mining,Commerce and Industry to Selborne (Confidential), 
29.9.1906, on the outcome of discussions between Selborne, 
Coryndon and Chamber representatives including A.M.Miller 
(SNA J 205/06). The Times of Swaziland.15.9.1906.contains 
details of the meeting. White evidence included testimonies 
to "native interference" which had "ruined farming operations". 
9 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
10 Quoted in the Morning Star.2.2.1905. 
11 On his visit to Swaziland Selborne was treated to two stories 
of how veld fires "started by natives" had ruined two farmers, 
Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
12 Ermelo farmers to Selborne,19.12.1906, SNA J205/06. 
13 D.Forbes to Selborne,20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
14 D.Forbes to Selborne,20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
15 Selborne to Elgin(Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
16 Selborne to Elgin(Confidential),17.11.1906,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
In a reference to the Zulu 'uprising' of 1906 Selborne saw it 
as related to the question of land in Natal and feared that a 
native war in Swaziland might eventuate if the plans were pushed 
through to partition. For an excellent study of the Zulu protest 
see S.Marks.Reluctant Rebellion : The 1906-8 Disturbances In 
Natal.1970. 
17 Times Of Swaziland.7.10.1905. 
18 Times Of Swaziland.23.12.1905. 
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19 Times Of Swaziland.21.10.1905 
20 No maps of the concessions they partitioned could be located. 
It is believed that one was to the north-east of Mbabane and 
the other in the Lebombo Mts. On the former they demarcated 
four parcels for the Swazi and on the latter,three. 
21 Times Of Swaziland.7.10.1905. Also, "Swaziland Crisis" (Times Of 
Swaziland.21.10.1905) reports a meeting of Transvaal interest 
holders and an extraordinary meeting of the Chamber. "Unanimous 
Meeting in South Swaziland"(Times of Swaziland.28.10.1905) reports 
a meeting of southern interest-holders pledging support for the 
Chamber. Also, a statement by W.Penfold(Local Manager,Henderson 
Consolidated Corporation) in Times of Swaziland.1.7.1905. and 
an editorial comment entitled "The Settlement" in Times of 
Swaziland.7.10.1905. At "Meeting in Pretoria Between Commission 
and Concessionaires".Times of Swaziland.23.12.1905 and 16.12.1905, 
a memorandum from the Chamber was presented and many unanimous 
protests voiced. On 20.1.1906 a deputation visited Selborne. 
22 Times of Swaziland.21.10.1905. 
23 A.M.Miller at a meeting with the Commission (Times of Swaziland. 
23.12.1905. 
24 Times Of Swaziland.21.10.1905. 
25 Chamber of Mining,Commerce & Industry to Selborne,20.9.1906, 
SNA J 205/06). 
26 The desire of the whites for locations on the peripheries of 
their farms was not confined to Swaziland. See for instance, 
R.Palmer.Land and Racial Domination In Rhodesia.1977. and 
B.Pachai,Land Policies in Malawi : An Examination Of The 
Colonial Legacy.Journal Of African History.14:4.1973. 
27 Meeting between Selborne and the Chamber (SNA J 205/06). 
28 SNA 45/07/1464. 
29 Swaziland Corporation Annual Report,1908 (KCL MS.MIL 1.08.3 MS 191a) 
30 SNA 45/07/1464. 
31 Times Of Swaziland.18.5.1907. 
32 In a meeting with Coryndon in June 1907,however, the Regent 
denied that she had made any such offer (SNA 45/07/640).Yet 
in meeting with Elgin in London in December 1907 a member of 
the delegation,Josiah Vilikazi,maintained the Swazi would be 
content if they were given two thirds of the land surface. 
33 Times Of Swaziland.10.8.1906. 
34 Selborne to Smuts (Confidential),6.1.1908,SNA D09/2. An original 
copy of this memorandum is in the private papers of Mr Sidney 
Williams,Manzini,Swaziland. It was also published in the Times 
of Swaziland.12.10.1907. 
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35 Forbes to Selborne,20.9.1906, BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
36 Elgin to Swaziland deputation,December 1907,BL MS Selborne Box 
163 f 157. Yet as Elgin wrote to Selborne afterwards no 
concessions were intended to the Swazi and none were made. 
"I think you will admit that I gave them no ghost of a 
chance for hoping the decision would be reversed...we shall 
do all we can to ship them off. I hope the result will 
strengthen your hands", quoted in R.Hyam.Elgin and Churchill 
At The Colonial Office.1905-8.1968.p 385. Matsebula's 
interpretation that this was a definite promise is therefore 
open to question. See J.S.M.Matsebula.A History Of Swaziland.1972. 
p 138 (1976 edition). 
37 Coryndon to Swazi Chiefs at a meeting,7.3.1908 (SNA 45/07/640). 
38 Selborne's Partition instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
39 BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
40 Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1910-1926. 
41 A further 37,000 acres were purchased from private interests 
for this scheme. As early as 1909 Selborne appears to have 
been involved in the financing of this settlement scheme in 
Swaziland. Thus even while Coryndon was attempting to pacify 
the Swazi with promises of a larger proportion of the land 
surface (37), Selborne wrote to him privately with: 
"I do not consider myself prohibited from putting a white 
man on any crown land which may become available" (23.11.1907, 
SNA 45/07/640). The extent of Selborne's involvement is 
unfortunately not admitted or articulated. Indeed it was not 
until the 1930's that his role was even openly admitted. A.Miller 
also appears to have had a major role in the scheme though even 
he was careful to dissociate himself from it publicly. 
In 1912, the Swaziland Development and Ranching Co.,another 
company in which A.Miller had extensive personal interests, 
bought 84,000 acres of crown land and 87,000 acres of private 
land. A further 100,000 acres was purchased in 1917 (KCL MS MIL 
1.08.47 MS 725a). 
42 Selborne to Grey (Confidential),10.10.1908,SNA D09/2. 
43 Grey to Selborne (Confidential), 15.10.1908,SNA D09/2. 
44 Grey was a close contact of Selborne and prioe to his Swaziland 
commission was General Manager of Katanga Mines from 1901-6. This 
commission appears to have been an attempt by Selborne to 
introduce Grey into the colonial service (Selborne to Grey, BL 
MS Selborne Box 71). In a letter to the Colonial Secretary 
Sept.,1908, (BL MS Selborne Box 71) Selborne writes of his 
appointment of Grey and also suggests the possibility of Grey 
entering the colonial service in Swaziland. 
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44 (Cont.) R.T.Coryndon.Some Account Of George Grey and His Work 
in Africa.1914.describes Grey's fieldwork : 
"Armed with district maps,cut up into sheets suitable for use 
on horseback, he covered without haste the whole area of the 
country in a close examination of the character of soil and 
density of native population. He told me there were few large 
valleys upon which his eyes had not rested, and few dominant 
mountains from the. top of which he had not searched out the 
native kraals,the cultivated lands and the concession boundaries. 
The examination caused him to mark on his maps almost every 
kraal in the whole territory, and his acquaintance with every 
corner was so close that it no doubt enabled him to arrange 
an acceptable solution". 
That only one Commissioner was appointed by Selborne was to 
hasten the partition process and to minimise colonial expenditure 
Times of Swaziland.12.10.1907. 
45 High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908,Grey's Official Report, 
Section 6. 
46 High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908,Grey's Official Report, 
Section 6. 
47 Selborne's Partition instructions to Grey, BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
48 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908 (SNA D09/2). 
49 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),3.5.1908 ( SNA D09/2). 
50 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908 (SNA D09/2).See 
Chapter 6 for a discussion of Swazi uncooperativeness. Grey 
reports a correspondence in which Coryndon tried,without success 
to persuade the Regent to order the chiefs to assist Grey. 
51 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 34 (SNAD09/2). 
52 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 36 (SNA D09/2). 
53 Times of Swaziland.21.11.1908 
54 Typed copies of these notes,covering about 60% of the country, 
are to be found in SNA D09/2. These notes were sent to Selborne 
direct. 
55 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),18.2.1908 (SNA D 09/2). In the 
final partition exactly 1/3 was deducted from 62 concessions, 
more than 1/3 from 51 concessions and less than 1/3 from 68 
concessions. Thirty two compensation schemes were devised by 
Grey (High Commissioner's Proclamation No 15 of 1909). 
56 Selborne to Grey (Confidential),16.11.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129). 
57 SNA 45/07/1464. 
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58 For instance : 
"The chief object of the reserves is not to compel all natives 
to go into these areas but to move of their own free will.As 
a rule natives make little use of these reserves. The native 
chooses his Master and looks up to him for help,advice and 
protection" (Selborne, SNA 45/07/1464) 
and, 
"It is likely that most farmers will try to keep the natives 
they have on their land" (Grey,SNA D09/2) 
59 Selborne to Grey (Confidential),16.11.1907 (SNA 45/07/2129) 
60 At the time of writing it had proved impossible to trace the 
whereabouts of either the originals or copies of these maps. 
High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908 mentions them as 
on a scale of 1 inch : 1 mile. 
There is reason to suppose that all or a number of these maps 
are to be found in File J 53/06 in the Swaziland National Archives. 
This particular file was missing from the shelves. 
61 Grey to Selborne,13.2.1908 (SNA D09/2). 
62 High Commissioner's Notice No 119 of 1908,Grey's Official Report. 
63 Selborne's Partition Instructions to Grey,BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
64 SNA D09/2. 
65 The map from which this data was extracted from a map made in 
the Surveyor General's Office,Pretoria,1914. The Swaziland 
National Museum recently acquired an original map from S.B.Williams 
and the Swaziland National Archives has a photstat copy of the 
map. 
66 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 35 (SNAD09/2). 
67 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 26 (SNA D09/2). 
68 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,Section 31 (SNA Do9/2). 
69 Enraght-Moony to Selborne,8.9.1906 BL MS Selborne Box 163. 
70 R.T.Coryndon.op.cit.. p 8. 
CHAPTER SIX 
1 B.Nyeko,Pre Nationalist Resisitance to Colonial Ru^e.Trans-African 
Journal of History.5:2. traces the rise and consolidation in 
power of the Queen Regent,Labotsibeni. 
2 Swazi Petition to Milner,30.12.1904,to protest the 1904 Proc. 
(SNA J 138/05). White and black legal advisers,Parsonson,Bremer 
and Seme. ,were employed to draft petitions for the Swazi. 
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3 Swazi Petition to Milner,30.12.1904, SNA J 138/05. 
4 Sir Francis Hopwood to 1907 Delegation to Britain, December 1907, 
SNA 45/07/640. 
5 The attitude of the colonial state to the 1890 Concessions 
Court was largely a matter of convenience. In cancelling the 
industrial monopolies the function of the Court was minimised, 
but in dealings with the Swazi it was always used as an 
immutable legal tribunal with far-reaching powers of concession 
confirmation. 
6 RHL MSS Afr S 633 Box 10 fl. 
7 Malunge to Elgin,21.11.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
8 Queen Regent to Coryndon,7.3.1908, SNA 45/07/640. 
9 J.S.M.Matsebula.A History Of Swaziland.1972. reveals that this 
view is still held by contemporary Swazi. In conversation with 
Matsebula, the author claimed that the payments made to the 
King were interpreted as traditional forms of tribute to the 
monarch. 
10 Grey to Selborne (Confidential),31.12.1908,SNA D09/2. Swazis 
were later given leave to appeal against any of the partition 
details. A mere 34 appeals were made through District 
Commissioner's, a function of Swazi dissatisfaction with the 
partition as a whole. 90% of these were rejected anyway by 
Grey ( SNA 45/07/140). 
11 Selborne to Swazi Delegation,1905,BL MS Selborne Box 163 f 157. 
12 These perceptive comments are hopefully also a rebuke to 
Mashasha.op.cit..1973. for his acceptance of colonial policy 
at its face value. (SNA 45/07/640). 
13 SNA RCS 379/14. Also,High Commissioner's Proclamation No 24 of 
1913. 
14 Times of Swaziland.12.10.1907. This ploy to give added weight 
to locally-made decisions was often used in dealings with the 
Swazi. 
15 Coryndon to Selborne (Confidential),6.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
16 Selborne to Elgin,17.8.1907,SNA 45/07/640. The failure of 
the delegation to obtain any concessions from the colonial 
state was pre-supposed. Selborne's private view of the Regent 
was less charitable. The Swazi were not supposed to protest 
actions of the colonial state undertaken in their supposed 
best interests : "These are the whims and intrigues of an 
autocrat who is intemperantly selfish and ambitious and has 
frequently exhibited a dangerous credulity for the advice of 
irresponsible and unsrupulous adventurers"(Selborne to Coryndon, 
6.6.1907,SNA 45/07/640). Swazi tradition attributes guite a 
different character to the Regent,Matsebula,op^cit.. 
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17 Coryndon's proposal is in RHL MS Afr S 633 Box 10. The 
Swaziland National Archives contains a file of intercepted 
correspondence between the Regent and Parsonson,a Pietermaritz-
burg attorney. 
18 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
19 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
20 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
21 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),28.8.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
22 Coryndon to Queen Regent,16.9.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
23 Selborne to Elgin (confidential),13.5.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
24 Selborne to Elgin (Confidential),28.8.1907,SNA 45/07/640. 
25 The delegation was also granted an audience with King Edward. 
A prepared statement of allegiance was read. The delegation 
attempted to express their grievances direct to the King but 
Marwick,the translator,refused to translate under orders from 
Elgin , SNA 45/07/640,Marwick memorandum on the 1907 Delegation. 
26 Marwick memorandum,SNA 45/07/640. 
27 Queen Regent to Coryndon,7.3.1908,SNA 45/07/640. 
28 Queen Regent to Coryndon in retrospect,16.6.1914,SNA RCS 375/14. 
29 Within a short period the numbers of Swazi employed in the 
South African mining industry rose dramatically,but tapered 
off after 1914 (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1909-1930). 
30 Loans were sought from the National Bank of Africa (c^30,000) 
and the Standard Bank (</l00,000). The Banks were discouraged 
by the colonial state from making the loans. 
31 Seme to Coryndon,16.6.1914,SNA RCS 375/14. 
32 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 2 of 1915. Land was 
bought from two whites,Torrens and Du Pont,who had themselves 
apparently bought it from the crown. Some speculation is 
therefore postulated though there is no apparent evidence. 
C.P.Youe.Imperial Land Policy In Swaziland and The African 
Response.1977. writes that the colonial state allowed this 
transaction as an appeasement exercise. 
33 Miller to Coryndon,30.4.1914,KCL MS MIL 1.08.47 MS 725b. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
1 The number of whites involved in agriculture was 533 in 1921 
and only 570 in 1936 (Swaziland Annual Colonial Reports,1921,1936). 
P.M.Mutibwa,White Settlers In Uganda:The Era of Hope And 
Disillusionment.1905-23.Trans African Journal Of History.5:2.1976. 
examines a similair process in Uganda though attributing it 
to different reasons. 
2 For instance,the Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme,which never 
managed to attract the numbers of settlers solicited. The 
Swaziland Corporation was also unable to attract settlers for 
its holdings. 
In 1960 there was no cultivation at all on 42% of landholdings 
and 40% of all holdings were owned by absentee landlords. The 
large proportion of externally-held land can be in one sense 
attributed to speculation by South Africans in the post war 
period of rising land prices. 
3 The Swaziland National Archives carry a full set of European 
Advisory Council minutes from its inception in 1924 until 1964. 
Examination of these records would undoubtedly show the impact 
of the petit-colon on local colonial policy throughout the 
colonial period. For instance,on several occasions a tax on 
unutilised land was proposed by the colonial state,opposed by 
the petit-colon and subsequently dropped. M.P.K.Sorrenson, 
Origins Of European Settlement In Kenya.1968.is a good study 
of the petit-colon impact on Kenyan policy. 
4 The loan fund was instituted by High Commissioner's Proclamation 
No 36 of 1929 as the Agricultural Development and Loan 
Fund Act. Between 1929-37,.* 30,000 was loaned to whites at 
easy interest rates for fencing,boring and land purchase 
mortgages. Grants in Aid amounted to ^ 300,000 between 1928-38 
but even as late as 1932,tax on blacks was still generating 
40% of colonial administrative income (Swaziland Annual Colonial 
Reports,1927-39). 
5 The question of transfer has been treated in detail by works 
such as F.A.Hoernle,Native Opinion and The Transfer Of The 
Protectorates.African Observer.2:2.1934. L.Curtis and M.Perham, 
The Protectorates Of Southern Africa : The Question Of Their 
Transfer To The Union.1935.R.C.Fitzgerald.South Africa And The 
High Commission Territories.World Affairs.4.1950. and 
W.E.Barker,South Africa's Six Point Claim To The Protectorates, 
Race Relations Journal.23:1.1956. 
6 See the work of T.J.D.Fair on the South African space economy; 
For instance.T.J.D.Fair.Polarisation.Dispersion and 
Decentralisation In The South African Space Economy.1975. 
7 Hertzog to Secretary of State,25.4.1934,in H.M.S.O..Basutoland 
The Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.1952.p 46. 
8 No stock of weight less than 8001bs was allowed entry to the 
South African market. The major colon ranching enterprise, 
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the Swaziland Ranching and Development Corporation (Capital: 
^170,000) in which the ubiquitous A.M.Miller was a major 
shareholder,controlled 200,000 acres of land and built up 
large herds in the early 1920's by importing stock. The Company 
went into liquidation in 1928 as a direct result of the Union 
embargo (KCL MS MIL 1.08.3 MS 268). 
9 National Development Plans were first instituted in 1946 and 
appeared at regular intervals for the remainder of the colonial 
period. The commitment of the colonial state to encouraging 
British multi-national capital in Swaziland is clear from 
these plans and is re-iterated in the reports of various 
economic survey missions.See V.Liversage.Swaziland Development. 
H.M.S.O.,1948, A.Symon.Economic and Financial Report On The 
High Commission Territories.H.M.S.O..1954 and sections on 
Swaziland in colonial economic reports of 1951,1960,and 1965. 
10 The role of the Colonial Development Corporation is appraised 
by A.R.Kendrick.The Role Of The C.D.C. In Project Formulation 
And Implementation In Swaziland,in J.Barrat (ed).Strategy For 
Development.1976. and by several propaganda publications of 
the C.D.C. (particularly.Notes In Explaining The Corporation's 
Work In Helping The Countries Of THe Developing World To Raise 
Their Standards Of Living.1976).Multi-national Corporation 
activities in Africa are considered in Langdon(1975),Widstrand(1975 
11 There is no indication who the land was purchased from but 
a large proportion is believed to have belonged to South 
African absentee landowners,and possibly speculators. 
12 For foreign capital,the construction of company towns with 
sharp black-white urban morphology (Mhlambanyati,Bunya, 
Mhlume and Big Bend) and the 1965 Railway to export iron ore, 
pulp and sugar. 
In 1945,40.3% of colonial state expenditure was on agriculture 
and only 5.6% on urban infrastructure. By 1963, the position 
was reversed (11.1% and 76.5% respectively).Swaziland Annual 
Colonial Reports,1945,1963. 
In 1936 700 Swazi were employed in mining and 2900 in white 
agriculture. In 1970 foreign capital controlled a Swazi labour 
force of over 25,000. 
13 C.P.Potholm.Political Development In Swaziland.1960-5.1967 
14 For the texts of these petitions see SNA 45/07/640. Matsebula, 
op.cit..1972.P 177-8(1976 ed.) documents the 1958 petition 
and the colonial response. 
The Swazi National Archives library carries a detailed account 
of the proceedings of the Privy Council Appeal(No 158 of 1924) 
in the case of A.M.Miller and the Swaziland Corporation v. 
Sobhuza 11. Detailed comment on the appeal is carried in, 
The British Protectorates and The Privy Council.Calcutta Weekly 
Notes.30:41.1926. 
15 Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1934. 
16 V.Liversage.op.cit..1948. See also Appendix 4c for a comparison 
between 1946 population and stock figures on reserves with 
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Grey's carrying capacity estimates made in 1909. 
17 Swaziland Annual Colonial Report,1936. 
18 High Commissioner's Proclamation No 2 of 1946. 
19 The implementation of the Native Land Settlement Scheme is 
covered in the Reports Of The Native Land Settlement Dept. 
(1946-54). 
20 G.Whittington and J.Daniel,Problems Of Land Tenure and 
Ownership in Swaziland, in M.F.Thomas and G.Whittington (eds), 
Environment and Land Use In Africa.1969. comment that former 
Land Settlement Areas show no obvious differences in appearance 
or organisation from longstanding Swazi areas. 
21 Sir Evelyn Baring,Resident Commissioner, meetings with Sobhuza 11 
(July 1945) in SNA File 1018. 
22 Sir Evelyn Baring to Colonial Office,Feb.1946,SNA File 1018. 
23 Speculation was rife around this time by landowners,resident 
and absentee. 
24 It was not possible to confirm or deny the supposed 
mismanagement of LIFA funds suggested by some informants. 
25 From.Secret Meetings Of A Special Session Of The 3rd European 
Advisory Council of Swaziland.1953. The quotation is a 
compilation of comments from C.TodcKa),J.Murphy(b) & R.Stephens(c), 
all of whom were later senators in the first independent 
Swaziland Government. 
26 The colonial agricultural officials desired the culling of the 
poorest stock in herds whereas the Swazi, for whom quality is 
traditionally a side issue,wanted to sell the stock that 
fetched higher market prices, SNA File 1018. 
27 Times of Swaziland.February 1968. 
28 For the importance of this in other contexts see B.J.Berman, 
Clientelism and Neo-Colonialism : Centre Periphery Relations 
and Political Developments In African States.Studies in 
Comparative International Development,9:2,1974, and C.Leys, 
Underdevelopment in Kenya : The Political Economy Of 
Neo Colonialism.1975. 
29 The market value of land quickly fell to ]0% of that for 
similair quality land in the Transvaal. 
30 Personal communication,Ministry of Agriculture official. 
King Sobhuza, 
31 Times of London. Special Report on Swaziland,October 1976. 
32 See 1st and 2nd National Development Programmes (1968-78). 
Jones (1977) suggests that a land grant claim by the Swazi was 
supported by the petit-colon who preferred the prospect of being 
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bought out than having their land confiscated. That there has not 
been a general expropriation of land is attributed to the influence 
of the settler&the desire to retain foreign capital. 
33 The land question was invariably central to the Pan Africanist 
rhetoric during this period. Nationalisation of all land holding 
and the restoration of traditional Swazi rights was an oft-
reiterated policy of the opposition N.N.L.C. party until its 
banning in 1973. The policy of accepting British funds for 
land repurchase was particularly attacked. See Ngwane Forum.12:11, 
1972, and Kusile Ngwane.1:3.1968. 
34 R.P.Stephens , currently Minister of Finance, was once general 
manager of Peak Timbers and is a powerful advocate of petit-colon 
and foreign capital interests. Two other senators, the late 
C.Todd amd J.S.Murphy, held extensive landed interests in 
Swaziland. 
35 M.Franssman, University of Sussex, is researching for a doctorate 
on this period of Swaziland's history. Other workers in the 
field of Swaziland's history are B.Nyeko of Makerere University 
and F.Mashasha of the University of Oxford. 
194 
APPENDIX ONE 
A. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS 
B. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS:ARCHIVES LIBRARY 
C. RESEARCH LETTERS : Killie Campbell Library 
Government Archives,Pretoria 
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APPENDIX ONE A : PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIALS 
SWAZILAND NATIONAL ARCHIVES (S.N.A.) at Mbabane and Lebomba,Swaziland 
l.DEmarcation Of Native Area 
HX D09/2,J155/02,J205/06,J53/06,RCS 321/09,Fi le 1291,File 769. 
2.Deeds Office Records 
RCS 891/30,Fi le 80,J212/02,RCS 153/15. 
3.Colonial S ta te and the S e t t l e r Companies 
J53/03,D09/65A,RCS 520A/08,45/07/1464,45/07/2129,S51Q,RCS 763/32,RCS 738/37, 
RCS 244/25. 
4.Swazis On Individual Tenure Land 
D08/80,RCS 579/13,RCS 247/14,RCS 249/14,RCS 336/14, RCS 450/11,RCS 379/14, 
RCS 619/14,RCS 462/14. 
5.Treksheep Farmers 
File 546, RCS 78/03, File 2203. 
6.Purchase Of Land By Swazi Nation 
File 1018,RCS 375/14,RCS 273/15,RCS 281/15,RCS 84/18,RCS 270/14 - 14b/16, 
D09/88 
7.Native Tax 
J l /03 -17b /03 , JS2 /04 , J l8 /05 , J l38 /05 . 
a.White Settlement Schemes 
RCS 62b/26, File 1269, RCS bb8/27,HCS 579/22. 
9.Colonial Settlement Schemes 
File 86b, File942, RCS b94/3b,RCS 369/39,File 1861A.RCS 7bl/23,RCS 347/26, 
RCS b70/28 
lO.Unconsulted Files for period after 1949 
File 3014,0,(>11, J/1,B 
Kile 3306 
KILLIE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY(K.C.L.) at Durban,South Africa 
Allister M. Miller Papers (MS.MIL.) 
(.MS,MIL.1.08.3 
KCM 2355,2362,2364-68,MS 229,191a,268 Correspondence concerning the Swaziland 
Corporation(1908-22) including Annual Reports 
MS 281a Correspondence with R.T.Coryndon(1908). 
I. MS.MIL.1.08.10 
MS 406 Correspondence with Lord Milner on Protectorate administration. 
J. MS.MIL.1.08.11 
MS 418 Information about mining companies in Swaziland. 
i. MS.MIL. 1.08.23 
MS 558 Memorandum on various concessions and syndicates in Swaziland. 
MS 547 a,b Mineral prospects and coneessions in Swaziland. 
MS KCM 2459-67 Papers presented to the Swaziland Concessions Syndicate(including 
original copies of concessions L44 to 82) 
MS.MIL.1.08.37 
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5.MS.MIL.1.08.37 
KCM 2295-2363,MS 645,MS 936 Correspondence about the Swaziland Development 
and Ranehing Co, and Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme. 
6.MS.MIL.1.08.38 
MS 661,651 Attitudes to incorporation. 
7.MS.MIL.1.08.47 
MS 72b Memo relating to land purchase by natives. 
RHODES HOUSE LIBRARY (R.H.L.) at Oxford,Kngland 
R.T.Coryndon Papers (MSS.Afr.S633) 
Box 9 : f 1-20,t" b If 1-32 
Box 1'.): ril ff 16-82 
Box 12: f 1 ff 2-4 
Box 12: i'4 If 1-3 
BODLEIAN LIBRARY (.B.L.J at Oxford University, Of ford, England 
Selborne Papers (us.selborne) 
I IS.Selborne 7\, ±' l^b-6 
72, l 1VJ-80 
163, f IbV 
170k, f MM 
Milner Papers (nSS.Eng.Hist) 
bb(b3),9(yj,c.fJ88 
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APPENDIX ONE B 
pi-UMAKY SOURCE1 MATERIALS (Swaziland National Archives Library) 
COLONIAL BLUE BOOKS 
1748 
2 3 1 6 
2 b 0 b 
2 6 9 b 
2y9K 
3 1 5 2 
3 4 1 9 
3 9 1 4 
4 0 3 7 
4 t i4b 
b08!) 
6 2 0 0 
1)217 
7 2 1 2 
7 6 1 1 
7 8 7 8 
9b02 
Of 
o f 
o f 
o f 
O f 
o f 
o f 
o f 
o f 
o f 
O f 
o f 
O l 
o f 
o f 
O f 
o f 
1 8 / y 
1879 
1880 
1880 
18H1 
1882 
1882 
1 8 8 4 
1 8 8 4 
1886 
1887 
1890 
1890 
18 y j 
l ayb 
189b 
l ayy 
Convention of Transvaal 
Convention of 1884 
Report of De Winton Commission 
Convention of 1890 
Concessions Listings 
Handing over of Swaziland to the Soutn African Republic 
SWAZILAND CONCESSIONS COMMISSION REPORTS 
1903 J.HUBIE: Sv/aziland Concessions Report(including a digest of concessions) 
190b Report to tne Governor(relating to a suggestion by A.M.Miller on behalf 
of the Sv/aziland Corporation) 
1905 Report On The Expropriation of Monopolies 
1908 Report . Of Detailed Decisions (relative to boundaries,registration of 
servitudes,periods of enjoyment,etc. in respect of land,grazing and 
mineral concessions) 
191b j.SMUTS: Report ON Registration of Land in Sv/aziland (unlocated). 
HIGH COMMISSIONER'S GAZETTES 
Swaziland Order-m-council of iy03 
Proc.No.3 of 19U4 concessions Proclamation 
Proc.No.4 of lyuv partition Proclamation 
Sv/aziland Order-in-Council of 1906 
JtfPoeJSo! 28 of lyuv Demarcation oi Native Areas 
Notice No.119 of 19U8 Grey»s Report 
proc.No.70 oi lyoa 
Swaziland Crown Lands order-m-council iyo7 
Swaziland Crown Minerals Order-in-Council 1908 
Notice No.53 of 1909 Grey's Compensation Report 
Proc.No 15 of 1909 . . 
Proc.No 39 of 1910 Preserving Native rights on Native Area 
Proc.No 13 of 1911 Disposal Of Crown Lands 
Notice No.19 Of 1912 Cancelled Concessions 
Proc-.No 24 of 1913 Natives still on Individual Tenure land 
Proc.No 2 of 1915 Control of African Land Purchases. 
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MISCELLKNEOUS 
Times of Swaziland,1897-1912 (published weekly) 
Annual Colonial Reports for Swaziland,1905-1966 
1 9 9 , ' •< C 
THE CAMPBELL COLLECTIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NATAL 
KILUE CAMPBELL AFRICANA LIBRARY WILLIAM CAMPBELL MUSEUM MASHU BANTU MUSEUM 
MUCKLENEUK 
3 2 0 MARRIOTT ROAD, DURBAN 
REPUBLIC OP SOUTH AFRICA 
Telephone 33-6476 
OurRefe.™*.: K C 6 1 1 . 5 1 / 6 2 7 CRUS 1 5 November 1 9 7 7 . 
Your Reference: 
Mr. D.S. Crush 
P.O. Box 728 
MANZINI 
Swaziland. 
Dear Mr. Crush, 
A.M. Miller's Papers 
Thank you for your letter of 5 November 1977. 
The Allistsr Mitchell Millar Papers housed in this Library form 
a large collection, extending in all over a hundred files and 
covering a wide range of topics, viz. administration, communications, 
agriculture, mining, Swazi history and customs, certain companies 
operating in Swaziland, as well as personal and business correspondence 
of A.M. Miller. Incidentally, the Library has also a virtually 
complete set of the Times of Swaziland from its inception in 1897. 
Should you wish to consult the Papers, the Library is open on weekdays 
from 08h30 to 13h00 and 14h00 to 16h45, and on Saturdays from 09h00 
to 12h00. However, with the coming Christmas vacation the Library 
will close at midday on 23 December 1977 and re-open on 3 January 1978. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Miss) 3.F. Duggarr-
Africana Librarian 
3FD/pjb 
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DEPARTEMENT VAN NASIONALE OPVOEDING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL EDUCATION 
STAATSARG1EF-GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES 
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PrW,«B,g )X236 
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[~~ I 0001 
Mr* J*S* Crush 
P.O. Box 728 3 0 -ft- 1977 
Manzini 
SWAZILAND 
i_ J 
Dear Mr* Crush 
I am writing in reply to your inquiry dated 8-11-1977 oonoeming the concession 
boundaries in Swaziland* 
The Report of the Commission appointed under the Swaziland Administration 
Proclamation. 1904. as to the Expropriation of the Rights referred to in 
Section 12 of the Proclamation with appendices (PM 1/2/17O-48/30) is in the 
custody of the Transvaal Archives Depot* The report covers 210 pages; six 
maps are also inoluded in the report* 
Xerox-copies can be supplied at 6 cents per copy plus 4 cents postage for 
every ten copies ordered, payable in advance* An order form is included* 
I regret to inform you that I could not trace any information regarding Mr* 
George Grey or his private papers* 
Yours faithfully 
t W CHEEP :'THANSVAAL ARCHIVES DEPOT 
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APPENDIX TWO 
A. ROYAL SWAZI DYNASTY 
B. EXTRACTS FROM SETTLER'S ACCOUNTS : Forbes 
Miller 
i 
202 
APPENDIX 2a 
GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE ROYAL SWAZI DYNASTY 
DLAMINI 1 
I 
MSWATI 1 
I 
NGWANE 11 
I 
DLAMINI 11 
I 
NKOSI 11 
I 
MAVUSO 1 
I 
MAGUDULELA 
HLUBI 
Pre 1750 
LUDVONGA 1 
I 
DLAMINI 111 
NGWANE 111 
I 
NDVUNGUNYE (Zikodze) 
SOBHUZA 1 (Somhlolo, Ngwane IV) 
MSWATI 11 
DLAMINI IV (Mbandzeni) 
J 
NGWANE IV (Bhunu) 
1 
SOBHUZA 11 
d.1780 
d.1815 
1815-1836 
1840-1868 
1875-1889 
1897-1899 
1921-
Note : Traditionally a chosen King does not attain full sovereignty 
until reaching his majority ar age 21. In the interim period 
the Queen Regent, generally the mother of the new King,rules 
in his stead. Labotsibeni held this office from 1889-1897 
and again from 1899-1921 when Sobhuza 11 was installed as 
King. 
Source : Matsebula (1972). 
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APPENDIX 2b 
Extract from D.Forbes.My Life In South Africa.1938. 
Then came the concessions era in Swaziland. We had returned 
to find it at its height. We realised that all was lost as regards 
the mineral rights all over Swaziland held by my uncle and father. 
So my brother and I decided to share in the spoils,and get concessions 
for ourselves. It was an exciting and also an amusing game. There 
were dozens of men walking around the King's kraal with concessions 
papers written over in their pockets ready to put before the King 
to be signed. Each man kept his own particular piece of ground as 
secret as possible in case another man forestalled him. He had a 
Swazi Chief as his agent to secure an audience with the King for 
him. 
We all walked or sat around the kraal to all outward appearance 
for no other reason than for the sake of our health. Only with our 
friends did we discuss the concession. 
On getting an audience with the King you would tell him you 
just wanted a piece of land as big as your hand on which you wanted 
the rights. You would give the King some money now, but thousands 
of pounds later,when you discovered gold and worked it. He got 
j£3000 when Forbes Reef was floated into a company. If your luck was 
in and the King was in a good mood he would say "Let me see the 
money " and never in your life did you part with your money quicker 
and more willingly. The King would say "Where is the pen?". He would 
make a cross where indicated,as his signature. Then there would be 
a scramble with the chiefs present to sign as witnesses and the 
custom was to give each chief who signed £l. A place was always 
reserved for Sandhlana and Tecuba to sign. 
The King was now very ill and,I am sorry to say it,we whites 
saw the end coming to our harvest of securing concessions,and most 
of us had just one more we would like to secure;I in common with 
the others. So I approached the King one day,as others were doing. 
He looked at me and said "You,Mahleka,son of my friend,are you also 
joining the vultures that want to pick my bones before I die? I 
did not expect it from you." Never have I felt such a crushing 
rebuke in my life. 
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Extract from A.M.Miller.Swaziland ; The land Of Green Pastures 
And Running Streams.1936. 
The year 1887 saw the birth of a concessions-hunting boom. 
It may have been picturesque but was definitely sordid. Roads were 
made and footpaths worn to bedrock by the horses of the would-be 
concessionaires. The King's sweeper, his brewer, his snuff-bearer, 
his nail-parer, were sanctified entities in the eyes of the 
suppliants. Into ever-open hands a constant stream of silver fell 
in the expectation that it might disclose some veiled path to 
the giver of good things. The ndunas were still more substantially 
rewarded. Gold was their guerdon and uncounted wealth was distributed 
in enlisting their assistance. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
A. SWAZILAND ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1903 
B. COLONIAL BIOGRAPHIES 
C. LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED CONCESSIONS : Land 
Minerals 
D. SWAZILAND CORPORATION MEMORANDUM 
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APPENDIX 3 a . 
- , SWAZILAND ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1903. 
j, (As amended by the Swaziland Orders in Council, 1906,1909 and 1934.) 
** • *AT THE COURT AT BUCKINGHAM PALACE, 
THE 25TH DAY OF JUNE, 1903. 
Present : 
THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN COUNCIL. 
WHEREAS the Government of the late South African Republic 
exercised rights and powers of protection, legislation, jurisdiction, 
and administration in and over the Territory known as Swaziland; 
And whereas the late South African Republic was conquered 
by His Majesty's Forces and was annexed to and now forms part 
of His Majesty's Dominions, and provision has been made for the 
government thereof as one of His Majesty's Colonies under the 
name of the Transvaal; 
And whereas all the rights and powers of the late South African 
Republic with respect to Swaziland have, by virtue of the conquest 
and annexation of the said South African Republic, passed to 
His Majesty, and His Majesty has by treaty, capitulation, grant, 
usage, sufferance, and other lawful means, power and jurisdiction 
in Swaziland; 
New, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue of the powers by the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or othenvise in His Majesty vested, 
is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, 
and it is hereby ordered as follows:— 
I 
1. This Order may be cited as the Swaziland Order in Council, I 
1903. 
f2. In this Order unless the contrary appears " Swaziland " 
means the territory known by that name bounded on the North, 
the West, and the South by the Transvaal, and on the East by 
the Colony of Natal and the Portuguese territories. " His Majesty " * 
includes His Majesty's heirs and successors. " Secretary of State " \ 
means one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State. [" High f 
Commissioner" means His Majesty's High Commissioner for J 
Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. v 
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" Gazette " means the Official Gazette of the High Commissioner 
for Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.] 
*3. The [High Commissioner] may, on His Majesty's behalf, 
exercise all powers and jurisdiction which His }fajesty, at any time 
before or after the date of this Order, had, or may have, within 
Swaziland, and.to that end may take or cause* fo be taken all such 
measures, and may do or cause to be dfeiK oil such matters and 
things therein as are lawful and as in the interest of His Majesty's 
»ervice he may think expedient, subject to such instructions as he 
mav from time to time receive from His Majesty, or through a 
Secretary of State. 
*4. The [High Commissioner] may appoint a Resident Com-
missioner and so many fit persons as, in the interest of His Majesty's 
service, he may think necessary, to be Assistant Commissioners, 
Judges, Magistrates, or other officers, and may define from time to 
. time the districts within which such officers shall respectively 
discharge their functions. 
Every such officer may exercise such powers and authorities 
as the i High Commissioner] may assign to him, subject nevertheless 
to such directions and instructions as the [High Commissioner] 
may from tune to time think fit to give him. The appointment of 
such officers shall not abridge, alter, or affect the right of the [High 
Commissioner] to execute and discharge all the powers and 
authorities hereby conferred upon him. 
The [High Commissioner] may remove an}' officer so appointed. 
*5. In the exercise of the powers and authorities hereby conferred 
opon him, the [High Commissioner] may, amongst other things, 
,r
 t^1 *^me t o t ' m e ^ Proclamation, provide for the administration 
Of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order, 
and good government of Swaziland, and of all persons therein, 
iftduding the prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb 
Hje public peace. 
- :TfiIre fHigh Commissioner] in issuing such Proclamations, shall 
' S J I * * a " y n a t i v e l a w s b y which the civil relations of any native 
n W 3 ' t r , l b e S 0 r P ^ ^ t i o n s under His Majesty's protection are 
. "awRegulated, except so far as the same may be incompatible with 
r
 frL!re eXCTClse o f H i s Majesty's power and jurisdiction, or clearly 
- . tetyww to the welfare of the said natives. 
' * « » l ^ & r > ' 1 t P r ^ l a m a t i o n o f t h e High. Commissioner shall be 
'" *bhbS i? Ul , GauUe' a n d s h a U f r o m a n d a f t e r the date of such 
- " « M I C * i P ° i ° m a n d a f t e r s u c h o t h e r d a t e M m a y b e mentioned 
>Mi«stv oi T i 1 0 " * a n d t h e r e a f t e r u ^ i l disallowed by His 
^ ; - - J L rt,Pea««a or modified by any subsequent Proclamation, 
^ > a ^ . . . ~ " ~ ' —.- • . . . 
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have effect as if contained in this Order, and the High Commissioner ' 
shall take such measures as he thinks proper for giving due publicity 
thereto within Swaziland.] 
*7. His Majesty may disallow any such Proclamation wholly or 
in part, and may signify such disallowance by Order in Council or 
through a Secretary of State, and upon such disallowance being 
notified in the Gazette, the provisions so disallowed shall from and 
after a dale to be mentioned in such notification, cease to have effect, 
but without prejudice to anything theretofore lawfully done 
thereunder. Due notification shall be publicly made by the [High 
Commissioner] within Swaziland of the disallowance of any such 
Proclamation. 
8. (Revoked by the Swaziland Order in Council, 1906.) 
*9. The [High Commissioner] may as he shall see occasion, ' 
when any crime has been committed within Swaziland, or for which 
the offender may be tried therein, grant a pardon, in His Majesty's 
name, to any accomplice, not being the actual perpetrator of such'.1 
crime, who shall give such information and evidence as shall lead -
to the apprehension and conviction of the principal offender; and i 
further, may grant to any offender convicted of any crime in any ; 
Court, or before any Judge, Justice, Magistrate, or other Officer 
within Swaziland a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, ', 
or any respite of the execution of the sentence of any such offender, « 
for such period as to the [High Commissioner] may seem fit, and ' 
may remit any fines, penalties, or .forfeitures which may become ' 
due and payable. 
10. (Revoked by the Swaziland Order in Council, 1906.) -'1 
" "i 
11. This Older shall be published in the Gazette, and shall there- Ki 
upon come into operation, and the High Commissioner shall give ''i 
directions for the publication of this Order at such places, and in ^ 
such manner and for such time or times as he thinks proper for ft 
giving due publicity thereto within Swaziland. | 
12. His Majesty may from time to time revoke, alter, add to, "1 
or amend this Order. h 
And the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, one of His ',< 
Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary i-1 
directions herein accordingly. 
A. W. FITZROY. 
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MAJOR COLONIAL OFFICIALS WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SWAZILAND,1902-14. 
SIR ALFRED MILNER 
Career Details : Private Sec. to Chancellor of Exchequer(1886-8), 
Private Sec. to Viceroy of India(1888-9),Director-General of 
Accounts,Cairo(1889-92),Chairman of Board of Inland Revenue(1892-7), 
Governor of South Africa and High Commissioner for Protectorates 
(1897-1905),Sec.of State for War (1916-8).Colonial Secretary(1918-20) 
Capital Linkages : Directorships of London Joint Stock Bank, Bank 
of West Africa,Northern Assurance Co.,Rio Tinto (1906-16).Chairman 
of Rio Tinto (1922). 
Biography : J.Marlowe.Milner:Apostle of Empire.1976. 
SECOND EARL OF SELBORNE 
Career Details : Undersec.of State for Colonies (pre 1900),First 
Lord of Admiralty(1900-5).Governor-General of South Africa and 
High Commissioner for Protectorates(1905-14).Minister of Agriculture 
(1915-16). 
Biography : none, but see 
D.G.Boyce & J.O.Stubbs;F.S.Oliver,Lord Selborne and 
Federalism.Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
5:1,1976. 
A.R.Booth, Lord Selborne and The British Protectorates, 
Journal Of African History.10:1.1969. 
Publications 
Earl of Selborne, The South African Protectorates, 
Journal of African Society.13.1914. 
SIR ROBERT CORYNDON 
Career Details : Private Sec. to Rhodes(1896).Administrator of 
of N-W Rhodesia (1897-1907).Resident Commissioner for Swaziland 
(1907-16).Rhodesian Native Affairs Commission(1914-15),Governor 
of Uganda(1917-22) and Kenyat1922-25). 
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Capital Linkages : Administrator for British South Africa Co. 
(1897-1907). 
Biography : R.Palmer.Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia.1977.C.5. 
C.P.Youe,Dalhousie University,is currently doing PhD 
reserach on Coryndon's career. 
Publications : 
R.T.Coryndon.Swaziland.Journal Of African Society.14.1914 
GEORGE GREY 
Career Details : Special Commissioner for Swaziland(1907-9) 
Capital Linkages : Manager,Northumberland Syndicate (1891),employee 
of Zambesi Exploration Co.(1895-99),General Manager of Tanganyika 
Concessions Co.Ltd. in Katanga (1901-6). 
Biography : R.T.Coryndon.Some Account Of George Grey And His Work 
In Africa.1914. 
W.S.Brelsford, Generation of Men.The European Pioneers 
Of N.Rhodesia.1965. 
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APPENDIX 3c 
LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED LANDS CONCESSION 
Enclosure 1 in No. 33. 
Duly registered in the books of the King. 
(Signed) ALLISTER M. MILLER, 
Embekelweni, Resident Secretary and Agent, Swazie King. 
29th July 1889. 
T o ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
B E it hereby made known that I, Umbandeni, King and Paramount Chief of the 
Swazie Nation, acting with the advice and consent of my Indunas in Council assembled, 
hereby grant, cede, and assign unto and on behalf of John Thorburn and Frank Watkins, 
their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, the sole, full, free, and exclusive farming 
right over all such pieces and portions of my country of Swazieland bounded on the north 
by the Komatie River, on the west by the Transvaal border, on the south by the Trans-
vaal border, on the east by the Portuguese and Tongaland borders, and lying within these 
boundaries, as have not at the date of signing of these presents been granted for farming 
and agricultural purposes. 
The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall further enjoy the 
full right and privilege to divert streams, make and utilise watercourses, make roads, 
build dwelling-houses, store-houses, and cattle kraals and stables, and do all such acts-
and things as may be requisite and necessary for the better carrying out of the business of 
a farmer on any and all such pieces, plots, and portions of ground as are contained in the 
boundaries aforesaid, and become their property by the signing of these presents. 
The said John Thorbuin and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall also have the 
right to use such water for irrigating and other purposes as they may deem necessary, the 
right to cut and use wood on the farms above referred to, the right to import any and 
every description of machinery and farming implements which they may deem requisite 
and expedient for furthering the interests and requirements ceded to them by this grant, 
as also the right to import all grains, cereals, and manures for farming purposes. 
The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall have the right to 
sublet, sell, or transfer to any person or persons, or company, syndicate, or companies ot 
persons, any portion or portions or the whole of the ground made over to them by virtue 
of this grant, and such person or persons or companies aforesaid shall acquire all and 
singular the rights, privileges, and benefits, granted under these presents. 
The period during which the said concessionaires and their foresaids shall enjoy the rights 
made over to them shall be for a period of fifty (50) years, to be reckoned from the date 
of the signing of these presents, provided, should they so desire it, they shall obtain a 
renewal of the rights hereby made over and granted for a further term of fifty (50) years, 
subject to the same terms and conditions as herein are provided. 
As and in full consideration for the rights and privileges hereby granted and made over, 
the said. John Thornburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall pay to me or my 
successors by way of yearly rental the sum of fifty pounds (50/.) sterling. 
The said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins, on behalf of themselves and successors, 
agree and bind themselves to respect all prior rights, should such exist, affecting, this 
grant, and further in no way to interfere with the rights of my native subjects ; and I, 
Umbandine, on behalf of myself and successors, agree to afford them all protection in. the 
enjoyment of the rights hereby granted and recognised by me. • \ 
I 
2 1 2 
(3c .Cont . ) 
Ii 
n't 
3 And it j s the true intent hereof— 
(1.) Thathe said John Thorburn and Frank Watkins and their foresaids shall enjoy the 
M ..jll and exclusive grazing rights over all portions of my country Iyiusj to the south of the 
C Komatie River, and bounded as above described, and which have not at the date of these 
fl, presents been granted to anyone else ; as also the grazing rights over all portions of mv 
^| kingdom already granted, but which may during the continuance of this grant lapse and 
* heconie null and void through any cause whatsoever ; further, the right to carry on dairy 
.Operations in connection with the grazing rights; and also, as aforesaid, the right to 
Ktnuke use of and import all machinery and dairy appliance hich may be considered 
(^necessary 
AM* 
.•'(2.) The full, sole, free, and exclusive right in that portion of my country lying to the 
'south of the Komatie River, and bounded as already described, to cultivate and carry on 
SP„ any and every species of agriculture and arboriculture and planting, on all portions or 
% pieces of land where such rights have not been granted at the date of these presents to 
*" anyone else ; as also the full and exclusive right to carry on any species of agriculture, 
planting, or arboriculture on all portions of my country over which such rights have already 
been granted, but which may during the continuance of this grant through any cause 
^whatsoever lapse and fall back to me; and, further, for the purpose of carrying on 
^agricultural operations, to make use of all such agricultural machinery and appliances as 
S*may by the concessionaires be deemed needful aud necessary. 
y The concessionaires and their foresaids shall enjoy and have the full, free, and undis-
turbed use and enjoyment of the rights hereby granted them, for which grant I have this 
day received good and sufficient consideration, and I engage, on my protection being 
•asked, to prevent anyone whomsoever from destroying and trespassing upon or injuring 
* the agricultural operations or works of the said concessionaires. 
Given under my hand and seal at my Head Kraal, Embekelweni (Gufane), Swazie-
land, on this, the twenty-sixth (26th) day of July, in the year one thousand 
eight hundred and eighty-nine (1889), in the presence of the 
witnesses. 
subscribing 
(Signed) 
& 
As Witnesses: 
(Signed) 
UMBANDENI, King, his X and (L.S.) 
Their 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
mark 
T'KUBA 
lIixr.Mi. 
M'T.SHASA 
JOSEBOMOU 
BOISOSA 
MAKAHLALAOA 
INCABANA 
LANGABALALA 
A'MABELE 
LUNTSHENGA 
#» 
# 
ALLISTER M. MILLER. 
CLAUDE H. VERUALL. 
A. O. GOULD. 
• I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I, this twenty-sixth day of July in the year 
Ji889, duly and truly interpreted the contents of the above document to King Umbandeni 
f^&nd to his Indunas whose names arc subscribed above. 
(Signed) E. COOPER. 
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LAPSED AND UNALLOTTED MINERALS CONCESSION 
W — 
Enclosure 2 in No. 33. 
Duly registered, 24th December 1888. 
(Signed) THKOPHILUH SHEPSTONE, 
I Resident Adviser and Agent, Swazie King. 
BE it hereby made known that I, Umbandeni, King and Paramount Chief of ; 
the Swazie nation, acting with the full consent of my Council, do hereby give, grant, 'J 
assign, and make over unto John Thorburn, his heirs, executors, administrators, and $ 
assigns, the sole, full, free, and exclusive right to prospect, mine, dig, search, or otherwiseq 
explore for gold or other minerals or precious stones on all such pieces, parcels, plots,if 
or portions of ground or country in this my kingdom of Swazieland, as have not up to \ ' 
the date hereof been granted, assigned, or apportioned as mineral concessions or rights A 
and further, the sole, full, free, and exclusive right of refusal of all such concessions, I 
mineral or otherwise, as may from time to time from the date hereof be abandoned or.r 
forfeited by the present holders ; the said John Thorburn and his foresaids in each and, * 
every instance abiding by the conditions laid down for the working and rental of such' 
concession or concessions, unless I, the said Umbandeni, or my ?- ~?*»ssors, agree to thef] 
modification of the same ; and the said John Thorburn and his . , ,jaids on discovering"' 
gold or^ftprecious stones or minerals of any description on or in any parcels or plots of ^ 
ground or country which are by these presents made over to him or them, or which mar,4 
from time to time, either by forfeiture or abandonment or noncompliance with document^ 
or agreement, become the property of the said John Thorburn or his foiesaids, shall?'* 
have the sole, full, free, and exclusive right to treat the same by machinery or otherwise, * 
according to the usages of mining in all its branches, and for the sole and exclusive C^i 
benefit of the said John Thorburn and his foresaids, to whom shall belong the full andf ~ 
undivided profits thereof. £ 
The period during which the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall enioy the4 
rights made over to him and them by these presents shall be a term of fifty (50)*?] 
years, to be reckoned from the date hereof; provided that, should he or they so desire it,*^  
the said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall obtain a renewal of the rights heifib|| 
granted for another term of fifty (50) years, subject to the same terms and conditions^ 
as herein are provided. _ ' ^1 
I As and in consideration in full for the rights hereby granted him and theffl2&be,j 
said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall yearly pay to me or to my successors in office/ 
the sum of 100/. (one hundred pounds sterling), for each and every Concession/ 
' whether mineral or otherwise, becoming the property of the said John Thorburjj 
or his foresaids, through forfeiture or abandonment of the original holder or holders, 
or his or their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, the said John Thorburn 
. shall pay to me, or my successors in office, a yearly rental as set forth in the ^ginal 
> Grant or Concession Deed of the Concession so acquired by the said John Thorburn 
or his foresaids. And, furthermore, the said John Thorburn and his foresaids hereby 
agree to pay to me or to my successors in office a bonus of 3,000/. (three thousaua 
poflnds), on the completion of" the erectiou of the first stamping machinery or batter," 
on any of the mineral concessions granted to him and his foresaids by virtue of jljhjj 
document. ,^ t< 
The said John Thorburn or his foresaids shall have the sole, full, free, and undivided, 
right to divert watercourses, dig and construct water-races, build houses and workshops,'] 
and cut, timber on each and every piece or parcel of ground on which he or. njS 
foresaids may by virtue of these presents mine, or dig for precious stones, such rights, 
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bonever, onjy to be exercised for the better development of the mineral rights and 
privileges hereby made over to him and them. 
AndViurther, the said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall have the sole and 
% xclnsive right and privilege to build stores and trade goods and liquors on such mineral 
concessions and mining lands as are by these presents granted him and them. 
And the rights hereby granted and made over to the said John Thorburn and his 
foresaids is a sole and exclusive grant and concession for the whole of Swazieland, 
whereby the said John Thorburn and his foresaids become possessed of mineral rights 
over each and every portion of this my country which has not at the date and signing 
hereof been granted for mining purposes; and further, of the sole, full, and free 
rpht to take over on the original terms, unless modified terms are mutually agreed 
upon between I, the said Umbandeni, and the said John Thorburn or his foiesaids 
all Concessions, whether mineral or otherwise, abandoned or forfeited by the original 
holders, their heirs, executors, or assigns, such rights and privileges being further 
extended to the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of the said John Thorburn. 
And, furthermore, 1, the said Umbandeni, on behalf of myself and successors, agree 
and bind myself not to grant any further mineral concession or concessions for the 
mining of and for precious stones in this my country after the date and signing of these 
presents; nor to grant a similar right for the first refusal of each and every concession 
abandoned or forfeited by the original holders, their heirs, executors, administrators, 
or assigns, to anv other person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or 
' syndicates; but, on the other hand, to forbid, disallow, and prevent any other person or 
persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates from infringing on any one or 
each of the rights and privileges for the finding and treatment of gold, and the securing 
of abandoned and forfeited concessions hereby granted to the said John Thorburn 
and his foresaids. 
The said John Thorburn and his foresaids shall have the right of disposing of and 
transferring the rights granted under this Concession, or portion of such rights, to any 
person or persons, company or companies, syndicate or syndicates, who shall thereby 
acquire all and singular the rights or portions thereof which arc enjoyed by the said 
John, Thorburn and his foresaids in respect of same. 
It is the true intent heieof that the said John Thorbuin and his foresaids shall enjoy 
and have the full, free, and undistuibed use, occupation, and enjoyment of the rights 
hereby granted him; but it is required of him that he and his foresaids shall duly 
' respect all prior lights granted by me. 
In making this Grant or Concession I do not alienate any part of my dominion, but 
reserve to myself and successors the sovereignty of the country. 
Thus done and passed at Embekelweni Kraal, Swazieland, this twenty-second day of 
December, in the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight, in the presence of 
thejsubscribed witnesses. 
', * (Signed) UMBANDINE, King, his X and (L.S.) 
Their 
T. KUBA x 
UNYCBEKA X 
HELEMI: X 
JoiiliE X 
marks. 
Witnesses:— 
(Signed) T. B. RATHBONE. 
ALLISTEK M. MILLER. 
! 
J " 
I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that the foregoing deed of Concession or Grant 
was duly and truly translated and interpreted by me to the Swazie King, Umbandeni, in 
• the presence of his Council and of the witnesses before mentiomed. 
(Signed) T. 13. RATHBONE, 
Interpreter. 
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Appendix 3d 
MEMORANDUM compiled by Lord Milner after discussions with A.M. Miller 
of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd., (28.12.1904) 
The following is a proposal, which, if accepted by the 
Governor, Mr. A. Miller is prepared to reccommend the Swaziland 
Corporation to accept for the settlement of all its claims 
under its various conditions in Swaziland, in accordance with 
the terms of Section 12 of Proclamation of 1st October, 1904. 
This proposal is not intended to exclude the Concession 
Commission. Indeed it is only the Commission which could give 
effect to it in detail. All that is desired to arrive at by the 
agreement are the lines on which the Commission would proceed 
in dealing with the particular case of the Swaziland Corporation. 
The propsal is as follows: 
The Corporation is to surrender, without compensation, all its 
concessions, on being confirmed in perpetuity in the sole and 
exclusive mineral right over certain areas, and receiving freehold 
titles to certain other areas, subject ineither case to the 
burdens imposed on mineral or land owners by the Proclamation and 
further subject, in the case of the land given to it in freehold 
to the servitudes hereinafter referred to. 
The arease over which the Corporation is to have mineral 
rights or aforesaid are those comprised in the following concessions: 
1. Forbes Reef Mineral Concession 
2. Horo Mineral Concession 
3. McNab Mineral concession 
4. Albu & Davis Mineral Concession 
5. 7/9 of Kannemeyer Mineral Concession. 
The Coroporation is only to be confirmed in mineral rights 
over these areas, to the extent to which there is no present 
conflicting claim to any of them which the Commission may deem to 
have priority over that of the Corporation, and the decision of 
the Commission as to boundaries is, in all cases, to be final 
and unquestionable. 
The land to which the Corporation is to receive freehold 
title is not to exceed 1,000,000 acres in all minus any amount 
which the Commission may set aside of the cole and exclusive 
use and occupation of the natives. In order to establish its 
right to under the agreement, the following course is to be 
pursued; 
The Corporation is to receive freehold title to all lands 
already in its possession, and in which no other land concessionaire 
has any rights, whether its claim is based on purchase or on the 
operation of the Lapsed and Unallotted Lands Concession (L.U.L.C.). 
Subject to proof of such claim and to the delimitation of boundaries, 
all these lands, minus the portion set aside for the sole and exclusive 
use and occupation of natives, are to be vested in the Corporation. 
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It is to be clearly understood that the above provision gives 
the Corporation no right to any land at present in its possession 
which the Commission may find to have been acquired by mistake 
or usurpation. 
Mr. Miller estimates the extent of the land lawfully in the 
possession of the Corporation and free from servitude, though 
of course, subject to Native rights at upwards of 500,000 acres, 
but it is not proposed that this estimate should form any part 
of the agreement of that any argument should be based on it. 
Whatever may be the amount ultimately given to the Corporation 
in freehold under the above provisions, that amount is to be 
made up to 1,000,000 acres, if possible (including any land which 
may be set apart for natives) by giving the Corporation freehold 
title. 
1. To any land, which it at present claims, either on the strength 
of the seperate documents or under the L.U.L.C., but over which 
other concessionaires have other rights, such as grazing (in the 
case or any such land, subject the proof of the Corporations's 
reversionary rights and to the delimitation of the boundaries, 
the freehold title is to be given to the Corporation; concessionaires 
being endorsed as servitudes on the title). 
2. To any land which will fall to the Corporation under the L.U.L.C. 
between this date and the end of 1939 (in any such case also, subject 
to the proof of theGoxporation's reversionary rights and to the 
delimitation of boundaries, the freehold title is to be given to 
the Corporation immediately, the rights of the present lease-holder 
or life interest holders being endorsed on the title as servitudes) 
It is to be understood that all the claims of the Corporation, 
to any lands under (1) and (2) above is to lapse, as soon as the 
Corporation has bee given freehold in an extent of land of 1,000,000 
acres in all, including the areas to be set apart for natives. 
It is also to be understood that if the land, at present in 
the possession of the Corporation, to which it suceeds in proving 
its claim, together with the lands under (1) and (2) above, to 
which it suceeds in proving its claims, do not collectively amount 
to 1,000,000 acres is only an upward limit. Moreover, whether 
the amount much land as is required for the use of natives is to 
be taken out of such amount. 
With regard to the land to be set apart for the sole and 
exclusive use and occupation of the natives, and which will be 
a deduction from any land, in which the Corporation would otherwise 
have the freehold title, the Commission is 
to determine, in every case, what amount it is reasonable to 
reserve, having regard to the requirements of the natives actually 
residing on, or habitually using any particular land. 
As however a perfectly unlimited discretion in this respect 
might make the present arrangement absolutely useless to the 
Corporation, it is proposed that the quantity of land to be reserved 
for natives should not exceed, on the average, 20 acres per native 
family, or in the aggregate 15% of the land allotted to the 
Corporation i.e. if the land reaches 1,000,000 acres not more 
than 150,000 acres. 
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It is further proposed that the Corporation should agree 
to offer not less than 50,000 acres of its freehold land to 
agricultural settlers, for purchase in installments. 
*-
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OFFICIAL GAZErEE 
OF T H E 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH AFRICA:^! 
PUBLISHEO BY AUTHORITY OP HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIOH COMMISSIONER 
Vol. XXI. JOHANNESRURQ, FRIDAY, 25TH OCTuNKR, 1907. 
. 11_ r i ml, M 
No. 812 
No. 28,of 1907.] 
PROCLAMATION 
'~** BT HIS EXCBILENCY THE HIOII COMMISSIONER. 
' • I 
r 
i">. 
i . 
WHEREAS by tlie Swaziland Ahninistiation I'rorla-mation I'JOl provisi m was made amongst other 
things for the constitution ul it Commission to ileal in 
manner provided by smli Proclamation with ronco>kions 
or grant* made by or on behnll ul' the King or I'tira-
mounl Cliiof of Swaziland HII<I rnulirmcd by the Chief 
Court established in the. s.n<l territory by the Organic 
Proclamation 18'W; 
And whereas it is expedient to amend in certain 
respects the provisions <>! the said Swaziland Adminis-
tration Proclamation 1004 relative to t'ie concessions to 
be dealt with bv the slid Commission and in particular 
to provide for the setting apart ot land foi the «ole 
and exclusive occupation of natives of tlio territory 
and the grant of freehold or other rights to persons 
holding concessions in respect of land not so set apart; 
Now therefore under and by \ i i tue of the powers 
authorities and jurisdiction conferred* upon and com-
mitted to me by His Majesty under the Swaziland Order 
in Council 190") as amendeef by the Swaziland Order in 
Council 4000 1 do hereby declare proclaim and rniko 
known as follows:— 
Dt«mtioB.. 1. in this I'roclam ition unless inconsistent 
with the context: 
" Commission " shall mean the Concessions 
Commission appointed under section 
eleven of the principal law 
•' Concessionaii e" shall mean in relation 
to a concession the holder for the time 
being of such concession. 
" Gazette " shall mean the Official Gazette 
of tlio High Commissioner. 
''Land concussion" sh.ill mean any con-
, , • cession confirmed by the Chief Court 
(other than amiiieia'i concession) which 
confers any title or tight (not being a 
light included in section twelve of the 
principal law) to land m-the use thereof 
for ugrictilliiial grazing or o her pur-
poses. 
'• Liter land concession' shall mean a 
land concession of suh-c(|iictit djte to a 
piior laud collection but cont'crimg 
rights simitar to and over the wine 
area or a pnitinn ul the name iiiv.i as 
that covered by and exercisable only 
after tlio expiry "f the rights granted 
under such prior land couiession. 
" .Mineral concession " shall mean a rou-
CCHHIOII loiilirined hy the Chief Court 
eonfirrinu a light (not being a light 
included in section tmle of the principal ! •' 
law) to minu dig sear-li or otherwise
 t \ 
explore for precious or base metals o r ; * ;.' 
coal or for precious stones'or in the \. ' 
cas« of any such concession which e o n - ' i 
• few any such right in addition to other "\, 
rights such concession tn as far as it ;.;. 
relates to such right.
 t »' 
"Principal law" shall mean the Swaziland ' 
Administration Proclamation IllOi. 
'• Pi mr land concession " shall mean a land
 v 
concession nrior in ditto to a later land 
concetsinii but conferring rights similar , 
to and over the same area or a portion / 
of the same area as that covered by the -
rights conferred by such later laud con- . 
cession. " • 
"Special Commissioner" shall mean the 
person appointed under section three of, '. 
this Proclamation. «" * ;> > , j .d 
''Territory" shall mean the territory of ., ?'- ' >r'<T.A<Sp 
Swaziland. .''« -.',*/'»&i 
PART I. , .• r , tv-.:"%. 
. - , (*>.'' V i 
ETTINO ASIDE OF LAND ron ExcujsrvE, >"'^ ^ /;'•'*< 
OCCUPATION OE NATIVES OK THE TKMUTORY. ,»-', tu "t '$$£» 
n £. . . . , .• , i i i i i - i ' '"* y A M 
SETTINO 
c 
2. Section twenty of the principal 
shall be and is hereby repealed. 
,.:..T 
law »>I>MI of'i ,* i j 
Mellon *>«*'•• 3 
HtrutUwl < v-V 
* ' • • AiliMlut.tcmr^.tJ" 
, lion I t o i l i . ' i v 
' ^ . > nuften l«M.«'$* 
' 3. The High Commissioner may from time Appoint. '*£ 
to time appoint the Resident Commissioner !!""". »' .. ^uiW 
or some other fit and proper person to be SKShMiifTnJW 
a S|ieciiil Commissioner to carry out t h e ; '"'V^ 
provisions of this part of this Proclamation.' 
The Special Commissioner shall in carrying 
out, sucti provisions art in accordance with 
the lawful directions and instruetionmf the 
High Commissioner and with any i emulations 
that inny bo from time to turn.* Iramed under 
.section etrwn. ' ., ^ 
4. (1) The Special Couitniisioner shall set s«tt'iii< »t»rt." ••'", 
apart portions-of land alKtud hy any land jJ^'J'jJJJ.a' '" 
concession or land concessions tor the sole |,y \ ^ ^ 
and exclusive us<' and occupation of natives oourMiion' 
of the territory and shall for such purjKise fi"«v«»'"l 
cause laud so fct apart to be surveyed and HM!'\1 
diagrams thereol framed at tlio cost or the 
concessionsiro or concessionaires and if 
ncutssaiy ap|iortion such costs pro rata ' 
amongst such concessionaiiet. The provisions ,' , 
ol section tixleen of the principal law shall 
»ii(/a/is mutitruiis apply to the re|>ayinent of > ^ 
such costs with int'ii'st theri-on by Instal- ;, t 
iiiniits. ' • l 
•t fl 
'3 
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i. 
v-
., • t 
t'\- . v.v- .v* 
;* t\* rroTlaton far 
J '<s Mproprla-
If'/ i • Hon of luid 
',' *.' soncttalona 
*>!"./"on »ppMca-
•r / ' , tlon of coll-
ie J' cwrionalns. 
('2) III i\etii>mg hi" dtiliei lindu tin-
s'ctlon the epical Commissioner -h.il 
demarcate one-thud ut the area ul land the 
subject of any l.n.d ror ei-sion iinUss theie 
shall he Mime -nlllcienf icuson approied \,\ 
the High ''oinioissiuner for not demarcating 
any pinion ol stub area or lor deiiiaicjlii'g 
a portion or poitions tli'icd less in extent 
than such one-third ard the site or «ite« ol 
the niea deinaicated shall ho a- the .-i>'eiui 
Commission!!' may in his discielion iletiT-
mine subject to" un appeal to the High 
Cominis-ioiier as in *iction nine is pmvidod. 
(3) The H'gh Co!iiu>i<-nioiipr uuy in ids 
disi return IC<|UIIC the Special Comn issiom r 
to demarcat" inoie than one-thud of ihe 
area of land the subject of a laud i one s<-ion; 
piovtdcd that the concessiunane slut 1 in 
such lase be entitled to be com|*nsatci| 
in respect of the extent ol aiea in 
excess of the one-third aforesaid. The 
amount of such eomp< nsatum shall in 
default of agi cement bo detci mined by an 
aibitiator appyinUd by the Chief Jii-tne ol 
the Transanal tlio rtinuuer.ilion ol such 
arhiti ator ami tl o cn.its neces-anly iru h'ental 
to arbitration piocecdings not including an\ 
costs inclined by the concessionaire heti g 
paid out ol the revenue of the tciritoiv. 
The amount of any compensation paid oi 
estimated to become payable under this 
suh-sectinn shall be recoierable Iroin all 
holders of any land or mineral concession 
or of any title to land isjuel in subaudition 
for any such concession in such propoi lion-
and in such mannei as the High Commis-
sioner ma) hereafter determine. 
(4) If no poition of Ihe area ot land the 
subject ol a land concession is domarcaled 
as aforesaid or if the poition or poitions 
demarcated do not "|iial in extent onc-tliiid 
of tho area ol land the subject of a land 
concession the High Commissioner may i cqun e 
tho Special (Jommis-sioner:— 
(a) to select a delimd piece or defined 
pieces of land which together with the 
area demarcated as aloresaid if any 
will make up such one-third and to 
demand transfer of such piece or 
pieces of land from the concessionaire.; 
or 
(6) to demand transfer from the conces-
sional! e of an undivided share of such 
lirouoition of land the subject ol his 
land concession as togither with the 
niea demarcated as aforesaid if any will 
muke up such one-third. 
Such piece or pieces of land or undivided 
sharo shall be transferred free of cost to 
the concessional! e into the name of tho 
High Commissioner who may in his discre-
tion sell the same and apply the proceeds 
of sale to reduction of any expenditure 
incurred in the exercise of the powers of 
this section or may exchange or otheiWise 
dispose of such pioce or pieces Of land or 
undivided tharo as to him may appoar 
expedient. 
(5) Any lights with legaid to piecious or 
base metals precious stones mirerals or 
mineral products exeiciseablg whether under 
a mineral concession or otherwise in respect 
of any portion of laud demarcated selected 
or transfencd under this section shall not 
be affected by such demarcation selection 
or transfer but such rights shall be subject 
to tho provisions of section ten of this 
Proclamation. 
5. A concessionaire mny after the exercise 
of tho powers of the last preceding section 
in respect of his land concessit n make 
application that such portion of land the 
subject of his land concession which has 
not been demarcated si lected or trnnsfened 
as aforesaid he expropriated and the High 
Conriii-sifiii r m.ij giant ir leluse -in Ii 
application ; pioiidcd that it -iicli application 
he gt.inted tin' punluc-i' pile.- of the poi-
tion <•>> cxiuoi'i ati d shall in delimit ol 
agieement Ii" dotoi mined b\ an arbitiator 
to lie appointed hi the Chief Justice i.l the 
Transvaal sin Ii pen e and the costs neies-
sanly incidental to such determination not 
ii'rliiduig any costs tuiiiirfd by the Coiiocs-
sionniie In ifig paid <<tit ot the general 
reienues ol the tointuiy. 
• >. All right- or inliicsts conferred upon 
a ciinccs-iiiiiaue hy his land concession shall 
in respect ol any poition ol land demarcated 
seheted or tiaii-leiied under section four 
cease and deti i mine ami MII Ii concessionaire 
shall saie as -perially pionded in sub-
section tliiei- ul the s<i't section have no 
< laim to compensation in any court of law 
or any place whatvieier m respect ol rights 
or interests so i vtingnished. Any poition 
not «o demaic.itfil seleitid or trnnsfened 
shall he freed Irom anv rght pofs»s-ed hy 
natiM'sot the teiriton t" u.-e and ouupalion 
of the «aine -ulject to the lolloping pro-
visions :— v 
(a) Knr a peiio.l of five yeais alter the 
ilem.it i .ilinii selection or transfer of land 
as aforesaid no native from lime to time 
actually ie-i'leiit on such land shall be 
rompeiled to move therelrom nor shall 
any mmii y oi other con«ideiatloti he 
exacted ti om him by a concessionaire 
in respect of his occupation thereof. 
(6) Alter such period of live years any 
native tamili may continue to occupy 
such land on such terms as mny by 
agreement with the coiuessionairc be 
deteimined. Any such agreement shall 
he subject to the confirmation of the 
Resident Commissioner, 
(c) All land the subject of n land concession 
whether demarcated selected or trans-
ferred as aloresaid or whether the same 
be I reed Irom ii'e and occupation by 
natiies shall be subject to any rights of 
way and outspau and to any tights to 
take water wood or reeds which maybe 
awarded by the Special Commissioner 
in respect ot such land and shall further 
be subject to such rights of way and 
outspau as bine been or may hereafter 
Irom time to time be by law established. 
7. If a concessionaire has under a land 
concession been granted:— 
(a) Title to the owneiship of land; or 
(6) a lease of land which with or without 
rights of leuewal is of not less than 
ninety-nine years' duration; 
there shall be issued to such concessionaire 
freehold title in respect of any portion ol 
land held under such title or lease not de-
maicated selected or transferred as aforesaid 
subj< ct to such leases and servitudes as may 
be determined by the Commission under 
suction fiflten of ti o principal law as amended 
by section fourtein of this Proclamation and 
to such other servitudes as maybe awaided 
by the Special Commissioner under the last 
preceding section; provided that if such land 
is the subiert of a later land concession tho 
concessiouaiie who is at the date of this 
Proclamation entitled to beneficial enjoyment 
of the right under his land concession for 
the longer unexpired pciiod shall have the 
prcferent right to claim freehold title under 
this seitionj provided further that if such 
concessionaire be the holder of the prior 
land concession he shall not be entitled to 
claim such freehold title unless the High 
Commissioner is satisfied that he has com-
pensated tho holder of the later land con-
cession for the \aluc of rights which, would 
by tho grant of such freehold title ho 
< ; n r ' l 
»l«>nalra * 
]»t»r*>t In 
lao<l M- I 
• |.«rt un.ler 
• • " ( I 'm 4 
t i t lh f t i iUhe i t 
att.l Un<l not 
*> v : apftit 
free 4 from 
i m t l t « new 
fllxl 
I I < apKtion 
Mtltjrct ti* 
i - i t u l n 
rrijr|i>lor.s. 
!»*ue ol 
fMHliold 
till- In 
ie*p»c« of 
land not 
"t apait 
fot natlrn. 
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extinguished. The minimi of such com-
pensation shall in tin- absein e of agieement 
l>e fixeil bv an inbitr.il'U appointed hy the 
t'hicl Justice of t i c Tiansv.'ul. 
S. Kvory giant ol ficehold title made 
uiiiler the l i - t pieceiling section «-h:t!t bo 
subject to the following conditions: that is 
to sav : — 
(<() The pi.mice shill continue p.ivmciit ol 
any iciils royalties or other u inucp due 
under the ci'i —ion on which disclaim 
to freehold title is based; provided how-
ever that in substitution lor any such 
rents louillics <>r oilier moneys" which 
are payable to the Swaziland Adminis-
tration the giaiitee may be required to 
pay 'piitreut ol such amount and atsuch 
pi'iioos as may be fixed by legulation ; 
(l>) The grantee shall mil by virtue of the 
grant become entitled to receive any 
lents royalties or other moneys payable 
under aiiy concession affecting the land 
included in Ihe grant or any portion of 
such land which he was not entitled to 
icceive by \ i i tue of the concession on 
., which his i laim to Ireehold title is based ; 
'. ' (o) the gi.intee shall in the event of his 
•; , , . ' failing lenelicially to occupy the land 
by himself or one or more white1 male 
substitutes of lull age to the satisfaction 
of the High Commissioner bo liable to 
pay to the Swaziland Administration 
fines of such amounts and at such periods 
as may be fixed bv regulation; 
(d) all lights to precious or base metals 
precious s tums minerals mid minetal 
pioducts shall he excluded from the 
gran t ; with the exeeiitiou of any such 
rights which arc «peciltcallv granted bv 
the concession on which th» grantee's 
claim to freehold title is based; 
(e) such other conditions not b- ing incon-
sistent with the conditions above-inen-
lioncd as are by the laws of tho Trans-
anal imphed in* grants ol Crown land. 
The term " t h e g inntee" as used in this 
section shall be deemed to include any 
persori who is the giantee's successor iii 
title to any land included in a grant or 
any portion of such land. 
9. An appeal shall lie to the High Com-
missioner against any exercise hy tho Special 
Commissioner of the powers ol this part of 
this Proclamation but there shall be no 
other appeal against any exercise by the 
Special Commissioner of such powers and 
the decision of the High Commissioner shall 
' be final. 
10. (1) Tho High Commissioner may from 
time to time by notice in the Gazelle define 
areas which arc occupied by or are in the 
neighbourhood of native kiaals of special 
importance or are the sites of the giavrs of 
native chiels as protected areas and notwith-
standing anything contained in any mineral 
concession it shall not be lawful to cany 
on any prospecting or mining operations iii 
such piotected aieas. 
('2> The exercise of rights under mineral 
concessions shall be subject in all respects 
to such restrictions on the disturbance of 
or interference with water buildings works 
kraals cultivated lands and other improve-
ments and to such provisions as to com-
pensation for any such distiubarice or 
interference as the High Commissioner may 
hereafter from time to time by Proclamation 
determine. 
11. The High Commissioner may from 
time to time make niter and rescind legu-
lations not inconsistent with the: provisions 
of this part of this Proclamation as to the 
amounts and times of payment of quitrents 
I a n l lines mentioned in section ei'jht md 
ge i ie i .d l i loi' Ihe better carrying out of the 
object*, .ind purp i se s ol this part of this 
I'rui lam i lmn. 
PART II. 
(iKS'UlAI. \MI NhMF.VrS OK THE SWAZILAND 
AliMIN|S||l\TIOS PlIOCl.AMATIllN 1904. 
I'J. ( I ) N i lion I'-n of the principal law 
shall be an I is hereby amended by tho 
niseiticiii at ihe end tljcrcol of the following 
word • :— 
" \VI ore any such concession or grant was 
so corilii iiicd in part onlv the same shall 
not he recognised by any Court of Law 
except to the extent of such limited 
conliriiiatioii. And such additional words 
shall he deemed to have been inserted 
•it the dale of tho taking effect of the 
principal law. 
111. Whenever in section fourteen of the 
principal law tlio woids "President of the 
Uomuussion" occur the words ' ' the Commis-
sion" shall be substitute I therefor; and 
wlieuevei in tlie principal law the term 
"Resident Magistrate" occurs the same shall 
bo doomed to moan the Resident Commissioner 
appointed under the Swaziland Administra-
tion Proclamation 1!HI7. 
I i . Section ftfU-i'ii of the principal law 
shall be and is hereby amended:— 
(a) Hy the addition to tho erul 'of sub-
section one thereof of, Ihe following 
words:— 
" And any dec ision ol the Commission 
under this section shall forthwith be 
tiansmiltcd in wiiting to the Registrar 
of Heeds by tho President;" 
(6) by theadditiori thereto of the following 
new sub-sections:— 
(3) " I t shall be lawful lor the Com-
mission Irom time to time to appoint 
any member thereof or any duly qualified 
surveyor to take; evidence on oath on 
nnv question relating to the boundaries 
of tho hind affected by any concession 
and tho record of any evidence so taken 
shall be made by or under the super-
vision of the pei sou so apixiintod and 
authenticated bv him and the evidences 
so recorded shalf bo doomed to beevldcnce 
taken before the Commission. Any person 
appointed by tho Commission to take 
evidence under this sub-section shall have 
and exorcise-all the powers privileges 
and jurisdiction conferred bv the Com-
missions Powcis Oidiuance 1002." 
(41 "Tho Commission shall further 
inquire into and deride the extent to 
which any concession the boundaries of 
which have been determined under sub-
section (1) of this section is registcrablc 
(it at all) as a servitude or leato against 
any other concession the boundaries ol 
which have heo.ii similarly determined 
and upon receipt ed' such decision bv 
by the Registrar of Deeds such officer 
, shall cause the necessary ontrios to be 
made in his registers and endorsements 
to be made on the cony of each jurli 
concession which is filed in his oflice 
and also on the registered copy of the 
holder of each such concession. Within 
two mouths or sin Ii lurther time as 
the High Ornmissioner may allow ol 
the notification to any such holder of 
any decision by tho Commission under 
this sub-section the holder of any con-
cession allected by «-url| decision shall 
AncMtclmtiit 
of viMlon 10 
or SwaiiUii.l 
Ailmlblalra-
llon ,, 
Proolama- i. 
Il»n ItcM. 
.Meaning uf 
leriua ilaecl 
In Stratlland 
Atlmlnlilr*. 
• bin 
I'roflasia-
llou 1IXM 
A mewi. 
nii'nia of and 
a.lilitlona to 
•"lion IS et 
Straillaiui 
Aitiulnlatrar 
lli.it 
Proclama-
tion 1904. 
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APPENDIX : 4b GREY'S CARRYING CAPACITY ESTIMATES 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Area(Acres). 
2,776 
40, 
5, 
56 
95 
42, 
20, 
14 
17, 
26, 
55 
65 
40, 
21, 
58, 
27, 
100, 
25 
7 
11 
61 
27 
10. 
13, 
11 
49 
144 
118 
20 
67 
258 
15 
,586 
617 
645 
,162 
,344 
,607 
230 
711 
670 
337 
348 
102 
903 
370 
338 
336 
973 
,224 
,762 
,301 
,985 
865 
266 
222 
,264 
,854 
614 
798 
632 
997 
952 
Esti mated 
Population Stock 
469 
5,411 
371 
6,293 
10,570 
4,704 
1,715 
476 
1,687 
2,219 
6,146 
10,892 
4,452 
1,827 
5,558 
3,647 
11,151 
1,729 
1,204 
2,611 
8,169 
2,667 
1,036 
882 
777 
4,690 
9,660 
11,298 
1,155 
9,016 
24,668 
2,128 
159,278 
335 
3,865 
265 
4,495 
7,550 
3,360 
1,225 
340 
1,205 
1,585 
4,390 
7,780 
3,180 
1,305 
3,970 
2,605 
7,965 
1,235 
860 
1,865 
5,835 
1,905 
740 
630 
555 
3,350 
6,900 
8,070 
825 
6,440 
17,620 
1,520 
113,770 
Area/ 
Family 
41 
53 
106 
63 
63 
63 
84 
209 
73 
84 
63 
42 
63 
84 
74 
52 
63 
105 
42 
31 
53 
73 
73 
105 
101 
74 
105 
74 
126 
53 
73 
52 
1946 
Population 
1,430* 
5 
5 
6 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
10 
7 
3 
1 
5 
3 
14 
1 
1 
1 
11 
2, 
1, 
5 
8 
5 
1 
6 
18 
3 
148 
,652* 
— 
230 
,610 
,800 
,500 
,990* 
,860* 
,910* 
,100* 
,030 
,980 
,960* 
,940* 
,970* 
,300* 
,060 
,260* 
030 
940* 
620 
100* 
900* 
860* 
,530* 
,120 
,140 
240* 
,040 
940 
,580* 
,381 
Stock 
a . 
11,446* 
675* 
10,983* 
17 
5 
2 
1 
3 
4 
16 
18 
6 
3 
14 
7 
20 
3 
1, 
3, 
17, 
3, 
2, 
1, 
1 
12 
23 
17 
1 
12 
45, 
4 
297 
,176* 
,961* 
,367* 
,627* 
,199* 
,902* 
208* 
,322* 
,502* 
,559* 
,583* 
,919* 
329* 
000* 
,673* 
118* 
398* 
380* 
362* 
894* 
243* 
,241* 
,638* 
,699* 
,621* 
909* 
010* 
536* 
,480 
* 1946 Figures ^ Grey's Carrying Capacity 
Source : S.N.A. D/09/2 
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APPENDIX 4c : EXTRACT FROM GREY'S NOTES 
SECTION Ilia NATIVE AREA NO. 2 
This area is chosen so as to include the country in which the 
graves of the Kings Ludonga, Mbandini & Bhunu are situated, and to 
include the kraals of the chief Zulongangeni, the custodian of the 
graves, and his son Dinabantu who will succeed him. 
I am satisfied that I have included all the country reverenced 
by the Swazi Nation in respect of the graves of these three Kings 
though the information I obtained as to their exact situation was 
rather vague owing to Zulongangeni's reluctance to give any but 
very general information. But this is a point on which I hope to 
get more exact information later. 
All of this area chosen in connection with the graves is very 
rugged rocky mountain and completely uninhabited, but the neigh-
bourhood of Zulongangeni and Dinabantu's kraals while hilly are in 
places fairly fertile and capable of considerable agriculture while 
the valley of the Mbuluzi contains much cultivated land. 
My inspection of this Section has shewn me that it will be 
necessary to alter the proposed partition north of the Mbuluzi in 
Section II so as to include both sides of the Mbuluzi valley in an 
area giving more contiguous land to Zulongangeni and his people. 
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APPENDIX 4 d : GREY'. CARRYING CAPACITY CALCULATIONS 
Grey arrived at his estimates as follows : 
1. Estimate of Total Swazi Population 
a. Total number of males over 18 from tax records = 23,204 
b. Assumes these are 50% of the male population = 46,408 
c. Assumes the number of males is less than females 
d. Formula for total population = 4J$ X over 18 males 
e. TOTAL POPULATION = 104,418 
2. Increase of Swazi Population 
a. Selborne and Grey agreed a 50% margin of increase. 
b. TOTAL POTENTIAL POPULATION = 156,627 
3. Land Required for Agriculture 
a. Estimates average family size as 7 
"whether 7 is a correct average or not is of no importance 
What matters is that the amount of land estimated as 
capable of supporting a native family in each area should 
be able to provide food and grazing for the stock of a 
group of 7 natives" 
b. Total number of families is 156,627/7 = 22,372 
c. Estimates Land Productivity 
i.Assumes each family of 7 consumes 21bs each per day of grain food 
grown on own land (14 lbs). 
ii.Total annual requirement per family is 14 X 365 = 5110 lbs/year 
iii.Best land in Swaziland "cultivated by native methods" yields 
1000 lb grain food/acre/annum. 
iv.Concludes a minimum of 5 acres cultivation each season is 
necessary to supply a family with food for a year. 
d. Cropping Frequency 
Assumes Swazi crop fields for 3 years and fallow for 2-3 years. 
Thus minimum agricultural land requirement should be doubled 
e. TOTAL AGRICULTURAL LAND REQUIRED : minimum 10 acres/family of 7. 
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4d (Cont.) 
4. Land Required for Grazing 
a. Estimates number of cattle held as 5/7 population. This takes 
into account the decimation of rinderpest and east coast fever : 
"The Swazi being a stock loving people will undoubtedly try, 
once east coast fever is stamped out,to take every opportunity 
to acquire new herds. It is necessary to provide sufficient 
land for the grazing of a normal quantity of stock not 
found in Swaziland under the present abnormal conditions" 
b. Could not verify empirically the carrying capacity of land 
Estimated an average 13 acres per head was necessary. 
c. Concludes areas chosen can carry 5/7 population 
5. Examined chosen areas with theoretical figures in mind. Concluded 
that a TOTAL POPULATION of 159,278 could be supported (a 52%% 
increase). 
Total stock carrying capacity : 113,770. 
226 
APPENDIX FIVE 
1907 SWAZI DELEGATION PETITION 
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APPENDIX 5 
The humble petition of Malunge Nkosi,Nogcogco Nkosi,Mamkiniki Kambule, 
Josiah Vilikazi and Heheraiah Vilikazi on behalf of themselves,the Chief 
Regent,the Councillors and people of the Swazi Nation. 
SHEWETH : -
The Independence of the Swazie Nation was recognised by the 
Governments of Great Britain and of the South African Republic by 
the Conventions of London of 1881 and 1884. 
In October 1889 King Umbandini died,and on the 18th of December 
1889 the Queen Regent,the Headmen and Councillors of the Swazie Nation 
(the new king Bhunu being a boy of tender years) issued a Proclamation 
creating a Provisional Government Committee with powers defined by the 
said Proclamation but which poweres in effect related exclusively 
to jurisdiction over persons of European birth or extraction and over 
matters and things in which any such persons were concerned. 
In July 1890 a convention was entered into between Great Britain 
and the South African Republic by which the independence of the Swazies 
as recognised by the 1881 and 1884 conventions was affirmed. The 
Provisional Government Committee was with the consent of the Swazie 
Government continued in its powers subject to certain conditions one 
of which was that a Judicial inquiry should be held into the validity 
of the Concessions granted by King Umbandine and with the like consent 
of the Swazie Government a special Court was established to exercise 
jurisdiction over Europeans - Articles 5,6 and 10 of the said 
Convention were in the following words:-
Article 5.Saving all existing rights the sovereignty and 
ownership of the Swazie Nation in respect of all land within the 
boundaries of Swazieland shall be recognised and respected,but no 
disposition of any such land,or any right in respect of any such 
land,and no grant or concession whereby any privileged or exclusive 
right is granted or conceded,or any right directly or indirectly 
interfering with the powers and jurisdiction of the Government 
Committee,shall after the date of such organic Proclamation be 
recognised as of any validity unless it shall be made with the 
approval of Her Majesty's High Commissioner and of the State President 
of the South African Republic. 
Article 6.The control and management by the Swazie Government 
of all affairs in which natives only are concerned shall remain 
unaffected by such organic Proclamation as aforesaid,and shall be 
regulated according to native laws and customs,save in so far as 
by such laws and customs any danger may arise affecting good and 
orderly government under the provisions of the organic Proclamation 
aforesaid. 
Article 10. The Government of the South African Republic 
withdraws all claim to extend the territory of the Republic or to 
enter into treaties with any natives or native tribes to the north 
or north-west of the existing boundary of the Republic,and undertakes 
to aid and support by its favouring influence establishment of order 
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and government in those territories by the British South Africa 
Company within the limits of power and territory set forth in the 
Charter granted by Her Majesty to the said Company. 
Save as provided by the last mentioned Convention the late South 
African Republic neither possessed nor exercised any rights of 
legislation,jurisdiction or administration over Swazieland either 
in law or in fact by the said South African Republic by agreement 
or otherwise,or became binding upon the Swazie Nation. 
Your petitioners admit that the late South African Republic 
was conquered by Your Majesty's Forces and was annexed to and now 
forms part of your Majesty's Colonial Possessions but Your Petitioners 
deny and are ready to prove that no rights or powers over the territory 
of Swazieland ever passed to Great Britain by the conquest and 
annexation of the South African Republic and that the independence 
of Swazieland recognised by the Conventions of London of 1881 and 
1884 has not been otherwise destroyed or impaired. 
In June 1903 shortly after the South African War Your Majesty 
on the advice of the then Secretary of State for the Colonies by the 
Swazieland Order in Council 1903 was pleased to invest His Excellency 
the Governor of the Transvaal with all powers and jurisdiction which 
your Majesty by the conquest and annexation of the South African 
Republic may have possessed within Swazieland. This Order in Council 
proceeded upon the assumption that the late South African Republic 
had exercised rights and powers of legislation and jurisdiction over 
Swazieland and that these rights by r son of the said annexation 
passed to and became invested in your Majesty. The Swazie Government 
has always protested against the issue and execution of this Order 
in Council. 
Your petitioners are now threatened in the execution of this 
Order in Council with a confiscation to your Majesty of all Swazie 
territory, the annihilation of all their rights and interests as well 
as the confiscation of the revenue of the King and government and the 
destruction of the national life and political independence of the 
race. Your Majesty's Resident Commissioner has proclaimed to the 
Swazie Nation that the policy of the future will partition the country 
into allotments and inter alia make grants of land in freehold and 
other tenure to concessionaires and others and will retain other 
portions of the land as Crown Lands and set apart certain areas as 
tribal lands for the use of the native race and will altogether 
exclude the native race from the ownership of all minerals underlying 
the said lands or any part thereof and will also after a period of 
five years exclude the native race from the use and occupation of any 
lands they now enjoy which may become the subject of any such 
Crown grants ; 
Your petitioners humbly pray : 
That Your Most Excellent Majesty will be graciously pleased to 
take this petition into Your Most Gracious Consideration and refer 
the same to a Commission or Board of Your Majesty's Privy Council 
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or to some such other competent Tribunal to inquire and report as 
to the truth of the recitals contained in Swazieland Order In Council 
1903 and otherwise to determine the validity of the said Order and 
if it shall appear that the said Order ought not to have been made 
or that it is contrary to International Law that Your Majesty will 
be pleased to revise,alter or vary the said Order or that Your 
Petitioners may have such further and other relief in the promises 
Your Majesty in Your great wisdom may seem meet. 
And your petitioners will ever pray,etc. 
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